

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report No. 50-286/92-16  
Docket No. 50-286  
License No. DPR-64  
Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York  
P.O. Box 215  
Buchanan, New York 10511  
Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant  
Inspection At: Buchanan, New York  
Inspection Conducted: June 7-11, 1992

Inspector: Edward B. King 6/29/92  
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by: R. R. Keimig 6/24/92  
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date  
Division of Radiation Safety and  
Safeguards

Areas Inspected: Management Support and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; Lock and Key Control; Security Training and Qualification; and Safeguards Information Protection Program.

Results: Improvements were noted in management oversight and support for most areas of your physical security program. However, the licensee was found in noncompliance with the NRC-approved Training and Qualification Plan regarding security force members carrying an extra pair of glasses, as required, when on duty. Additionally, a potential weakness was identified in the area of testing and maintenance. Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made.

## DETAILS

### 1.0 Key Persons Contacted

#### 1.1 Licensee

- \*J. Russell, Resident Manager
- \*J. Vignola, General Manager Maintenance
- \*J. Fitzsimmons, Security Manager
- \*J. Perotta, General Manager, Operations
- \*B. Ray, Manager-Licensing/OERG
- \*M. Albright, I&C Manager
- \*S. Davis, Quality Assessment Supervisor
- \*M. Leonard, Security Supervisor
- \*T. Weber, Security Support Coordinator
- \*J. Mosher, Security Admin Coordinator
- \*J. Cherubini, Security Coordinator
- \*J. Watson, Security Operations Sergeant

#### 1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

G. Tracy, Senior Resident Inspector

\*Denotes those present at the exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other licensee security personnel during this inspection.

### 2.0 Management Support and Audits

#### 2.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was based upon the inspector's review of the various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection as documented in this report.

Security program enhancements made since the last routine physical security inspection (50-286/92-08) were as follows:

- the assessment system upgrade is continuing with a projected completion date of March 1993;

- the installation of a badge detection system to aid in the prevention of badges exiting the Protected Area (PA); and
- the procurement of new duty weapons and response equipment.

## 2.2 Audits

The inspector reviewed the licensee's annual Quality Assurance Audit, No. 92-04, of the security program, which was conducted from February 17 - March 31, 1992. The audit was indepth and thorough and included two corrective actions requests (CARs) and fourteen recommendations. The inspector determined, by a review of the licensee's responses to the findings, that corrective actions were taken and were adequate and that the recommendations were not indicative of any programmatic problems and were appropriately addressed. No deficiencies were noted.

## 3.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barrier, Detection and Assessment Aids

### 3.1 Protected Area Barrier

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the PA barrier on June 7, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan). No deficiencies were noted.

### 3.2 Protected Area Detection Aids

The inspector observed the perimeter detection aids on June 8, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. The inspector requested testing of the detection aids at different locations in numerous zones. At three locations, the testing identified deficiencies. The inspector verified that the zones tested satisfactorily during the last periodic functional test, which had been conducted during the previous evening.

During the previous inspection (50-286/92-08), the licensee committed to utilizing more challenging testing methods when performing periodic or functional testing. The inspector determined by observation that the testing methods presently utilized by test personnel have improved. However, it appeared that the testers lacked an indepth understanding of the operating principles of the detection aids. Training for the testing personnel in these principles would enhance the testing program by ensuring that areas with the greatest potential for vulnerabilities and failures are identified by the tester and are tested more rigorously.

The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions for the identified deficiencies, which included the establishment of compensatory measures in the deficient areas and repairs and adjustments. After initial repairs, the retest results were not satisfactory in two of the three locations. These required rework which then resulted in successful tests. All repairs and retesting were completed within thirty-six hours of the time of identification. (See also Section 5.0)

### 3.3 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey on June 9, 1992, from approximately 4:30 a.m. to 5:15 a.m., accompanied by a licensee security supervisor. The inspector determined by observation that the station's lighting system was very effective and that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier. No deficiencies were noted.

