



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
475 ALLENDALE ROAD  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

JUL 09 1991

Docket No. 50-336  
File Number RI-91-A-0077

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
ATTN: Mr. E. J. Mroczka  
Senior Vice President - Nuclear  
Engineering and Operations Group

P.O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Mroczka:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently received information concerning activities at the Millstone Nuclear Power Facility, Unit 2. The details are enclosed for your review and followup.

We request that the results of your review and disposition of these matters be submitted to Region I within 30 days of the date of receipt of this letter. We request that your response contain no personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so it can be released to the public and placed in the NRC Public Document Room. If necessary, such information shall be contained in a separate attachment which will be withheld from public disclosure. The affidavit required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) must accompany your response if proprietary information is included. Please refer to file number RI-91-A-0077 when providing your response.

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
K/53

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

2

Your cooperation with us is appreciated. We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this information.

Sincerely,

  
Charles W. Heil, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: ~~(10 CFR 2.90(a) Information)~~

cc w/ encl:  
Public Document Room (PDR)  
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)  
State of Connecticut

bcc w/ encl:  
W. Raymond, SRI, Milstone  
Allegation File, RI-91-A-~~103~~ 0077  
J. Stewart  
E. Kelly  
T. Shedlosky

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE~~

ENCLOSURE

Issue

The wiring diagram for the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps B and C Common Discharge Header Isolation Valve (2 SI-654) was found not to reflect actual plant conditions. Specifically, contacts 12 and 13, designated "spare" on the drawing are energized with 120 VAC. The wiring diagram evidently had not been updated as part of a modification done under Project Assignment 84-63 which had used the contacts. An additional concern exists in the fact that preventive maintenance activities have been routinely performed in the past with no one reporting voltage at contacts 12 and 13.

Request

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If any deficiencies are identified in wiring diagrams and or drawings, or in the procedural control of preventive maintenance activities, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence. Please provide us with an assessment of the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.

RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Millstone

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: RI-91-A-0079

Chairman - J. T. Wiggins

DATE: 8 MAY 91 (Mtg.  2  3  4  5)

Branch Chief - F. C. Wenzinger

PRIORITY: High  Medium  Low

Section Chief (AOC) - E. M. Kelly

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - C. W. White R. L. Nimitz

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD  SC

D. J. Holody J. S. Stewart

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes  No  
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

R. C. Brady R. L. Fuhrmeister

IS THEIR A DOL FINDING: Yes  No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION:

- 1) Write letter to utility asking if it is true that procedure was released for use and was unusable in the field
- 2) letter to allegor stating that specific technical concern has been resolved, we are looking into matter of procedure adequacy, will inform him
- 3) refer matter of EQ status of thermo couple connections to utility
- 4) refer inadequate dwngs in PDOR to utility
- 5) refer NI spiking to licensee

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

K154

RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Hillstone

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: RI-91-A-0082

Chairman - J.T. Wiggins

DATE: 8 May 91 (Mtg. 1 2 3 4 5)

Branch Chief - E.C. Wenzinger

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

Section Chief (AOC) - E.M. Kelly

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - R.C. Brady

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD BC SC

R.G. Schaaf

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No  
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

R.L. Fuhrmeister

IS THEIR A DOL FINDING: Yes No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION:

1) close level detectors based on resident report  
writup

2) refer discrepancy in drawing to licensee

3) \_\_\_\_\_

4) \_\_\_\_\_

5) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_

K/55



RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Millstone

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: R1-91-A-83

Chairman - J. T. Wiggins

DATE: 8 MAY 91 (Mtg. ① 2 3 4 5)

Branch Chief - E. C. Wenzinger

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

Section Chief (AOC) - E.M. Kelly

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - C.W. White R.C. Brady

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD BC SC

J.A. Cullings J.S. Stewart

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No  
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

R.G. Schaaf P.L. Fuhrmeister

IS THEIR A DOL FINDING: Yes No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION:

1) Respond in writing that event is being reviewed  
by residents, allegation of backbiting AWO unsubstantiated

2) Previous occurrence was at Millstone 2

3) \_\_\_\_\_

4) \_\_\_\_\_

5) \_\_\_\_\_

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

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RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Millstone

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: RI-91-A-0084

Chairman - J. T. Wiggins

DATE: May 91 (Mtg. ① 2 3 4 5)

Branch Chief - \_\_\_\_\_

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

Section Chief (AOC) - E. M. Kelly

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - J. S. Stewart

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD BC SC

R. L. Fuhrmeister

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No  
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

IS THERE A DOL FINDING: Yes No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION:

1) Refer to licensee issue of unsatisfactory response from management

2) \_\_\_\_\_

3) \_\_\_\_\_

4) \_\_\_\_\_

5) \_\_\_\_\_

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

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RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Millstone

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: R1-91-A-0086

Chairman - J.T. Wiggins

DATE: 8 MAY 91 (Mtg. 1 2 3 4 5)

Branch Chief - \_\_\_\_\_

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

Section Chief (AOC) - E.M. Kelly

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - J.P. Durr

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD BC SC

J.S. Stewart

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No  
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

R.L. Fuhrmeister

IS THERE A DOL FINDING: Yes No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION:

1) Send a specialist (DRS) to read radiograph  
and look at UT information

2) \_\_\_\_\_

3) \_\_\_\_\_

4) \_\_\_\_\_

5) \_\_\_\_\_

NOTES: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

K/60





UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
475 ALLENDALE ROAD  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

JUL 07 1991

Docket Nos. 50-336  
File Number RI-91-A-0082

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
ATTN: Mr. E. J. Mrocza  
Senior Vice President - Nuclear  
Engineering and Operations Group

P.O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Mrocza:

