RLB-92-150

July 9, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 92-013, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(ii). Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

R. Z. Bax Station Manager

RLB/TB/plm

Enclosure

cc: J. Schrage T. Taylor INPO Records Center NRC Region III

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ABSTRACT:

On June 9, 1992 at 1000 hours at the Station's Training Center, a simulator scenario was being performed in which power was lost to Bus 19 [BU] (which feeds the "B" train of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) [VI]) an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) signal failed to start the "A" train of SBGT. This scenario was found to occur only under conditions whereby "A" train is in the primary mode and "B" train is in the standby mode. Upon further review of the Standby Gas Treatment schematic diagrams it was discovered that this problem was also present in the plant. "A" train will start as required while "A" train is in standby and "B" train is in primary. At the time this LER was initiated Unit One was in the run mode at 100% rated core thermal power and Unit Two was in the run mode at 35% rated core thermal power.

The apparent cause of the event is a design deficiency in the SBGT and Primary Containment Isolation (PCI) [NH] logic.

The immediate corrective action was to change the lineup of the SBGT system so that the "B" train would not be placed in the standby mode of operation. Follow-up corrective action is to change procedures to warn against operation of "B" SBGT in the standby mode.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) T | XT CONTINUATION | | Form Rev 2.0 |
|----------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | Page (3) | |
| FACILITY NAME (17 | | Year /// Sequential Number | /// Revision Number | |
| Quad Cities Unit One | 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 dentification System (EIIS) codes | 9 2 - 0 1 3 | - 010 | |

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Design Deficiency In The Standy Gas Train Logic.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: One Reactor Mode: 4 Event Date: June 9, 1992

Event Time: 1000

Mode Name: RUN

Power Level: 100%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-1-92-061.

RUN Mode (4) - In this position the reactor system pressure is at or above 825 psig, and the reactor protection system is energized, with APRM protection and RBM interlocks in service (excluding the 15% high flux scram).

B. DESCRI TION OF EVENT:

On June 9, 1992 at 1000 hours at the Station's Training Center, a simulator scenario was being performed in which power was lost to Bus 19 [BU] (which feeds the "B" train of Standby Gas Treatment (SBCT) [VI]) an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) signal failed to start the "A" train of SBGT. This scenario was found to occur only under conditions whereby "A" train is in the primary mode and "B" train is in the standby mode. Upon further review of the Standby Gas Treatment schematic diagrams it was discovered that this problem was also present in the plant. "A" train will start as required while "A" train is in standby and "B" train is in primary. At the time this LER was initiated Unit One was in the run mode at 100% rated core thermal power and Unit Two was in the run mode at 35% rated core thermal power.

When Bus 19 is lost, it deenergizes Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] Bus 18 which deenergizes th_ 595-134 relay [RLY] (per drawing 4E15098 Sht. 1). The 595-134 relay will give a start signal to the "B" SBGT time delay relay 1/2-7541-30B[2] (per drawing 4E1400A Sht 2). After 25 seconds the time delay relay will time out and energize the 1/2-7541-28B and 1/2-7541-29B relays. These relays will send a start signal to the "B" train of SBGT, but the "B" train will not start because of loss of power to Bus 19. The 1/2-7541-28B relay when energized will open the 5/6 contact on the "A" train logic. This contact being open will prevent either a manual or automatic start of the "A" train (per drawing 4E1400C).

The one hour Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone call was made on June 9, 1992 at 1020 hours.

| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---------|-----|----------------|--------------------|-----------|--|
| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | Year | 199 | Sequential /// | Revision Number | Page (3)_ | |
| Quad Cities Unit One | 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 ntification System (EIIS) code: | 4 9 1 2 | - | 0 1 3 - | 210 | | |

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), the licensee shall report any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

The apparent cause of the event is a design deficiency in the SBGT and Primary Containment Isolation (PCI) logic. The 595-134 relay, which provides a start signal for the "B" train of SBGT, has the same power supply as the components of the "B" train of SBGT.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety consequences of the event are marginal. This scenario would only occur if power was lost to Bus 19 for more than 25 seconds. If the time delay relay 1/2-7541-30B does not reach its 25 second time out, then there would be no adverse consequences to the "A" train logic.

This event would require operator action to swtich the "B" train to OFF or PRIMARY. This action deenergizes the 1/2-7541-28B relay allowing the "A" train to be started either manually or automatically.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to change the lineup of the Standby Gas Treatment system so that the "B" train would not be in the standby mode of operation. A caution card has been placed on the "B" train mode switch to warn against placing "B" train in Standby.

Follow-up Corrective actions will include changes to the operating procedures to warn against operation of "B" SBGT in standby mode (NTS #2542009206101).

The system design is being evaluated to determine if a modification is needed to change the power supply of the "B" train of SBGT or "B" SBGT start signal relays (NTS #2542009206102).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

There have been 4 previous events of logic design deficiencies.

LER 87-018 Group IV Isolation from Hi Temperature due to design deficiency of the HPCI Room Temp Monitoring System.

LER 88-021 HPCI Isolation (Group IV) during Pre-warming.


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| Quad Cities Unit One | 0151010101215 | 514912 - 01113 - 010 | 01 4 05 01 | | |

LER 89-003 Loss of Secondary Containment during search for grounds on 125 2DC due to inadequate design of the doors.

LER 91-014 SBGT heater logic circuitry missing due to an inadequate review of the SAR.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

No component railure date is needed.




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
4E 1509B SH 1

RELAY TABULATION 595-134

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| 11/2 | 595-134 |
| 3 4 | <u>V1601–57</u> SH 16 |
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| 7 8 | ACTIVATE SBGTS |
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


RELAY TABULATION 1/2-7541-28B



'B' TRAIN LOGIC ('B' TRAIN IN STANDBY)

4E 1400A SH 2



'A' TRAIN LOGIC ('A' TRAIN IN PRIMARY)

4E 1400C

RELAY TABULATION 1/2-7541-25A

| $\frac{1}{1} \Big _{\frac{1}{2}}$ | SEAL-IN START FAN 1/2-A-7506 |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 5 6 | OPEN DAMPER 1/2-7505A |
| 7 8 | CLOSE DAMPER 1/2-7505A |
| 9 1 10 | OPEN DAMPER 1/2-7507A |
| 11 12 | CLOSE DAMPER 1/2-7507A |

RELAY TABULATION 1/2-7541-26A

ATTACHMENT I (Cont'd)

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DEVIATION REPORT

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| POTENTIAL PART 21 | | TO THE NUCLEAR ENGIN | EERING MANAGER | | |
| POTENTIALLY SIGNIFI | CANT EVENT PER NOD DI | RECTIVE OP.10 | I YES | _X_ NO | |
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| PART 2 OPERATING ENGINE | FR'S CONSENTS | I RESPI | DNSIBLE SUPERVISOR | š | DATE |
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| X 30 DAY REPORTABLE/ | 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) | | GION III | DATE | TIME |
| 5 DAY REPORT PER 1 | | | NSU | DATE | TIME |
| .R. # | DRT REQUIRED | | PORATE NOTIFICATION IS | | |
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| PRELIMINARY REPORT | | | | | |
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