tinc Form 200 (0-43)					LIC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OME NO. 3180-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/86					
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Reac		cram	- Lov	Level											
	INT DATE			LER NUMBER		AS	PORT DA	TE (7)		OTHER P	ACILITIES INVO	LVED (B)			
MONTH DAY YEAR		YEAR	YGAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAM		0 15 0 0			
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	RATING		THIS RE	PORT IS SUBMITTE	D PURBUANT 1	TO THE R	EGUIREM	ENTS OF 1	0 CFR 5: /0	Shack one or mans o	f the following) (1	1)			
POWER DISPLANT			20.408(a)(1)(B) 20.408(a)(1)(B) 20.408(a)(1)(B) 20.408(a)(1)(B) 20.408(a)(1)(b)			20.408(e) 50.38(e)(1) 50.38(e)(2) 50.73(e)(2)(i) 60.73(e)(2)(ii) 60.73(e)(2)(iii)			×	90,73(a) (2) (iv) 90,73(a) (2) (vi) 90,73(a) (2) (vii) 90,73(a) (2) (viii) (A 90,73(a) (2) (viii) (B 90,73(a) (2) (xi)		73.71(a) 72.71(a) X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Taxt, NRC Form Special			
NAME					·	CENSEE	CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)			TELEPHONE NUM	450		
	. Koe	nig,	exter	nsion 575							8 1 1 5		1617 1611		
				COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH CO	MPONEN	T FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPORT	(13)				
CAUSE	NUSE SYSTEM COM				TO NPROS				SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	•		
A	E B	SW	GIR	1,0,3,0	N						1.1.1				

Unit 1 was at approximately 99% power, 1116 MWe, when stator water cooling heat exchanger 1B was being valved into service. Water in this heat exchanger caused stator water conductivity to increase rapidly. High conductivity resulted in a generator field ground alarm. The Shift Engineer determined that, for generator protection, the generator should be unloaded within three minutes.

X NO

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Following the scram procedure, the Operator proceeded to transfer aux power supplies in preparation for reactor shutdown. In the process of transferring 6.9 KV Bus 151 (non-safety related switchgear) from its normal Unit Aux Transformer feed to the System Aux Transformer, a switching error occured which de-energized Bus 152 (non-safety related switchgear).

The bus de-energization resulted in a loss of two running condensate pumps. The standby pump auto-started but reactor vessel level decreased rapidly due to insufficient feedwater flow. The Operator observed reactor vessel level decreasing and manually scrammed the reactor.

Reactor water level dropped to about -44 inches. HPCS, which initiates at -50 inches, auto started and injected. The HPCS diesel generator also auto-started. No other PCIS or ECCS action was required during the event, other than RWCU isolation on high differential flow during the transient. All initiating systems functioned as designed.

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YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

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MONTH

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) DAY

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	24.50			-		

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)						LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)		
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LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5	0	0 0	13	171	3	81	5	_	0 0 2		010	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT I.I more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's/ (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On January 5, 1985, at 1314, Unit 1 Condensate (SD) Pumps 1B and 1D auto tripped (2 of the 3 running pumps). The loss of these pumps resulted in a low water level condition in the Unit 1 reactor vessel. Before the water level reached 12.5 inches the Unit 1 NSO manually scrammed the reactor in anticipation of the low water level scram (JM). When level reached -44 inches (referenced to instrument zero), the HPCS 1B diesel generator (BG, EK) auto-started, and the High Pressure Core Spray system (BG) initiated, injecting spray into the vessel. This event isolated (JM) Reactor Water Cleanup (CE), and produced a turbine trip (TA) on reverse power (JJ). Reactor Recirculation (AD) pumps downshifted to slow speed, vessel pressure dipped to 820 psig and later came back to 920 psig. No SRV (AD) actuation occurred.

II. CAUSE

The following events preceded the scram, and attributed to the scram. The Standby Heat Exchanger, in the Stator Cooling (TJ) system, was being placed into service. When the flow path was established through the Standby Heat Exchanger, high conductivity water was placed into the system. (This was water that has been in this isolated heat exchanger for a long time.) A high conductivity and generator ground alarm was received on the Stator Cooling system. The high conductivity water resulted in a generator (TB) exciter trouble alarm (generator field ground). Steps were then taken by procedure to reduce load and take the generator off-line. In the process of transferring Bus 151 from its normal feed [Unit Aux Transformer (EL)], the Operator opened up the normal feed to Bus 152 by mistake. This resulted in an auto-trip of condensate pumps 1CDO1PB and 1CDO1PD. The loss of these pumps resulted in a rapid drop in vessel level. When vessel level started dropping the NSO manually scrammed the unit.

When vessel level reached -44 inches, the 1B diesel generator auto-started, and the High Pressure Core Spray system initiated. The Reactor Water Cleanup system isolated on high differential flow due to the event. Reactor pressure dropped to 820 psig and came back to 920 psig. No SRV actuations were noted; reactor recirculation pumps down-shifted; and the turbine tripped on reverse power. The 1A RR pump also tripped due to an ATWS signal.

After vessel level turned around and was back to a normal range HPCS was secured and the "A" TDRFP was used to control level. An attempt was made to trip the "B" TDRFP with no results. The pump flow was lowered. (The "B" feedwater trip problem was found to be a sticky solenoid.)

All level 2 actions did not occur due to the starting of HPCS at a conservative level and refilling of the reactor vessel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION						U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/86					
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)						PAGE (3)		
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III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

All components reacted as required during this event. HPCS initiated at a conservative level, and reactor recirculation pumps downshifted as required. The generator was not damaged by the event. The accumulated cycles on the HPCS nozzle is 5 cycles and the nozzle usage factor is less than 0.70.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The Operator involved with switching the UAT, SAT bus was counseled on having better observations during switching operations. The Operating Department will also be trained on this event. (AIR 01-85-67009) The possibility of rearranging the control switches on the auxiliary electrical power panel is being investigated (AIR 01-85-67010) along with a procedure to deal with generator Stator Cooling system high conductivity, specifically. (AIR 01-85-67011)

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

No previous occurrences, trips due to operating the wrong breakers, have been recorded.

VI. NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

R. D. Koenig, 815/357-6761, extension 575.

January 29, 1985

U.S. Muclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-002-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

Fr. J. Buly Superintendent LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director INPO-Records Center File/NRC

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