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Your cooperation with us is appreciated. We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this information.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Mehl, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

9106140213

Enclosure: (10 CFR 2.790(a) Information)

ENCLOSURE

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE~~

*Issue 1:*

*The wiring diagrams involving Reactor Coolant Pump RTD circuits have not been updated following modifications made under a PDCR to replace RTD circuit knife switches with Weidmuller Test Blocks. Drawing No. 25203-31069, Sheet 5, Rev. 3, dated August 29, 1989, does not reflect the change for at least 4 RTD circuits (TCD, TCC, TCA, TCB). The instrument loop diagrams (Drawing No. 25203-28500, Sheets 140 & 146) show the Weidmuller Test Blocks. Also, in Drawing number 25203-31069, Sheet 5, the jumpers shown between cable lead 1 and the cable shield ground on the loop diagrams are not shown. In addition, access to the GRITs system, to verify the latest drawing revisions, is restricted in that personal access codes are only valid for 30 days.*

**Request 1:**

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If discrepancies are found, please assess the significance of the discrepancies with respect to plant operation and safety and discuss any actions taken or planned to correct these discrepancies.

*Issue 2:*

*The Steam Generator No. 2 mid-loop instrumentation (L-122) was not "operable" during drain-down for tube inspections on May 2, 1991. GEM switches were found to be "frozen" on in place. In addition, L-112 had an electronic noise problem caused by an improperly installed jumper. Thus licensee commitment that two monitors be operable during drain down condition was not being met.*

**Request 2:**

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If any discrepant conditions are identified, please discuss their significance with respect to plant operation and safety during the Steam Generator No. 2 drain-down evolution. Also please discuss any actions taken or planned to correct these deficiencies.

*TO CIA 2.7.99 Information*

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*Issue 3:*

*Pressure indicating instrument (PI 6350 A/B and PI 6351 A/B) and mountings for service water (SW) supply to emergency diesel generators (EDG) are not seismically mounted. Any kind of shock would be sufficient to knock the gauge and valve off of the strainer. Additionally, the location of the taps as shown on the P&ID apparently does not coincide with the actual tap locations.*

**Request 3:**

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If the assertions are valid, please discuss their effect on the safe operation of SW supply to the EDG. Please provide any actions taken or planned to ensure that seismic requirements for these instruments are being met.

*Issue 4:*

*On May 3, 1991, the Unit 2 Stack Radiation Monitor (RM 8132) was inoperable as a result of being flooded with water. This monitor would have been inoperable anyway, as air flow had been isolated. Filling and pressure testing of Steam Generator (SG) #1 was underway during the same time period. Problems with valve line-ups for the rad monitor and the SG testing contributed to the flooding and monitor inoperability. Additionally, health physics (HP) controls during removal of the water from the monitor was inadequate resulting in contamination of personnel.*

**Request 4:**

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If discrepancies are confirmed, please discuss actions that you have taken or will take to ensure that plant procedures regarding rad monitor operation, conduct of tests, and HP activities are being used properly.

*Issue 5:*

*Procedure discrepancies exist between OP-2336E and SP-2617A for the restoration of the line-up of the radiation monitor (RE-245), and its associated sample pump. Operators routinely fail to perform OP-2336E, Section 5.1, Step 5.1.13 which is to immediately close AOV-244A/B and AOV-245 when securing from condensate polishing facility discharges. This failure to follow procedures results in the sample pump to radiation monitor (RM-245) continuing to operate when the tank discharge is secured.*

**Request 5:**

Please discuss the validity of the above assertions. If any discrepancies are identified concerning procedure noncompliance, please discuss their significance on the operation of radiation monitor RM-245. Please discuss any corrective actions taken or planned, to ensure operators are meeting procedural and technical specification requirements.

**Issue 6:**

*The following discrepancies have been identified during an evaluation of Work Order AWO-M2-91-04411. These discrepancies identify continued non-compliance with procedures and poor response of operations and management to recurring problems with radiation monitor RE-245.*

- a. *The sample pump continues to run when the tank discharge stops at 15% tank level (TK-11).*
- b. *The "Low Flow" switch does not always see a low flow condition when TK-10 and TK-11 discharge pumps stop. The head of water in the pipe and tidal conditions affect the flow of water.*
- c. *Operations normally rely on the 15% tank level pump trip to stop flow causing a low flow to trip shut RE-245 discharge valve, and AOV-245. If AOV-244A/B are shut and no low flow condition exists, RE-245 sample pump will continue to run until AOV-245 is shut.*
- d. *Changes to OP-2336E were identified in 1989 to prevent the problems identified by AWO-M2-91-04411. However continued identified procedure non-compliance by operations has caused repeated problems.*

**Request 6:**

Please provide an assessment of the above discrepant conditions. If the assertions are valid, please discuss their safety significance and effect on operation of radiation monitor RE-245. Please discuss any corrective actions that are being used to correct the problems.

bcc w/encl: 5  
Allegation File, (6) RI-91-A-0082, 0084, 0085, 0096, 0099, ~~0105~~  
T. Shedlosky, SRI, Millstone  
J. Stewart  
E. Kelly  
W. Raymond

K/56





UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
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JUL 07 1991

Docket Nos. 50-336  
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Senior Vice President - Nuclear  
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
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9106140215  
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~~TO CFR 2.709 Information~~

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**Request 6:**

Please provide an assessment of the above discrepant conditions. If the assertions are valid, please discuss their safety significance and effect on operation of radiation monitor RE-245. Please discuss any corrective actions that are being used to correct the problems.

bcc w/encl: 5  
Allegation File, (6) RI-91-A-0081, 0084, 0085, 0096, 0099, 0185  
T. Shedlosky, SRI, Millstone  
J. Stewart  
E. Kelly  
W. Raymond

K/59