

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos.: 50-317/92-22
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
License Nos.: DPR-53
DPR-69


Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland

Inspection Conducted: August 17 - 21, 1992

Inspector:  9-3-92
R. J. Albert, Physical Security Inspector Date

Approved by:  9-3-92
R. R. Keimig, Chief Date
Safeguards Section
Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Areas Inspected: Management Support and Security Program Plans; Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Packages; Testing and Maintenance; and Security Training and Qualification.

Results: The licensee's program was directed toward ensuring public health and safety and was in compliance with the NRC requirements in the areas inspected. Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made. No safety concerns or violations of regulatory requirements were identified.

DETAILS

1.0 Key Personnel Contacted

1.1 Licensee

- * J. Alvey, Assistant General Supervisor
- H. Ashby, Security Maintenance Planner
- * M. Cox, Security Program Specialist
- * D. Dean, Security Training Specialist
- * J. Entz, Security Shift Supervisor
- D. Fontz, Senior Computer Project Administrator
- * J. Frost, Security Shift Supervisor
- * L. Gibbs, Director, Nuclear Security
- B. Hall, Security Maintenance Technician
- * P. Hines, Security Training Specialist
- * J. Kennedy, Supervisor, Security Training and Support
- B. O'Conner, Principle Facilities Project Administrator
- * C. Schertle, Security System Analyst
- * J. Volkoff, Engineer - Compliance

1.2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- * A. Howe, Resident Inspector

* indicates those present at the exit meeting

The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.

2.0 Management Support and Security Program Plans

2.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be adequate by the inspector. This determination was based upon the inspector's review of various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection, as documented in this report.

2.2 Security Program Plans

The inspector verified that changes to the licensee's Security, Contingency, and Guard Training and Qualification Plans, as implemented, did not decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, and had been submitted in accordance with NRC requirements.

The inspector met with licensee security and project personnel on August 17, 1992, to discuss details of a major upgrade to and expansion of the security program, which includes the security system interface with the on-site independent spent fuel storage facility. Based on discussions and a walkdown of work done to date, the project appeared to be well thought-out and, as implemented, did not pose any visible security concerns. Transition planning, including project tasks, scope of work, compensatory measures and potential impact on the plant, was detailed in a document titled "CCNPP Security Systems Upgrade Project Transition Plan." The licensee intends to submit this document to the NRC, to augment a previously submitted security plan change, in the near future. However, the security system interface with the on-site independent spent fuel storage facility appeared to be modified from that which formed the bases for NRC approval of the previously submitted plan. This will be discussed with the lead NRC reviewer for the facility.

3.0 Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids

3.1 Protected Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on August 18, 1992, and determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved physical security plan (the Plan).

3.2 PA Detection Aids

The inspector observed the licensee conduct scheduled tests of the PA perimeter intrusion detection aids on August 19, 1992. The inspector determined that the detection aids were installed and maintained as committed to in the Plan. However, one of the zones that was tested was effective in only 29 out of 30 test sequences. The licensee's testing criteria requires a 100 percent detection rate. The licensee promptly took appropriate compensatory measures and, within 1.5 hours, the detection aid was repaired and tested satisfactorily. The inspector's review of testing documentation determined that the zone had tested satisfactorily on numerous previous occasions.

3.3 Isolation Zones

The inspector verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.

3.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that they were installed and operated as committed to in the Plan.

3.5 PA and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on August 19, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that lighting in the PA and isolation zones was adequate.

Other than the PA detection aid isolated failure previously mentioned, no deficiencies were identified in this area.

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Packages

4.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and vital areas (VAs). This determination was based on the following:

- 4.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of access badges and key cards.
- 4.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan.
- 4.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs display their access badges as required.
- 4.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee has escort procedures for visitors in the PA and VAs.

4.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that are brought into the PA and the main access control portal. The inspector observed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.

No deficiencies were noted in this area.

5.0 Testing and Maintenance

The inspector reviewed testing and maintenance records and confirmed that the records committed to in the Plan were on file and readily available for NRC and licensee review. The plant provides computer maintenance personnel to conduct preventive and corrective maintenance. In addition, the security organization created its own maintenance support unit in May of 1992. The support unit consists of a security-system analyst, a security-system planner and a security-maintenance technician. The support unit performs all testing of security systems and also conducts preventive and corrective maintenance on security-system hardware, such as doors and barriers. The inspector found the work being accomplished by the support group to be noteworthy.

A check of repair records indicated that maintenance and testing were generally accomplished within one day. The inspector observed good teamwork between computer maintenance personnel and the security maintenance support unit.

There were no deficiencies identified in this area.

6.0 Security Testing and Qualification

The inspector selected at random and reviewed the training and qualification records for 12 security-force members, including supervisory personnel. Their physical and firearms qualifications records were also inspected.

During the inspection, the licensee conducted an emergency preparedness drill. The inspector observed the security organization's involvement in the drill. While the scenario was unrealistic in that it did not result in a degradation of security systems, the security organization recognized that degradations would have occurred and took appropriate actions.

The inspector also observed members of the security force conduct night firearms training.

There were no deficiencies identified in this area.

7.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on August 21, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented.