



Nebraska Public Power District

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NSD920730
July 8, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Notification of Plans to Restore Alternate Shutdown Capability
Cooper Nuclear Station
NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46

Gentlemen:

This letter is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specification 3.2.1.2. The Limiting Condition for Operation for this specification was entered when the Alternate Shutdown (ASD) capability for CNS was declared inoperable on June 11, 1992, following a review of NRC Information Notice 92-18, "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire." The review discovered that the possibility exists, in certain fire scenarios, for control circuit faults to occur in 19 motor operated valves prior to the transfer of their control to the ASD panel. These control circuit faults could cause the bypass of the motor operator position limit and torque cutout switches and, because of the absence of thermal overload protection, could permit possible damage to the motor operated valve thereby rendering the ASD capability inoperable.

CNS Technical Specification 3.2.1.2 does not require a plant shutdown upon loss of ASD capability but rather restoration of the equipment to operable status within 30 days or notification of the NRC providing the District's plans to restore the ASD capability. The District is currently reviewing the various corrective measures that will provide permanent resolution of this ASD deficiency. The District is committed to complete any necessary valve circuit modifications or other permanent corrective actions prior to startup from the Spring 1993 refueling outage presently scheduled to begin in March 1993.

In the interim, the District has initiated several compensatory measures that include:

- Briefing of appropriate plant and control room personnel on the potential failure mechanisms and mitigating actions.
- Implementing temporary procedure changes to expedite implementation of mitigating actions and corrective measures to prevent damage to motor operated valve circuits.

The District plans to continue plant operation with these interim measures in place until the Spring 1993 refueling outage during which final corrective actions will be completed. These interim measures, in conjunction with the plant's existing fire detection and suppression capabilities required by


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Technical Specifications and the extremely low probability of a fire occurring in those areas that would cause a loss of ASD capability, will maintain the required level of safety for continued operation of CNS through March 1993.

If you have any questions, please call.

Sincerely,



G. R. Horn
Nuclear Power
Group Manager

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cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
Arlington, Texas

NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Cooper Nuclear Station