Commonwealth Edison
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

PRIORITY ROUTING

July 14, 1992

Mr. A. Bert Davis
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

DCD/DCB

Subject: Braidwood Station Unit 2
Diesel Generator 2DG01KA Failure
NRC Docket No. 50-457

Reference: (a) NUREG-1276, Technical Specification
(b) May 28, 1992, T.W. Simpkin letter
to A.B. Davis

Dear Mr. Davis:

Section 4.8.1.1.3 of reference (a) requires that all diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, be reported to the NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.2. The enclosure provides the report that addresses one invalid failure for the 2DG01KA diesel generator. The criteria used to determine valid tests and failures is taken from section C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

Reference (b) is the most recent report addressing diesel generator failures, submitted per Section 4.8.1.1.3.

Please direct any questions concerning this submittal to this office.

Very truly yours,

Terrence W. Simpkin

T.W. Simpkin
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

cc: R. Pulsifer - NRR
B. Clayton - RIII
Resident Inspector - Braidwood
NRC Document Control Desk

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Braidwood Unit 2, Train A Diesel Generator Valid Failure
June 10, 1992

On Wednesday, June 10, 1992 at 0855 hours the Braidwood Unit 2, Train A (2A) Diesel Generator (DG) was started in accordance with Braidwood Unit 2 Operating Surveillance Procedure (2BwOS) 8.1.1.2.a-1, Unit Two 2A Diesel Generator Operability Monthly (Staggered) and Semi-Annual (Staggered) Surveillance, for a semi-annual operability run. At 0910 hours the 2A DG output breaker was closed resulting in the parallel operation of the 2A DG to the system grid. When the 2A DG output breaker was closed the operator noticed that output VARs were high. The operator began reducing output VARs without first placing a load on the 2A DG. Subsequently, the 2A DG tripped due to a reverse power condition caused by operator error. The Shift Supervisor conducted remedial training with the operator involved regarding the purpose of the reverse power trip and the importance of maintaining a load on the DG when the DG output breaker is closed. At 1123 hours, the same operator restarted the 2A DG in accordance with 2BwOS 8.1.1.2.a-1. The surveillance was successfully completed without incident.

This failure of the 2A DG has been determined to be an invalid failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 Section C.2.e. This invalid failure does not put the 2A DG on an increased test frequency schedule. The 2A DG is currently on a monthly test frequency.

As of June 18, 1992 the 2A DG has had four valid failures and the Braidwood Unit 2, Train B (2B) DG has had no valid failures in the last one hundred Braidwood Unit 2 valid DG demands.