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- g. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/84-70-04: Emergency Procedure Walkthroughs for Catawba Based Shift Advisors. The two Catawba based Shift Advisors completed the walkthroughs of the Catawba Emergency Procedures prior to the commencement of fuel loading.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Surveillance Observation (61726)

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations in compliance with various Technical Specifications (TS) requirements. Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, residual heat removal, control room ventilation, and DC electrical sources. The inspector verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, tests results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

As a result of this inspection, one violation was identified. On September 8, 1984, Performance Test (PT)/1/A/4200/10A, Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Performance Test, was conducted. The test results indicated that the pump did not meet the acceptance criteria and should be identified as inoperable. The test technician conducting this test did not recognize that the pump did not meet the acceptance criteria and should have been declared inoperable as defined in the performance test. On September 15, a second individual, a test supervisor, verified the data calculations obtained during the test and he also did not recognize that the data was outside the acceptance criteria limits. This supervisor completed additional reviews on September 17 and identified the problem to the Test Engineer. The Test Engineer (Performance Personnel) reviewed the results of this test and concurred that the pump did not meet the acceptance criteria and notified an Operations Engineer. The Operations Engineer, performance personnel, and licensing and projects personnel discussed this item since questions arose as to what constituted operability of the RHR pump. This discussion process occurred even though procedure PT/1/A/4200/10A, step 12.20 states that the pump is inoperable in this case and requires notification to the SRO of action taken to correct the inoperable problem. This pump was determined to be inoperable on September 18 at 9:15 a.m. and logged in the Technical Specifications action logbook. The Technical Specification action requirements for the resulting conditions were already being complied with, although not because this problem was recognized.

The original error and untimely review of the test conducted on September 8, resulted in both RHR pumps being inoperable at the same time since RHR pump 1B was placed in an inoperable status based on the erroneous decision that pump 1A was operable. Although RHR pump 1A should have been, and later was technically declared inoperable according to the performance test acceptance criteria, it is reasonably expected that pump 1A could have been actuated and operated in the event an emergency need would have arisen. Secondly, there is no decay heat in the reactor coolant system because the reactor has not yet achieved initial criticality.

This failure to follow procedure, in that the RHR 1A pump was not declared inoperable as specified in step 12.20 of PT/1/A/4200/10A on September 17, when the personnel error was identified is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 which requires procedures to be established and implemented. This is violation 413/84-87-04: Failure to follow procedure for RHR pump surveillance testing.

13. Operating License Conditions (Unit 1) (92706)

- a. Attachment 1 to the Catawba operating license identified items that were to be completed prior to exceeding 200°F (Mode 4). The first item addresses relocation of containment atmosphere monitor sample lines and is discussed in IE Report 413/84-90. The second item addressed the completion of ice condenser testing and all associated steel erection removed during ice loading. The inspector reviewed the following testing and work requests:

MP/O/A/7150/06 - Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Testing and Corrective Maintenance

MP/O/A/7150/07 - Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Door Corrective Maintenance

TP/1/A/1200/23 - Initial Ice Basket Weight Determination

TP/1/A/1100/02 - Ice Condenser Region Functional Test

MP/O/A/7150/10 - Inspection of Ice Condenser Flow Passages

MP/O/A/7150/08 - Ice Condenser Floor Drain Inspection

Shutdown Work Request No. 8695 - This work request removed the sections of the ice condenser required to load ice and perform testing. This work request has been cleared and reviewed for acceptability.

Based on this review, the inspector considers the utility has met the license conditions identified in Enclosure 1.

- b. One of the items identified as a "Proposed License Condition for a Low Power License to be Completed to Satisfaction of Region II" is item F.7, complete post inspection testing of the emergency diesel generators and supporting systems. Performance engineering personnel identified that the testing had been completed on 1A diesel generator but the results had not been reviewed. The inspector reviewed the test results of TP/1/A/1100/05, Diesel Generator 1A Post Inspection Run. As a result of this review, a deviation was identified. In a letter from July 6, 1984, to H. R. Denton from H. B. Tucker, Duke committed to perform two fast starts on the diesel generators, and specified the parameters that would be met during these test. Parameter B.4.b of