

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/84-40(DRP)

Docket No. 50-461

License No. CPPR-137

Licensee: Illinois Power Company  
500 South 27th Street  
Decatur, IL 62525

Facility Name: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL

Inspection Conducted: November 7-9, and 28-30, 1984

Inspector: F. J. Jahlonski

Approved By: *RC Knop*  
R. C. Knop, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 1C

12-21-84  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 7-9, and 28-30, 1984 (Report No. 50-461/84-40(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection concerning allegations and review of licensee action on open items. The inspection involved 59 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Illinois Power (IP)

- \*J. Perry, Manager of Nuclear Programs Coordination
- G. Baker, Records Coordinator (Quadrex)
- J. Brownell, QA Specialist
- \*C. Calhoun, Quality Projects Coordinator
- R. Campbell, Director of Quality Systems & Audits
- \*W. Connell, Manager of QA
- \*H. Daniels, Project Manager
- \*M. Hassebrock, Director of Quality Engineering & Verification
- K. Hill, Training Coordinator
- \*J. Loomis, Construction Manager
- \*J. Miller, Director of Startup Testing
- \*F. Spangenberg, Director of Nuclear Licensing
- \*J. Sprague, QA Specialist

#### Baldwin Associates (BA)

- \*A. King, Project Manager
- C. Anderson, Manager of Quality Engineering
- R. Holas, Boilermaker (Welder)
- W. Laicoff, Boilermaker (Welder)
- G. Larkin, Industrial Engineer (Accountability)
- \*L. Osborne, Manager of Quality & Technical Services
- D. Schlatka, Senior Superintendent
- J. Stivers, Supervising Quality Engineering Procedures

Other personnel were contacted during the inspection as a matter of routine.

\*Designates those who attended the exit meeting on November 30, 1983.

### 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Noncompliance (461/83-19-05): Sampling plan for electrical supports not formulated in accordance with recognized standards. The inspector reviewed the corrective action described in IP letter to NRC dated April 26, 1984, and verified that a revised sample plan was prepared as described in Corrective Action Report 163. BA Procedure 3.5.12 has been revised and requires that sampling plans meet the guidelines of MIL-STD-105D as required by ANSI N45.2. This matter is closed.
- b. (Closed) Noncompliance (461/83-19-06): Corrective action not adequate to substantiate work of former electrical QC inspector. The inspector reviewed the corrective action described in IP letter to NRC dated April 26, 1984, and verified that both concrete expansion anchors and electrical hangers were reinspected in accordance with a revised and

approved sampling plan. The number of rejectable attributes for concrete expansion anchors and electrical hangers was less than the maximum allowed. Based on the above results it is concluded that the areas inspected by the former QC inspector have an acceptable number of rejectable attributes. All areas inspected by the former QC inspector are subject to the ongoing BA/IP Verification/Overinspection Program. This matter is closed.

- c. (Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) (50-461/83-05): Conduit clamp screws twisted off while being torqued. This matter was initially reported to NRC on April 12, 1983. On September 26, 1983, IP reported that based on their completed review of the subject, a reportable deficiency did not exist. A review of the data file on this matter by the inspector confirmed that even if nothing were done except to replace those screws which twisted off, an unsafe no safety condition did not exist. Analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy, and reviewed by an independent consultant showed that each assembly completed without failure of the screw constituted an individual severe load test and meets the design intent. This matter is closed.
- d. (Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) (50-461/83-09): Damage to Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC) cable connectors. This matter was initially reported to NRC on June 29, 1983. On November 14, 1983, IP reported that based on their completed review of the subject, a reportable deficiency did not exist, that is, there was no deficiency in either design or construction which could adversely affect the safe operation of Clinton Power Station.

A review of the data file on this matter by the inspector confirmed that the condition was identifiable by test. Although a seemingly simple task of connecting together two multiple plugs, special training has been provided and only specific persons are allowed to make plug connections; to date only minimal subsequent instances have recurred. This matter is closed.

### 3. Followup on Allegations

- a. On August 24, 1984, the NRC resident inspector was contacted by a BA craftsperson about being terminated for making allegations to IP. The craftsperson also stated that there was a "boomer" welder\* (non-local union) still employed who had made poor welds. Due to the craftsperson's haste to leave the site a telephone number was provided by the craftsperson to make future contact. NRC unsuccessfully attempted to make contact on September 13, 1984; however, on September 14, 1984, the craftsperson contacted the NRC Regional Office. The craftsperson had concerns in three areas described below.

(Closed) Allegation (RIII-84-A-0131-01) (#99): The craftsperson identified the "boomer" but had not personally observed any of the boomer's work. The craftsperson heard that welds had been welded

\*Welding is a "skill" used by crafts such as pipefitters, boilermakers or electricians.

over and many of the mistakes had to be ground out and replaced. The craftsperson could not identify any locations of the poor welds but identified another person who could possibly have more information. On November 29, 1984, the other person was interviewed by the NRC inspector and when only hearsay information was provided. Approximate locations were thought to be in the containment at elevation 770 feet. Discussions with BA personnel disclosed that several areas in the containment, including elevation 767, had problems with fit up of large beams and bumper plates. It was explained by BA personnel, and documented on Nonconformance report 21215, that because of plate thickness, full penetration welds caused the plates to draw away from their "fit" position. In many instances, plates had to be removed and the job started over. The problems was related to a design deficiency and not to the poor performance of the boomer. A welder's skill was critical to the job; the "boomer" was considered by the senior superintendent to be one of the more skilled welders and had been involved with work of the type described.

