



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429
July 10, 1992

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324
LICENSE NO. DPR-62

SPECIAL REPORT PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8 AND
PURSUANT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.9.2 (2-SR-92-004)

Gentlemen:

The following fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) informational summaries are a result of major structural outage modifications being performed at the Brunswick Plant. The number of LCOs required by this work occurred due to the major scope and duration of the outage required to complete the structural modifications.

A2-92-F0382

On June 3, 1992, at 1110 hours, a seven day LCO was initiated due to the discovery that a fire barrier penetration seal, located over the Unit 2 computer room had been opened. The seal was not identified on the current design drawing as a fire seal when this work commenced. Therefore, LCOs had not been initiated and appropriate fire watches had not been established. Upon determination that the seal was a fire seal, an LCO was initiated and an appropriate fire watch established. The seal was discovered during modification work associated with the missile deflector wall in the Unit 2 control room stairwell. On June 10, 1992, at 1110 hours, this LCO exceeded 7 days. Due to ongoing work associated with the missile deflector, this seal was restored, but required longer than the 7 days allowed by technical specifications. This LCO was cancelled on June 24, 1992 at 1615 hours. Appropriately stationed fire watches remained in effect until this LCO was cancelled.

A2-92-F0397

On June 5, 1992, at 1445 hours, a seven day LCO was initiated due to the opening of a hole in the east wall of the Unit 2 reactor building, resulting from the removal of a conduit and cable penetration which was discovered during reactor building wall inspections. This conduit and cable protruded through the east wall of the Unit 2 reactor building to the 20 foot elevation in the RHR heat exchanger room. The conduit and cable, which was indicated on the Unit 2 design drawings as a spare penetration, was capped on the inside wall of the Unit 2 reactor building, but uncapped on the outside surface of the wall. An engineering evaluation is being conducted to determine the appropriate repair for the hole in the reactor building wall. Appropriate fire watches were established when the LCO was initiated. On June 12, 1992, at 1445 hours, this LCO exceeded seven days. This work is currently scheduled to be completed by July 17, 1992. Appropriately scheduled fire watches will remain in effect until this work is completed and the LCO is cancelled.


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A2-92-F0400

On June 6, 1992, at 0930 hours, a seven day LCO was initiated due to the opening of fire door 102 in order to support outage work. This door is located in the control building. Appropriate fire watches were established at that time. On June 13, 1992, this LCO exceeded 7 days. This LCO was cancelled on June 20, 1992 at 0930 hours. Appropriately stationed fire watches remained in effect until the LCO was cancelled.

Very truly yours,



J. W. Spencer, General Manager
Brunswick Nuclear Project

JCP/jp

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. R. H. Lo
BSEP NRC Resident Office