

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OF UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE --PNO-V-92-22 Date: 7/6/92

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by Region V staff on this date.

FACILITY: WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
WNP-2
DOCKET NO. 50-397
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

Emergency Classification
 Notification of Unusual Event
 Alert
 Site Area Emergency
 General Emergency
 Not Applicable

SUBJECT: FAILURE OF SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (REACTOR SCRAM/UNUSUAL EVENT)

At 4:56 a.m. (all times PDT) on July 6, 1992, while testing safety/relief valves (SRVs) from the alternate remote shutdown panel, SRV 3B opened and would not close. Operators attempted unsuccessfully to reclose the SRV by transferring control back to the control room twice. At 4:58 a.m., after two minutes had elapsed with the SRV still open, operators initiated a manual scram as prescribed by the Technical Specifications (TS). The SRV closed 28 seconds later.

WNP-2 was in the process of initial startup following its 1992 refueling outage. The reactor was initially at 14% power, with pressure at 930 psig under automatic control of the bypass valves. The plant responded appropriately after the scram, and was stabilized without complication. Reactor pressure decreased to approximately 850 psig before the SRV closed, representing a cooldown of about 15 degrees F. Reactor water level went below 13 inches following the scram (on narrow range indication, from an initial level of approximately 35 inches), and suppression pool temperature reached 91 degrees F. These conditions prompted entry into the emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The operators responded well to the event, and exited the EOPs at 5:05 a.m. after conditions were stabilized. An Unusual Event (UE) was declared at that time, and was terminated at 5:48 a.m.

SRV 3B was worked during the refueling outage and had been sent offsite for setpoint testing by a contractor. The SRV had failed to open from the control room earlier in the test sequence. The licensee has quarantined SRV 3B and is placing the plant in cold shutdown for an expected two days to conduct an investigation and perform other maintenance activities. The SRVs at WNP-2 are Crosby 6XRX10 Style HB-65-BP dual function valves.

The Senior Resident Inspector entered the control room shortly before the scram was initiated, and monitored operator actions in response to the event. The residents are following the licensee's ongoing investigation. The licensee has issued a press release regarding this event.

This information is current as of 9:30 a.m. on July 6, 1992.

Contact: P. H. Johnson (510) 975-0300

9207130017 920706
PDR I&E
PNO-V-92-099 PDR

1E34 1/0

DISTRIBUTION BY 5520:

Date: 7/06/92 Time: 12:30 pm

Comm. Rogers	EDO	RI
Comm. Curtiss	AEOD	RII
Comm. Remick	SLITP	RIII
Comm. de Planque	NRR	RIV
OCA	NMSS	
OGC	IRM	
OE	RES	

FAX TO:

Date 7/06/92 Time: 12:45 pm

The Chairman
 ACRS
 OIG
 OCAA
 OPA
 LICENSEE
 INPO
 NSAC
 RESIDENT INSPECTOR
 HQS. OPERATIONS OFFICER
 PDR (202) 634-3343

MAIL TO:

DCS (Original)
 DOT: (Trans. Only, Applicable State)