

JUL 20 1992

Docket No. 50-219

Mr. John J. Barton
Vice President and Director
GPU Nuclear Corporation
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Dear Mr. Barton:

SUBJECT: MANAGEMENT MEETING TO DISCUSS THE OYSTER CREEK
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE
PROGRAM

A Management Meeting was conducted on February 21, 1992, between members of your staff and NRC staff from Region I and Headquarters, at the Region I office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. A summary of the results of this meeting were provided to you in our March 11, 1992, letter. In Section 2.0, "Issues Identified for Action," of the enclosure to this letter, we stated that the NRC staff will determine the acceptability of several assumptions made in your reassessment of Supplement 3 valves.

The NRC staff (including the Human Factors Assessment Branch of NRR) has completed its review of this issue. We disagree with your assumption that the control room operators will not take action to close these motor-operated valves (MOVs) for a period of 35 seconds following the event. We believe that the control room operator may receive prompt leak location information from sources outside the control room. Unless the control room operator is provided with procedures and training to the contrary, we would expect the control room operator to act swiftly to commence leak isolation if the severity of the event and adequate information to initiate isolation were known. We conclude that the possibility exists for a control room operator to recognize a high energy break in the isolation condenser line and to take action within 35 seconds.

The reliance on control room operator inaction is unacceptable unless appropriate procedures and training, or physical restraints, are in place to prevent manual action. Your timer circuitry for the isolation condenser MOVs does not prohibit a control room operator from attempting to close the valves earlier in the transient at a higher differential pressure in anticipation of its automatic closure. Such an attempted closure by the control room operator

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might result in the MOV failing in a partially open position if the motor was unable to deliver sufficient torque to trip the torque switch. The locations of the line break and the MOV could cause the leak to be unisolable for a significant period to time.

We request that you respond to this letter and provide us with your planned action regarding this issue. Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Clifford A. Anderson, Acting Chief
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

cc:

M. Laggart, Manager Corporate Licensing
G. Busch, Licensing Manager, Oyster Creek
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New Jersey

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Region 1 Docket Room (with concurrences)

DRS/EB SALP Coordinator

R. Blough, DRP

J. Rogge, DRP

R. Lobel, OEDO

A. Dromerick, NRR/PD 1-4

F. Young, SRI, Three Mile Island

L. Rossbach, SRI, Beaver Valley

T. Scarbrough, NRR

RI:DRS

Trapp

CTA
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Dyrr

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