LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85								
ACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER	(2)	PAGE													
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2								0 3 9 17	1 OF 01							
Signi'icant Design	Deficien				1.1											
EVENT DATE (8)	LER NUMBER	statement of the second second second	REPORT DATE	1 (7)		OTHER	FACILITIES INVOL	VED (8)								
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH DAY	YEAR		PACILITY NA	AMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
								0 5 0 0	10111							
15 2 15 8 4 8 4 0 4 7 0 1 0 1 2 5 8 5								0 1510 10	101 1 1							
OPERATING	PORT IS SUBMITTI	D PUREUANT T	O THE REQUIREME	NTS OF 10	CFR 5: 10		of the following; (11									
	402(b)	-	20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1)		X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	Se . 66 S.	73,71(b) 73,71(c)								
LEVEL O O O	406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(e)(2)		-	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		X OTHER IS	weity in Abetract							
20	406(a)(1'(iii))		60.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)		Below and in Text. NRC Form 366AJ								
	.406(a)(1)(iv)	-	80.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)		H	50.73(a)(2)(viii)		50.72(0)(2)(ii)							
			ICENSEE CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)											
NAME							AREA CODE	TELEPHONE NUN	REA							
R. L. Koenigs, Cor	noliance E	naineer						31 7 71-	1 2 5101							
R. E. Roenigs, oo	and the second se	and the second se	EACH COMPONENT	PAILURE	-			2279	I H VIVI							
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT	COMPONENT MANUFAC. REPORTABLE TURER TO NERDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TURER	TO NPROS								
B JIM III		N				111	111									
- I I I I I I I	1					111	1.1.1									
	SUPPLEM	ENTAL REPORT	EXPECTED (14)	-			EXPECTE	MONTH	DAY YEAR							
YES I'L VA SUMPLAN EXACTED	EURWISSION DAT		Y NO				SUBMISSIC DATE IS	in i								
Biological Shield Immediate correct Technical Specific	Wall - Pe ive actio	netratio n was t	on Fire Pro	sh a					nce with							

A

NRC Form 388

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXPIRES 8/31/86

PACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)						Г	LER NUMBER (6)									PAGE (3)			
									Y	18AA 14		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER				NUMBER			Π		
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0	15	10	0	10	13	19	17	8		-	0	Ħ	17	-	0[1	0 12	OF	01	2	

Plant Conditions

a) Power Level - 0%

b) Plant Mode - 4

Event

During a cross-discipline review of radiation shielding for penetrations through the biological shield wall, it was determined that the previous design did not consider radiant heat from adjacent fire zones to possibly ignite the ureathane foam separating the biological shield wall and primary containment vessel. The resultant fire could incapacitate the electrical penetrations required for safe shutdown. The WNP-2 FSAR committed that the biological shield wall penetrations must be sealed to maintain the three hour margin required by 10CFR50, Appendix R.

Immediate Corrective Action

Upon notification of the event the Shift Manager assigned a person as a Fire Watch Patrol to view one side of the wall in all areas where unsealed penetrations exist, at least once every hour, in accordance with Technical Specification Action Item 3.7.7.a. This person's duties were to determine that no fire exists that could ignite the foam between containment pressure vessel and the biological shield wall. Verbal notification was given to NRC at 1530 hours on May 25, 1984.

Final Corrective Action

By 6/15/84, all but one of the penetrations determined to need seals (122) were sealed with a minimum of four inches[®] of approved sealing media which provided not less than 3 (three) hours of fire protection to the containment pressure vessel. Engineering direction to seal the remaining one penetration has been implemented and resulted in 100% sealing. Hourly fire watch patrols were maintained until 100% closure was achieved. All other biological shield wall penetrations within the Plant have been reviewed for this condition and it has been determined no further sealing is required.

Safety Significance

This event is considered to be unique to the biological shield wall and the result of a specific design deficiency. The final assessment determined that this design deficiency had no impact on non-biological shield wall penetrations. The biological shield wall, as committed in the FSAR (per 10CFR50, Appendix R) is a 3-hour fire barrier. In the event of a fire in the Reactor Building, had it gone undetected for a significant period of time, it was deemed possible that high temperatures from the fire could have resulted in radiant heat transmission through the unsealed penetrations and ignition of the ureathane foam insulation. Burning of this foam could result in heat damage to electrical penetrations associated with dedicated safe shutdown equipment and potentially preclude achieving safe shutdown.

However, this did not happen and actions taken since the determination that fire seals were required have eliminated the condition. The assessment was made that the event posed no danger to Plant personnel or the public.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

January 25, 1985

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-047-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-047-01 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73, discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, action taken to preclude recurrence and clarifies the intent of the corrective action discussed in Licensee Event Report 84-047-00.

Very truly yours,

CM Pavers for

J. D. Martin (M/D 927M) WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 84-047-01

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A) Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA