

Omaha Public Power District

P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Ft. Calhoun Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0399  
402/636-2000

July 13, 1992  
LIC-92-142L

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

Subject: Licensee Event Report 92-021 for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 92-021 dated July 13, 1992. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(D) and pursuant to Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 5.9.3. If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

*W. G. Gates*  
W. G. Gates  
Division Manager  
Nuclear Operations

WGG/lah

Attachment

c: J. L. Milhoan, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV  
S. D. Bloom, Acting NRC Project Manager  
R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
INPO Records Center

*1622*

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 30.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-590), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (0150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1

DOCKET NUMBER (8) 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 1 | OF 0 | 4

PAGE (8) 1 OF 0 | 4

TITLE (4) Failure to Initiate a Fire Watch for an Inoperable Fire Door

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0	6	1	9	2	9	2	0	2	1	0	0	7	1	3	9	2	N	0   5   0   0   0
																		0   5   0   0   0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 | 0 | 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 85. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(f)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(g)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 886A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(h)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(f)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	Special Report
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(g)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(j)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(h)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: William J. Blessie, Shift Technical Advisor

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 4 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | - | 6 | 8 | 9 | 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

USE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS
X	N	F D R	C 9 7 1 3	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 11, 1992, during the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FP-0001, Fire Door 989-4 to the Charging Pump Valve Room (Room 7) was found to have a broken latch. On June 17, 1992, a fire barrier impairment and associated fire watch were initiated. The door was repaired and the impairment cleared on June 23, 1992. A review of the completed surveillance test identified that the fire barrier impairment and associated fire watch had not been generated at the time the door latch was discovered to be inoperable. As a result, requirements of Technical Specification 2.19(7) were not met.

This event was found to be of negligible safety significance because Room 7 does not contain significant amounts of combustible material and the fire detectors in the area were operable.

The root cause of this event was determined to be ambiguous instructions contained in a note at the beginning of a Fire Protection Door Checklist.

Corrective actions will include procedure revisions and informing appropriate personnel of requirements for maintaining fire door qualification and the importance of notifying the Shift Supervisor of fire door discrepancies.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-200), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20585, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   8   5   9   2	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (4)	
		YEAR	SEQ. INITIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9   2	-   0   2   1	-   0   0	0   2	OF 0   4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 800A's)(17)

The Fire Protection System at Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is maintained through surveillance testing and periodic inspections in order to ensure the ability to detect and suppress a fire and maintain Technical Specification compliance. Included in these, is a monthly inspection of fire doors to ensure proper operation of the latching mechanism. The latching mechanism on a fire door must be operable in order for a door to maintain its fire rating. The reason for this is that during a fire, the internal pressure in the room increases resulting in a force applied to the door, potentially opening it and allowing the fire to spread. Also, applicable Codes require that a door be able to withstand the force of a water nozzle without opening.

FCS Technical Specification (TS) Section 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 within an additional 30 days.

On June 11, 1992, during the performance of monthly Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FP-0001, 'Fire Protection System Inspection and Test', Fire Door 989-4 to the Charging Pump Valve Room (Room 7) was found to have a broken latch. The hydraulic closing mechanism for the door was operating properly; however, the latch on the strike plate was missing. The operator who made the discovery noted on the surveillance test that the latch was broken, but failed to report it to the Shift Supervisor as required by OP-ST-FP-0001 or initiate a Maintenance Work Request (MWR). A note at the beginning of a fire door checklist in procedure OI-FP-6, 'Fire Protection System Inspection and Test', stated, in part, that "All doors shall be closed unless in use or a Fire Watch is posted." (Note: Procedure OP-ST-FP-0001 requires the fire protection test and inspection be performed in accordance with OI-FP-6.) It was the opinion of the operator that since the door was closed, the criterion was met.

On June 13, 1992, following completion of OP-ST-FP-0001, the Shift Supervisor reviewing the completed surveillance test noted that the latch on the door had been found to be broken, and initiated an MWR to repair it. He did not consider a fire watch to be required based on the note at the beginning of the OI-FP-6 checklist. The actual time when the fire door latch broke could not be determined.

On June 17, 1992, at approximately 0755, a General Maintenance craftsman, experienced in lock repair and fire door requirements, contacted System Engineering to generate a fire barrier impairment and initiate an appropriate fire watch. The door was repaired and the impairment cleared on June 23, 1992.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   8   5	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (5)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9   2	-   0   2   1	-   0   0	0   3	OF 0   4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 288A's)(17)

Also on June 23, 1992, the System Engineer, while in the process of reviewing the completed OP-ST-FP-0001, realized that the fire barrier impairment and associated fire watch had not been generated at the time the door latch was discovered by Operations to be inoperable. Incident Report (IR) 920451 was generated to document the fact that the fire barrier impairment and associated fire watch were not implemented within one hour of discovery as required by TS 2.19(7).

This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This report is also being submitted pursuant to TS 5.9.3 (as referenced in TS 2.19(7)) because Fire Door 989-4 was inoperable for more than seven days.

A review of OP-ST-FP-0001 and OI-FP-6 found that a note at the beginning of OI-FP-6, Checklist H, which is utilized for fire door checks, stated, in part, that "All doors shall be closed unless in use or a Fire Watch is posted." The operator who discovered the broken latch and the Shift Supervisor who reviewed the completed surveillance test both interpreted the note as an indication that as long as the door was shut, the requirements of TS 2.19(7) were met. A review of other operating instructions, standing orders, surveillance tests and maintenance procedures related to fire doors was also conducted. As a result, it has been determined that fire door/latching mechanism operability was not adequately addressed in the following procedures: SO-G-58, 'Control of Fire Protection System Impairments' and GM-PM-MX-0501, 'Inspection and Repetitive Maintenance for Alarmed RCA Doors.'

The significance of this event with respect to nuclear, equipment and personnel safety was negligible because Room 7 does not contain significant amounts of combustible material and the fire detectors in the area were operable to alert the Control Room in the event of a fire.

The root cause of this event was determined to be ambiguous instructions contained in the note at the beginning of procedure OI-FP-6, Checklist H, 'Fire Protection Door Check.' A contributing cause identified with respect to this event was that upon discovery of the discrepancy, the operator did not report his finding to the Shift Supervisor as required by the procedure.

The following corrective actions have been completed:

1. Procedure OI-FP-6 has been revised to clearly define that the latching mechanism on a fire door must be operable in order for the fire door to be considered operable.
2. A memorandum has been issued to plant personnel to inform them of the event, requirements for maintaining fire door qualification and the importance of notifying the Shift Supervisor immediately upon discovery of a discrepancy with a fire door.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 90.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (P-150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   8   5	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (4)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	PREVIOUS NUMBER		
		9   2	-   0   2   1	-   0   0	0   4	OF 0   4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 886A's)(17)

The following corrective actions will be completed:

1. Procedure SO-G-58 will be revised by September 30, 1992 to clearly define that the latching mechanism on a fire door must be operable in order for the fire door to be considered operable.
2. Procedure GM-PM-MX-0501 will be revised by October 30, 1992 to clearly define that a fire impairment is required within one hour if, during inspection of alarmed doors in the Radiation Controlled Area, the latching mechanism on a Technical Specification fire door is discovered to be inoperable.
3. Shift Supervisors will discuss with their crews the importance of immediately notifying the Shift Supervisor of any anomalies or deficiencies identified while performing a surveillance test. These discussions will be completed by July 31, 1992.

LERs 92-003, 91-006 and 90-001 document previous events involving failure to initiate fire watches. None of these previous events related to operability requirements for fire doors.