

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-275/96-05  
50-323/96-05

Licenses: DPR-80  
DPR-82

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
77 Beale Street, Room 1451  
P.O. Box 770000  
San Francisco, California


Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: San Luis Obispo County, California

Inspection Conducted: March 18-22, 1996

Inspector: D. W. Schaefer, Physical Security Specialist  
Plant Support Branch

Approved:

  
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch  
Division of Reactor Safety

  
Date

Inspection Summary

Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2): Routine, announced inspection of the physical security program. The areas inspected included audits, protected area barriers, access control of personnel and packages, testing and maintenance, training and qualification, lighting, records and reports, review of previous inspection findings, and review of commitments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Results (Units 1 and 2):

Plant Support

- The security audit program was effective, performance oriented, and comprehensive (Section 1.1).
- A very good protected area barrier was in place. A weakness was identified involving obstructions (weeds) in a portion of the isolation zones (Section 1.2).

- An effective program for searching personnel and packages at the main protected area and at the intake structure was maintained. The program for the timely withdrawal of security badges for personnel that had terminated employment at the site was excellent (Section 1.3).
- The length of time required to complete action requests and repair security equipment was excessive (Section 1.4).
- Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented (Section 1.5).
- Security lighting inside the protected area was very good (Section 1.6).
- The security quarterly event logs and event reports were excellent (Section 1.7).

Summary of Inspection Findings:

- Followup Item 275/9228-01; 323/9228-01 was closed (Section 2.1).
- Followup Item 275/9228-02; 323/9228-02 was closed (Section 2.2).
- Followup Item 275/9513-01; 323/9513-01 was closed (Section 2.3).

Attachment:

- Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting

## DETAILS

### 1 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM (81700)

The inspector reviewed certain elements of the licensee's physical security program in order to determine adequacy and compliance with the NRC-approved physical security plan. Evaluations and determinations were based primarily on observations of activities, review of records, and interviews with licensee and contractor personnel. The following paragraphs describe the inspection findings in each of the program areas inspected.

#### 1.1 Audits

The audits of the security program were reviewed to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p), and the security plan.

The inspector confirmed that a security program audit was conducted at least every 12 months. By a review of licensee records and interviews with audit personnel, the inspector confirmed that members of the audit teams were independent of plant security management. Audit team personnel were qualified to conduct audits and the audits were performance based. The security department was prompt in resolving all deficiencies/findings.

#### 1.2 Protected Area Barriers

The licensee's protected area physical barriers were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the main protected area barrier and isolation zones. The inspector determined, by observation, that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the security plan. The required isolation zones were maintained on each side of the barrier and were free of obstructions that would allow an intruder to hide from assessment by cameras or response personnel, except as noted below.

On March 18, 1996, the inspector observed that a portion of the isolation zone near the warehouse contained weeds that were approximately 4 feet tall. Upon identification, the licensee compensated for this weakness by posting a member of the security force to observe this area until the weeds were removed.

#### 1.3 Access Control - Personnel and Packages

The access control program for personnel was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

The inspector determined through observations at the security building that the licensee properly controlled access of personnel to the protected area. The inspector observed the x-ray machine search of packages at the access control point. The operators were efficient and appeared to be well trained. The last control area for access to the plant was contained within a bullet resistant enclosure.

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During this inspection, the inspector also observed the searching of packages and materials at the receiving warehouse. The licensee's system of ensuring a search of packages and materials was efficient.

During this inspection, the inspector verified through a review of records that the security badges for personnel that had terminated employment at the site between February 1 and March 18, 1996, had been properly deleted from the active access authorization program.

#### 1.4 Testing and Maintenance

The testing and maintenance program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the open action requests (work orders) for repair, maintenance, or enhancement to security equipment. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had 16 open "NRC trackable" action requests. One of the action requests was less than 90 days old; 11 action requests were between 3 months and 1 year old; and the remaining 4 action requests were between 1 and 5 years old. The oldest action request, pertaining to necessary modification to a portion of the perimeter alarm system, had been submitted in February 1991. The repairs and modifications to the security equipment had not been completed.

During this inspection, the inspector also observed that the image produced on a television monitor (screen) inside a guard station was blurred. The officer stationed inside the guard station stated that the blurred image on the monitor made it difficult to distinguish the image displayed on the monitor. An action request for this monitor had been submitted in July 1995; however, the problem had not been corrected as of March 22, 1996.

During the exit meeting on March 22, 1996, the inspector stated that the length of time required to complete the above two action requests appeared excessive. The licensee stated that they would review the inspector's observations.

#### 1.5 Training and Qualification

The security training and qualification program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the Training and Qualifications Plan.

The inspector reviewed medical examination records for six security officers. The records were complete and indicated that the required annual medical examinations were thorough and conducted in a timely manner. The results of the medical examinations were properly documented.

During the inspection, the inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. Without exception, the security officers were confident that the on-site medical staff provided high quality medical services, including the required annual medical examination.

The inspector also observed security officers assigned to the various defensive positions throughout the protected areas. All security officers maintained assigned security equipment and were knowledgeable of their assigned response duties.