### 3.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

However, the inspector noted several areas where the assessment aids continue to be marginally effective. As noted in Section 2.0, the licensee's assessment upgrade is progressing and is expected to be completed in March 1993. The licensee continued to maintain adequate compensatory measures. This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

### 3.5 Vital Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected vital area (VA) barriers on June 10, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the VA barriers were installed and maintained and described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

### 3.6 Vital Area Detection Aids

The inspector requested and observed testing of selected VA detection aids on June 10, 1992, at several locations. All detection aids tested satisfactorily except one. The inspector confirmed that it had tested satisfactorily during the previous test. The licensee immediately implemented compensatory measures by posting an officer in the area. The licensee determined that the

detection aid was defective. On that same day, it was repaired by the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technicians and tested to ensure operability. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

#### 4.0 Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

##### 4.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:

- 4.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the plan. The inspector observed both plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods on June 8 and 10, 1992. The inspector also interviewed members of the security force and licensee security staff about personnel access procedures. Additionally, on June 7, 1992, the inspector observed access control processing for containment entry. The inspector determined that only authorized personnel were granted access to the area and that a mechanism was in place to positively control materials and personnel into the area. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee had escort procedures for visitors into the PA and VAs. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.1.5 The inspector verified the licensee had a mechanism for expediting access to the vital equipment during emergencies and that mechanism was adequate for its purpose. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 4.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main access portal. The inspector reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 4.3 Vehicle Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee properly controlled vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified by a security force member (SFM) at the main access portal. This procedure was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal. On June 9 and 10, 1992, the inspector observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 5.0 Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspector determined that the licensee was conducting tests and maintaining security systems and equipment as committed to in the Plan. This determination was based upon a review of the test records for the equipment. The station provides I&C technicians to conduct preventive and corrective maintenance on security equipment. A review of corrective maintenance records indicated repairs were being accomplished in a timely manner.

In discussions with the licensee, the inspector was informed that although certain technicians are provided by the station to perform security equipment repairs, the technicians rotate out of the security assignment every year and new technicians are then assigned. The newly assigned technicians are not provided with any formal training on the equipment. Because the new technicians lack experience and training on the equipment, they essentially learn by trial and error. This has resulted in the need for the licensee, at times, to have the technicians return to make additional repairs or adjustments due to unsatisfactory test results when the equipment is returned to service. The licensee stated that a review is underway to look into this problem. This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.



The inspector also reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 6.0 Lock and Key Control

The security lock and key procedures were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector reviewed the lock and key records and discussed the procedures with the licensee's security staff. Additionally, the inspector conducted an inventory of all security keys by physically verifying that all security keys were accounted for in specified locations throughout the plant. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 7.0 Security Training and Qualification

Based on observations and discussions with licensee management and training staff, the inspector determined that the licensee has taken an aggressive approach towards improving the training program. Training enhancements made since the last routine physical inspection (50-286/92-08) are as follows:

- the incorporation of a performance based-training program which provides for training while assigned to a specific duty;
- the development of a structured drill program to ensure the involvement of security officers in all contingency event drills; and
- increased tactical training including the identification of target sets and time lines.

Several SFMs were interviewed on June 10, 1992, to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of the job requirements.

However, during the interviews, the inspector determined and later confirmed, that three SFMs whose uncorrected distance vision was 20/40 or less in the better eye were not carrying an extra pair of glasses.

The Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Guard Training and Qualification Plan, dated August 2, 1982, Revision 3, Section 1.4, states, in part, that any security personnel whose uncorrected distance vision is 20/40 or less in the better eye will be required to carry an extra pair of glasses while on duty.

Failure of the SFMs to carry an extra pair of glasses as required by the NRC-approved Indian Point 3 Guard Training and Qualification Plan represents an apparent violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-286/92-16-01).

The inspector noted that the licensee has a formal mechanism in place to ensure that those SFMs requiring an extra set of glasses have them in their possession prior to going on duty. However, it appears that the SFMs were returning their extra set of glasses to their lockers after they had been verified to be carrying them by the duty sergeant.

#### 8.0 Safeguards Information (SGI) Program

The inspector reviewed the licensee's stations procedures and records, interviewed personnel and discussed the training of SFMs and other Security Department personnel on the preparation, receipt, identification, use, reproduction, transmittal and storage of SGI with licensee management. The inspector verified that all SGI is stored within access controlled areas in approved storage cabinets, and is only accessed by authorized personnel with a need-to-know. The inspector determined that the licensee's program for the protection of SGI meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21. No deficiencies were noted.

#### 9.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection of June 11, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented.