



**GPU Nuclear Corporation**  
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

February 21, 1985

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Fire Protection Special Report

Enclosed is Fire Protection Special Report No. 85-01 which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.3.d and 3.12.B.3(3).

If any questions or comments should arise, please contact Mr. Drew Holland, Oyster Creek Licensing Manager at (609)971-4643.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF/PFC/dam  
Enclosure

cc: NRC Resident Inspector  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Fire Protection  
Special Report 85-01

Report Date

February 21, 1985

Occurrence Date

February 11, 1985

Identification of Occurrence

The Fire Suppression Water System was rendered inoperable in order to perform maintenance on post indication valve (PIV) V-9-13. This Special Report of the above condition is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12.B.3(3).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The reactor was in the cold shutdown condition.

Description of Occurrence

On February 2, 1985 at 0432 hours leakage was observed around PIV V-9-13 which branches off the main fourteen (14) inch firewater feed from fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2. Repair efforts on PIV V-9-13 could not be immediately initiated due to the firewater system operability requirement when one (1) Core Spray System train is inoperable, per Technical Specifications, Section 3.4. Following verification of the operability of Core Spray Systems I and II, on February 11, 1985 at 0915 hours the fourteen (14) inch firewater main was isolated in the area of PIV V-9-13. Prior to isolating the firewater main the Redundant Fire Protection Water Supply System pump was tested for operability, aligned to the fire suppression underground header and was continuously run to maintain Fire Protection System pressure.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Upon examination of PIV V-9-13, a crack was found in the valve body which caused the leakage. In order to perform maintenance on PIV V-9-13, the fourteen (14) inch firewater main had to be isolated and drained, rendering fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2 inoperable.

Analysis of Occurrence

There was no safety significance associated with this event. Both Core Spray Systems were operable and the Redundant Fire Protection Water Supply System was operating to maintain firewater header pressure. The Fire Suppression Water System was out of service for approximately thirteen (13) hours.

Corrective Action

Corrective action was to replace PIV V-9-13 and restore the Fire Suppression Water System (14 inch main from fire pumps 1-1 and 1-2) to operable status. This was completed at 2220 hours on February 11, 1985.

Further investigation to determine the specific cause of the valve failure has been initiated. Non-destructive examination (NDE) will be performed on the valve body. Results of NDE performed on PIV V-9-13 will determine if any further action is necessary.