

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-454/85005

Docket No. 50-454

License No. CPPR-130

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: February 6-12, 1985

Inspector: *J. M. Ulie*
J. M. Ulie

2/26/85
Date

Approved By: *L. A. Reyes*
L. A. Reyes, Acting Chief
Operational Program Section

2/26/85
Date

Inspection Summary







Inspection on February 6-12, 1985 (Report No. 50-454/85005(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Special inspection to verify corrective actions taken in response to findings identified in inspection reports 50-454/84-82(DRS), 50-454/84-74(DRS), 50-454/84-60(DRS), and 50-454/83-62(DRS). The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector, including 2 inspector-hours during off-shifts.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)



DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)

P. Anthony, Technical Staff
R. Cassidy, Station Fire Marshal
L. DelButterfield, Nuclear Service Technical Manager
C. Diaz, Technical Staff
T. Maiman, Manager of Products
T. Nodzinski, Quality Assurance Engineer
J. Pausche, Technical Staff
R. Pleniewicz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
E. Schlosser, Byron Project Manager
M. Snow, Assistant Technical Staff Superintendent
T. Tulon, Operating Engineer
R. Tuetken, Startup Superintendent
R. Ward, Assistant Superintendent Administrator and Support Services

All individuals noted above attended the exit meeting of February 8, 1985.

2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Noncompliance (454/84-82-01(DRS)): The licensee failed to provide and maintain the following aspects of the approved fire protection program:
- (1) Operator Training - Training of all operations personnel required to implement the post fire safe shutdown method and supplemental procedures had not been accomplished as required by Sections 3.1.b.(7), 3.2.d.(10), 3.3.a and 3.4.b. of the Byron Fire Protection Report. The inspector verified through the review of ten individuals (Shift Engineer, Shift Foreman, Nuclear Station Operators, Equipment Attendants and Station Control Room Engineer) training records that training sessions had been conducted on plant operating procedures numbered 1-BOA-PRI-5, 1-BOA-ELEC-3, and 1-BOA-ELEC-5 and completed as of February 8, 1985 with the exception of one individual who was to complete his training on February 11, 1985.
 - (2) Communications - Suitable portable radio communications were not provided to support safe shutdown as required by Section 3.6.G. of the fire protection report and Section 9.5.1.4 of the SER Supplement No. 5. The inspector requested the licensee to perform a radio test from the remote shutdown panel to the Division II 4KV Switchgear room and to the 1A Diesel Generator room. This test was performed with clear verbal and adequate volume of voice communications taking place on February 7, 1985.
 - (3) Emergency Lighting - Adequate Emergency lighting to support safe shutdown was not provided as required by Section 3.5.G. of the fire protection report and Section 9.5.1.4 of the SER Supplement

No. 5. The inspector verified that the emergency lighting unit located at the remote shutdown panel had been relocated and is now clear of any obstructions.

- b. (Closed) Open Item (454/84-82-02(DRS)): There was inconsistency in the minimum shift crew composition required by Technical Specification 6.0 and the minimum shift crew composition required by Section 3.5.c(4) of the Byron Fire Protection Report. During the inspection visit on February 8, 1985, the licensee agreed to revise the shift manning procedure numbered BAP 300-2 to more accurately reflect the number of individuals available for safe shutdown and fire brigade activities. However, this revision had not been approved prior to the inspectors' departure from the site on February 8, 1985. Subsequently, on February 12, 1985, the inspector verified through discussions with the resident inspector that procedure number BAP 300-2 had been revised and approved on or before February 10, 1985.
- c. (Closed) Open Item (454/84-82-03(DRS)): The instrumentation available for direct reading of the pressurizer pressure during subcooling requirements needs to be replaced with a gauge more suitable for its purpose. During the inspection visit on February 8, 1985, the licensee provided the inspector with a copy of Work Request No. 6PS014 initiating the work to replace the Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indicator for Unit 1. However, this modification was on-going at the time of this inspection visit. Subsequently, on February 12, 1985, the inspector verified through discussions with the resident inspector that the replacement gauge had been installed and verified operable on or before February 10, 1985.
- d. (Closed) Open Item (454/84-82-04(DRS)): The licensee agreed to insert the instructions for plant cooldown included in BGP 100-5 into Procedure No. 1-BOA-PRI-5. The licensee provided the inspector with Revision 5 of Procedure No. 1-BOA-PRI-5 which included the necessary changes.
- e. (Closed) Open Item (454/84-60-03(DRS)): The licensee shall have an operable fire hazards panel and associated instrumentation. During the inspection visit on February 8, 1985, the licensee provided the inspector with a copy of Work Request No. 6FW017 initiating the work to provide a power feed from the 480V ESF motor control center to the fire hazards panel (1PL10J). However, this modification was on-going at the time of this inspection visit. Subsequently, on February 12, 1985, the inspector verified through discussions with the resident inspector that the fire hazards panel installation has been completed and was tested operable on or before February 10, 1985. This item is considered closed. This also closes license condition (6)(f) of the Byron License.

