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R. E. DENTON
GENERAL MANAGER
CALVERT CLIFFS

July 20, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318
Penetration Fire Barrier Special Report
Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION Statement a

Gentlemen:

Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION Statement a, we hereby submit the attached Special Report concerning inoperable fire barrier penetrations, specifically a Fire Damper in the Unit 2 Switchgear Room HVAC was inoperable for greater than 7 days.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

RED/CDS/DEB/bjd

Attachment

cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
R. A. Capra, NRC
D. G. McDonald, Jr., NRC
T. T. Martin, NRC
P. R. Wilson, NRC
R. I. McLean, DNR
J. H. Walter, PSC

Cert # P098603341

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ATTACHMENT (1)

PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SPECIAL REPORT

BACKGROUND

On June 24, 1992, the fire dampers 2FD407F1, 2FD526F7 for the Unit 2 Switchgear Room HVAC System was found inoperable while performing an Engineering Root Cause Analysis (ERCA). One of the corrective actions of the ERCA was to visually inspect the damper assemblies to determine if they would close satisfactory. This inspection was based on failures with the same dampers on Unit 1 Switchgear Room HVAC System.

As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION Statement a, a special report must be issued to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 if the fire dampers are not restored to an operable status within 7 days.

EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION

On June 24, 1992, with Unit 2 at MODE 5, fire dampers 2FD407F1 in the 45 foot Switchgear Room exhaust and 2FD526F7 in the 69 foot Main Plant Exhaust Equipment Room to Switchgear Room HVAC Supply were found inoperable. These fire dampers are addressed by Technical Specification 3.7.12. In accordance with the Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION Statement a, an hourly fire watch patrol was established and operability of the fire detection on one side of the affected fire barrier was verified.

In addition to the hourly fire watch patrol, the Switchgear Room is equipped with a total flooding Halon System which mitigates the temporary inoperability of the fire barrier.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES

A root cause analysis was conducted and has identified the causes of the fire damper inoperability. The root cause and corrective actions for this event will be discussed in an upcoming LER. Engineering and Maintenance work is in progress to correct the problems with these fire dampers. These dampers will remain inoperable and appropriate actions will continue in accordance with Technical Specification requirements until the fire dampers are restored to an operable status.