

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

CON'T REPORT SOURCE: L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) (NP-33-82-60) On 9/21/82 at 1030 hours, the Control Room operators received a full trip on the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 3. Investigation of the trip showed that the field contacts input 48 volt DC/DC power supply failed. This invoked Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, action item (b), statement 13 which required the channel to be tripped within one hour. The failure of the power supply provided this action automatically. There was no power reduction due to this action.

09 | SYSTEM CODE: C C (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: C K T B R K (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: B (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16) | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 17 | EVENT YEAR: 8 2 (21) | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 5 1 (24) | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 (28) | REPORT TYPE: X (30) | REVISION NO.: 1 (32) | ACTION TAKEN: A (18) | FUTURE ACTION: B (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS: 0 0 0 (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: S 5 2 7 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause of the over-voltage trip is believed to be component failure. On 9/22/82 at 0048 hours, a new power supply was installed. The channel was declared operational at 0114 hours and removed from Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, action statement 13.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 0 8 6 (29) | OTHER STATUS: NA (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator observation (32)

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z (33) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA (36)

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION: NA (39)

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION: NA (41)

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA (43)

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION: NA (45)

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-60

DATE OF EVENT: September 21, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 3, 48 volt DC/DC power supply loss causing a full trip of that channel

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2384 and Load (Gross MWe) = 816.

Description of Occurrence: On September 21, 1982 at 1030 hours, the Control Room operators received a full trip alarm on the SFRCS Channel 3. Investigation of the trip showed that the field contacts input 48 volt DC/DC power supply failed.

This invoked Technical Specification 3.3.2.2., action item (b), statement 13 which required the channel to be tripped within one hour. The failure of the power supply provided this action automatically.

There was no power reduction due to this action.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: A component failure is believed to have caused the over-voltage trip device to have tripped the power supply. The power supply was reset. The input and output voltages were checked and found to be good. However, after fifteen minutes the power supply failed again. It was reset a second time and again failed after a few minutes. After this third failure, a decision was made to replace the power supply in order to make SFRCS Channel 3 operable.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The loss of the power supply did trip the channel and placed it in the mode required by Technical Specifications and design.

Corrective Action: On September 22, 1982, at 0048 hours, a new power supply was installed. The channel was declared operational at 0114 hours and removed from Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, action statement 13.

Failure Data: Although this was the first failure of a 48 VDC power supply, there have been previous failures of 24 VDC and 15 VDC power supplies in other channels of the SFRCS; reference Licensee Event Reports NP-33-77-24, NP-33-78-121 (78-102), NP-33-79-79 (79-070), NP-33-79-113 (79-097), NP-33-79-148 (79-131), NP-33-80-15 (80-011), NP-33-80-36 (80-027), and NP-33-81-23 (81-021).

LER #82-051



February 20, 1985

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File: RR 2 (NP-33-82-60)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 82-051. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please destroy or mark superseded your previous copy of this report, and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Stephen M. Quennoz'.

Stephen M. Quennoz
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

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