## (7-77)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) LICENSEE CODE CON'T 0 SOURCE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) (NP-33-82-22) At 0820 hours on 3/26/82, the source range detector NI-2 high voltage cable was cut by a construction electrician. This resulted in the loss of one of the 0 3 two source range indicators, placing the unit in the action statement of Technical 0 4 Specification 3.9.2. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or 0 5 station personnel. There were no core alterations or positive reactivity changes in 0 6 progress at the time of the loss of the source range detector. SYSTEM CAUSE COMP CAUSE SUBCODE C | O | N | (14 D REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT REPORT NO CODE LER/RO X 11 0 3 0 1 1 8 NUMBER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER PRIME COMP. NPRD-4 FORM SUB HOURS 21 0101 /E ACTIONS (27) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORREC The cause was a problem on coordination of work being performed. The cut cable was reconnected; and after testing, the detector was declared operable at 1400 hours on |March 27, 1982. All remaining cables to be cut per Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-401 were reverified to be spare prior to restarting work. Nuclear Facility Engineering Procedure, NFEP-010, was modified to require prerequisites be listed on the FCR form. 4 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY FACILITY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) OTHER STATUS A (31) Operator Observation 80 COLUENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELFASED OF HELEASE NA Z (33) Z (34) 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURE. DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER Z (38) PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41 8503040575 PDR ADOCK 0 0 0 (40) NA LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 Z (42) NA PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) SSUED N (44) NA NAME OF PREPARER Ron Uebbing/Stan Batch/Jan Stotz 419-259-5000, Ext. 372 DVR 82-043 PHONE: .

## TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-22

DATE OF EVENT: March 26, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of one source range indication due to a cut cable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0820 hours on March 26, 1982, the source range detector NI-2 high voltage cable was cut by a construction electrician working in containment penetration box PILILI per Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-401. This resulted in the loss of one of the two source range indicators as was noticed by the Control Room operator. The loss of one source range neutron flux monitor placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.2 which requires an immediate suspension of all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes. There were no core alterations or positive reactivity changes in progress at the time of the loss of the source range detector. No core alterations or positive reactivity changes were performed while the detector was inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was a problem in coordination of work being performed per several different FCRs. The cables were to have been spared by several previous FCRs prior to being cut per FCR 79-401. The FCR should have contained a warning of the required inter-relationships between the FCRs which had to be completed prior to cutting the cable.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The cut cable resulted in a loss of only one of two source range neutron flux indications. The signal is used for indication only and does not perform any control function when the reactor is tripped. No core alterations or positive reactivity changes were being performed at the time of the loss of the detector.

Corrective Action: The power supply for source range detector NI-2 was deenergized, and the cut cable was reconnected to the bulkhead connector and remounted to the penetration phenolic plate. To provide operability, the "NI Detector Post Functional Test", IC 2002.03, and the "Source Range Functional Test", ST 5091.01, were performed, and source range detector NI-2 was declared operable at 1400 hours on March 27, 1982.

All remaining cables to be cut per FCR 79-401 were reverified to be spare prior to restarting work per FCR 79-401.

Nuclear Facility Engineering Procedure, NFEP-010, "Processing Facility Change Requests", has been modified to require that prerequisites to implementing an FCR supplement be noted in the "Engineering Summary of Pl. s and Precautions" section of the FCR form.

Failure Data: Although there have been previous failures of source range neutron flux indication, the causes of the loss were not similar to this occurrence.

LER #82-018

1



February 20, 1985

Log No. K85-423 File: RR 2 (NP-33-82-22)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 82-018. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please destroy or mark superseded your previous copy of this report, and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Saphen Menny

Stephen M. Quennoz Plant Manager Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III

> Mr. Walt Rogers DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

> > IEZZ 1/1

JCS/001