

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices - Selden Street, Berlin Connecticut

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July 10, 1992
MP-92-740

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Licensee Event Report 92-009-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-009-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: Stephen E. Scace
Director, Millstone Station

BY: Fred R. Dacimo
Millstone Site Services Director

SES/RAP:ljs

Attachment: LER 92-009-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding this estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) **Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 1** PAGE (3) **OF 0 2**

TITLE (4) **Sprinkler System Isolation**

EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES										
0	6	1	2	9	2	9	2	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	6	1	2	9	2	9	2	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):																		
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	0	0	0	20.402(b)		20.402(d)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)									
					20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)									
					20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
					20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
					20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)												

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME **Richard A. Perry, Engineer, Ext. 6067** TELEPHONE NUMBER **2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 12, 1992, at 0001 hrs, with the plant in Mode 5, an Auxiliary Building elevation (-)45'-6" sprinkler system, required by Technical Specifications, was isolated for approximately eight hours. This isolation took place while isolating the piping for planned work on three hose stations. The Technical Specification Action Statement was logged for the hose stations (TSAS 3.7.9.3.a), but not for the sprinkler system (TSAS 3.7.9.2.a). Work was stopped, the isolation valve was reopened, the Technical Specification Action Statement was exited. A continuous fire-watch was stationed as directed by TSAS 3.7.9.2.a, and backup suppression was verified. Work was restarted, again, in accordance with the requirements of TSAS 3.7.9.2.a.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-830), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 51-503369-2	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3) 02 OF 02
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		92	009	00	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A-1 (1))

I. Description of Event

While in Mode 5 on June 12, 1992, at 0001 hours, the fire protection system located at the (-)45'6" elevation in the Auxiliary building was tagged out in preparation for repairs to three hose stations (222, 224 & 225).

The Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS 3.7.9.3.a) was logged for the isolated hose stations. An additional equivalent fire hose capacity was routed to this area. The Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS 3.7.9.2.a) was not logged for the sprinklers.

The sprinkler system was isolated for approximately eight hours. Upon discovery that the sprinklers were isolated along with the fire hose stations, the hose stations and sprinkler system were put back into an operable state. A continuous fire watch was stationed per TSAS 3.7.9.2.a and backup suppression was verified, and work restarted.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of the event is personnel error. The operator thought that this sprinkler system was not part of the Technical Specifications and, therefore, did not take this action required by TSAS 3.7.9.2.a.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), "any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications." The Auxiliary building (-) 45' -6" elevation general area was not protected by a sprinkler system for approximately eight hours. This area is protected by a fire detection system. During this period there were no challenges to the fire detection or suppression systems. There were no fires detected during the plant equipment operator rounds.

The safety significance of this event was minimal. Additional fire hose capability had been provided for this area. Any fire would have been quickly detected since the area smoke detectors were operable. Smoke detection would initiate a response by the unit fire brigade. Therefore, any fire would be quickly extinguished.

IV. Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to restore the hose stations and sprinkler system to an operable state. Action to prevent recurrence:

The incident has been discussed with Operations Department personnel to reinforce the need to verify fire systems covered by Technical Specifications before authorizing system isolations.

V. Additional Information

There were no failed components

Similar LERS: none

EHS Codes

<u>System</u>	<u>Components</u>
KP - Fire Protection Water	Sprinkler