### 1.6 Lighting

The protected area and isolation zone lighting system was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

On the evening of March 20, 1996, the inspector determined, by observation, that illumination of the isolation zone and the protected area provided a minimum of 0.2 foot-candles.

### 1.7 Records and Reports

Records and reports were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) and (c), 10 CFR 26.73, and the security plan.

The inspector determined by a review of the security event reports and the security quarterly event logs that the licensee conforms to the regulatory and license requirements to report security events. The inspector specifically reviewed the security quarterly event log from January 1 to March 18, 1996. The reports were accurate, neat and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine reportability and corrective action taken.

## 2 FOLLOWUP (92904)

### 2.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 275/9228-01; 323/9228-01: Video Capture Buffer Overflow

In October 1992, the licensee's "video capture" system was evaluated by NRR. It was determined that the electronic buffer (memory) only captured and stored the views associated with a few alarms; all additional security alarms were lost. As a result, in certain conditions, the video capture system was ineffective.

During this inspection, the licensee demonstrated the capabilities of their upgraded video capture system. The buffer (memory) of the new video capture system was capable of capturing and storing many additional security alarms.

### 2.2 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 275/9228-02; 323/9228-02: Perimeter Intrusion Detection System Weakness

In October 1992, a perimeter microwave alarm link at Vehicle Gate 1 was defeated by climbing on a support post and jumping over the detection zone. A

compensatory security watch person remained posted in this area pending completion of the licensee's corrective actions.

The licensee's evaluation determined that the long-range microwave transceivers were not designed for the short-range area at Gate 1. During this inspection, the inspector observed that short-range transceivers plus a new vehicle barrier system gate that had been installed at Gate 1. A compensatory security watch person remained posted in this area pending completion of additional ground leveling work. The inspector determined that the weakness at Gate 1, had been eliminated.

2.3 (Closed) Violation 275/9513-01; 323/9513-01: Inadequate Searching of Material at the Warehouse

During a previous security inspection, the inspector determined that 21 boxes off-loaded at the warehouse were not adequately searched prior to admittance into the protected area.

In their September 8, 1995, response to this violation, the licensee stated that Security Procedure SP-405, "Incoming Package and Material Control," required either x-ray or hands-on searches of packages being transported into the protected area. Due to temporary inoperability of an x-ray machine, warehouse materials employees were conducting physical, hands-on searches of all materials entering the protected area. All of the packages in question were opened and inspected inside, however, contrary to SP-405, the search was not sufficient to detect possible contraband in the bottom of the packages. The use of hands-on searches increased the time required to perform materials searches and may have led the employees to rush the search process and therefore conduct an incomplete search process.

In their response to this violation, the licensee also stated that the following corrective actions were implemented: (1) warehouse materials employees researched the materials in question, revealing no contraband, weapons or explosives; and (2) security personnel were briefed concerning specifics of the inadequate search, and warehouse materials employees received refresher training on the proper conduct of searches, emphasizing that employees must be more cognizant of the manner in which searches are conducted. Additionally, the licensee stated that an evaluation of the materials receipt and search process will be performed to provide recommendations for improving these processes by October 1, 1995.

During this inspection, the inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions. The licensee's evaluation indicated that a Warehouse HIT-Team, comprised of six security and three warehouse personnel, met on July 25, August 1 and August 8, 1995, to evaluate the receipt and search process for warehouse materials. The team has revised Security Procedure SP-405 to further define the armed security officer's responsibilities at the warehouse, and also revised the opening and closing checklists for the operation of the warehouse material receiving area.

### 3 REVIEW OF COMMITMENTS IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspector verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.

## ATTACHMENT

### 1 PERSONS CONTACTED

#### 1.1 Licensee Personnel

- \*R. Powers, Acting Vice President and Plant Manager
- H. Cowan, Security Shift Supervisor, Training
- \*C. Dougherty, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Quality Services
- \*W. Drake, Watch Commander, Security Services
- \*L. Fisher, Security Supervisor, Compliance and Administration
- \*C. Harbor, Nuclear Regulatory Engineer, Regulatory Services
- \*J. Hubble, Security Supervisor, Special Projects
- \*L. Lunsford, Security Supervisor, Operations and Training
- \*D. Morris, Security Shift Supervisor, Special Projects
- R. Prigmore, Engineer, Quality Assurance
- \*W. Ryan, Supervisor, Access and Fitness-for-Duty
- \*R. Taylor, QA Engineer, Nuclear Quality Services
- \*R. Todaro, Director, Security Services
- R. Willett, Watch Commander, Security Services
- \*J. Young, Director, Quality Assurance

#### 1.2 NRC Personnel

- M. Tschiltz, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Boynton, Resident Inspector

\*Denotes those that attended the exit interview.

In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspector contacted other personnel during this inspection period. Those employees included members of the licensee's technical and management staff and members of the security organization.

### 2 EXIT INTERVIEW

An exit meeting was conducted on March 22, 1996. During this meeting, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report.