In addition, during the review of this item the inspector performed a plant tour of the fire hazards panel area observing that only one lighting unit having one lamp was in the area. The inspector requested the licensee to perform a review to determine the emergency lighting illumination adequacy at the fire hazards panel and routes thereto. This item is considered an open item (454/85-05-01(DRS)) pending the

review completion of the emergency lighting illumination adequacy in the area to and at the fire hazards panel.

- f. (Closed) Open Item (454/84-60-05(DRS)): Adequate isolation for the sequencer relay contacts identified as K611 needed to be completed. During the inspection visit on February 8, 1985, the licensee provided the inspector with a copy of Work Request No. 6DG017 for Diesel Generator 1A and Work Request No. 6DG018 for Diesel Generator 1B initiating the work to isolate the sequencer relay contacts. However, this modification was in progress at the time of this inspection visit. Subsequently, on February 12, 1985, the inspector verified through discussions with the resident inspector that the isolation of the sequencer relay contacts had been completed on or before February 10, 1985.
- g. (Open) Unresolved Item (454/83-62-11(DRS)): Penetration openings in fire barriers were unsealed and membrane protection of structural steel were incomplete. During the inspection visit on February 8, 1985, the licensee indicated that due to on-going plant modifications, unsealed penetration openings will remain. In addition, the membrane protection of the structural steel will also remain incomplete. In areas where penetration openings remain unsealed and membrane protection for structural steel has not been installed, fire watch patrols have been instituted according to the limiting condition for operation as identified in Technical Specifications. This item remains open pending the sealing of any open penetrations and installation of membrane protection for the required structural steel.
- h. (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/83-62-14(DRS)): The licensee needed to perform a fire detection system design review. The licensee completed their evaluation of the adequacy of the installed fire detection system specifically in those areas having detectors where high ventilation air flows are present. This evaluation identified two locations needing to have four detectors relocated. These two areas were in the control room (three fire detectors numbered 3, 5, and 15) and the auxiliary electric equipment room (one fire detector numbered 12). The licensee provided the inspector with a draft copy of the fire detection system evaluation results. The licensee also provided the inspector with Work Request No. 6FP031 initiating the work to relocate the fire detectors. However, this modification was on-going at the time of this inspection visit. Subsequently, on February 12, 1985, the inspector verified through discussions with the resident inspector that the four fire detectors have been relocated in the two areas noted above.

3. List of Documents Reviewed

a. Procedures

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
BAP 300-2, Revision 9	Shift Manning
BAP 300-2, Revision 10	Shift Manning
1-BOA-PRI-5, Revision 5	Control Room Inaccessibility Unit 1

b. Modification Sheets

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
M6-0-85-057	Relocate Four Smoke Detectors

c. Work Request

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
6PS014	Pressure Indicator
6FW017	Fire Hazards Panel
6DG017	Diesel Generator 1"A"
6DG018	Diesel Generator 1"B"
6FP031	Fire Protection

5. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.

6. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on February 8, 1985 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents as proprietary.