This allegation was not substantiated; however, on August 24, 1984, the craftsperson notified the site Safeteam\* of other specific welding related concerns. NRC will follow up on actions related to Safeteam Item CS 1277. (Open Item 461/84-40-01)

(Closed) Allegation (RIII-84-A-0131-02)(#99): The craftsperson stated that some welders had consumed alcohol, marijuana, or both while on the job. One person was specifically named and a pseudonym was given for another. The inspector determined on November 29, 1984, that one of the persons had been terminated for cause (theft of company property). The other person was directly asked about drug or alcohol use on site. The person denied use or knowledge of others' use.

Both IP and BA have documented policies that could result in dismissal for use or possession of alcohol or nonprescription drugs. cursory searches of handcarried items for alcohol are routinely conducted. There have been cases of employee dismissal for attempting to bring alcohol on site. Dismissals have also occurred for possession of marijuana. NRC does not impose security requirements on the licensee during plant construction. The responsibility is vested in IP and BA the owner/constructor. As stated above, there was evidence that both had appropriate policies in place.

Both IP and BA have established quality assurance programs and the site aslo has an overinspection program designed to detect and correct adverse conditions including those that may result from work performed under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To date the NRC has confirmed through routine inspections and independent measurements that the established programs are effective. This matter is closed.

\*Independently of IP/BA, Safeteam conduct routine interviews of drop-ins and all terminating employees to determine if there are concerns requiring followup and investigation.



(Closed) Allegation (RIII-84-A-0131-03) (#99): The craftsperson believed that the termination of employment was for using the IP "hotline" to inform IP of the concerns for improper use of welding materials to make personal items.

There was no tape recorded telephone message of anyone using the hotline to inform IP of the above situation; there are no NRC regulations prohibiting making of personal items. On August 24, 1984, the craftsperson made two visits to the Safeteam. One visit was made the morning prior to the craftsperson's layoff (see RIII-84-A-0131-01 above). The other was made in the afternoon as part of the established debriefing required of all terminated employees; no further concerns were made known to the Safeteam. Notice of layoffs was made over a period between August 23 and 30, 1984. Although the precise date and time could not be established, the craftsperson probably had knowledge by August 23, 1984, of the impending layoff. During the layoff period, 250 persons were terminated including 20 of the same skill as the craftsperson. The craftsperson's termination slip indicated eligibility for rehire.

On September 14, 1984, during conversation with the NRC Regional Office, it was suggested that the craftsperson notify the U. S. Department of Labor (DOL) if discrimination was suspected during the layoff. On October 24, 1984, the DOL notified the craftsperson that their investigation showed the termination was a result of a reduction in force by BA. This matter is closed.

- b. (Open) Allegation (Reference RIV-83-A-0072)(#100): On November 7-14, 1983, NRC's Vendor Program Branch conducted an inspection of a company called MATSCO because of several allegations made to the NRC. Results of the inspection were that "six of ten allegations were substantiated; however, in no case were there significant implications of poor quality or a compromise of safety". One of the allegations was that MATSCO testing personnel were sent to a site prior to verification of qualification as required by contract. As of this inspection, MATSCO had approximately 15 persons on site assigned to the Startup Group; however, MATSCO had not forwarded verifications of their personnel qualification. IP took some remedial action but MATSCO remains chronically unresponsive compared to several other companies who also supply testing services to IP. The allegation was substantiated, but because of the type of work presently being performed by MATSCO employees, no items of noncompliance were identified. This matter will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

- c. (Closed) Allegation (RIII-84-A-0146) (#103): On October 5, 1984, it was reported to the NRC that the new concept of processing BA procedures by the Project Procedures Control Group (PPCG) as proposed in BA Procedure 2.15 Revision 4 would be detrimental to the project by possibly skipping proper review and generating large quantities of unnecessary procedure change requests.

BA Procedure 2.15 Revision 4 was never issued. BA Procedure 2.15 Revision 3 was made August 27, 1984, and was in effect as of this inspection. In January 1984, the PPCG was formed to centralize and streamline the process of developing and controlling BA procedures and instructions. In August 1984, a plan was developed to resolve the extensive logistic and administrative problems within the PPCG. One recommendation was to perform PPCG Activities in a review board concept. As a result, the PPCG was reorganized from a line function to a staff (service) function. Instead of individual representatives from various organizations reporting full time to a quality engineering person, organizational representatives reported to their respective discipline supervisors and periodically (weekly) met as a board with Quality Engineer (QE) as chairman, to evaluate, review, and approve procedures and procedure change requests. Discussions with cognizant IP management agreed that the reorganization has had positive effects on reducing changes to BA Procedures. Procedure change statistics over the past month indicate that the problem has been controlled.

BA Procedure 2.15 Revision 4, was never implemented; the organizational changes appeared to be positive and not detrimental to the project. This matter is closed.

#### 4. Record Verification Program

On October 1, 1984, NRC received a letter from IP, number U-10189, regarding changes to the original Record Verification Program plan documented in inspection Report 50-461/83-16. Based on conversations with cognizant IP personnel at the site during this inspection period, the change to the types of records now being reviewed could not be determined. The change in scope from "All (100 percent)" to that which is actually being reviewed, must be comprehensively defined. This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (Open item 461/84-40-02)

#### 5. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 30, 1984. The inspector summarized the scope and purpose of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the information and comments.