

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2						DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1			PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
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TITLE (4)  
ISOLATION OF PORTION OF FIRE WATER SYSTEM

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)																																														
0 1	2 4	8 5	8 5	0 1 1	0 0	0 1	2 1	9 8 5	SONGS UNIT 3		0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2																																														
<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="3">OPERATING MODE (9) 6</td> <td colspan="9">THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0</td> <td>20.402(b)</td> <td></td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(i)</td> <td>X</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(ii)</td> <td></td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(iii)</td> <td>X</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(iv)</td> <td></td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(v)</td> <td></td> <td>20.405(c)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(iv)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(v)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(vii)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</td> <td></td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(ix)</td> <td></td> <td>73.71(b)</td> <td></td> <td>73.71(c)</td> <td></td> <td>OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</td> </tr> </table>												OPERATING MODE (9) 6			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	X	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		20.405(a)(1)(v)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		73.71(b)		73.71(c)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER		TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0	
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH:     DAY:     YEAR:
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Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 2030 on 1/22/85, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power, isolation valves were closed to perform maintenance on the east side of the fire water system loop. Due to personnel error, it was not recognized that isolation valves had previously been closed on the west side of the loop to perform maintenance. Therefore, the Unit 3 and Common 2/3 fire spray/sprinkler and hose stations were not pressurized by the loop from the time the east side loop isolation valves were closed until the condition was corrected at 1925 on 1/24/85. However, the seismically qualified backup fire water supply and pumping system remained available throughout the period. Dedicated, onsite fire response personnel, and procedures for use of the backup system, were in place to pressurize the fire spray/sprinkler and hose stations, and the west side loop isolation valves could have been opened if needed.

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence include: a review of the process involved in the valve closures with appropriate personnel, including disciplinary action; a formalized periodic review by management of equipment outages; improving communication interfaces between the Operations and Fire Protection divisions; development of computer-assisted plant status tracking system; and a design change to provide additional fire water system loop pressure indication in the control room.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 24, 1985, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power, a planned maintenance outage was being performed to replace valves in the fire water system (EIIS System Code KP) loop which encircles Units 2 and 3. This maintenance outage commenced at 2030 PST on January 22 and required closing isolation valves (EIIS Component Code ISV) located in the east side of the loop.

On January 24 at 1850 PST, it was determined as a result of a routine fire hydrant (EIIS Component Code HYD) surveillance, that hydrant isolation valves had been closed previously on the west side of the fire water system loop resulting in the isolation of the southern portion of the loop between the two work areas. This prevented pressurization of the Unit 3 and Common 2/3 fire spray/sprinkler and hose stations from the loop, contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.8.1. Immediately after discovery the hydrant isolation valves were opened at 1925 PST, restoring the systems to operable status. Throughout this period of isolation, the seismically qualified truck trailer fire water supply and pumping system (truck trailer), which is required to be maintained as a backup system at Units 2 and 3 for use in the event of a failure of the non-seismically qualified fire water loop, was available. As the isolation of the loop was inadvertent, prompt notification was made to the NRC. Procedures exist which would result in the use of the truck trailer by the San Onofre full-time, dedicated fire department as a backup system any time the fire water loop flow rate or residual pressure is unsatisfactory.

The maintenance work on the west side of the fire loop was initiated in November 9, 1984, and had been suspended pending further planning. Due to a personnel error, an Equipment Deficiency/Mode Restraint (EDMR), used to identify outages of equipment important to safety, was not prepared, contrary to established procedures. When the maintenance for the east side of the loop was being planned and approved, it was not recognized that closure of isolation valves for work on the west side remained in effect because no outstanding EDMR's were found when the mandatory EDMR review was conducted. The west side of the loop was available for use and could have been pressurized if needed by simply opening the isolation valves.

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and to improve the effectiveness of the control of such equipment, are as follows:

1. This event has been discussed with appropriate personnel during shift briefings.
2. Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken.
3. Management review of work authorizations and clearances, for equipment important to safety, is performed periodically but will be formalized to ensure the proper prioritization and implementation of work activities.
4. To improve the tracking of clearances, work authorizations, and equipment outages, development of the computer assisted Automated Technical Specification Information System (ATSIS) will be continued and accelerated.
5. Programmatic improvements in the communication interfaces between the Operations and Fire Protection divisions will be implemented to ensure adequate cognizance of day-to-day system status by Fire Protection personnel.

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TEXT CONTINUATION


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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- A design change will be initiated to provide fire water system loop pressure indication and alarm in the Control Room from two different points rather than only from the fire pump header.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances under which this event could have been more severe. There was no effect upon the health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

*Southern California Edison Company*



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES  
STATION MANAGER

January 29, 1985

TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 85-011  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36 and 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the fire water system. Since this event involved components common to Units 2 and 3, a single report is being submitted in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 85-011

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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