NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
INDIAN POINT UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

FAILURE OF AUX. FEEDWATER PUMP STEAM ISOLATION VALVES

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
1 1	2 7	8 4	8 4	— 0 2 2	— 0 0	1 2	2 7	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
MICHAEL BLATT	AREA CODE 9 1 4 5 2 6 — 5 1 2 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	S B	I S V	C 6 8 4	N					
A	S B	P S X	A 6 0 9	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				
NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 27, 1984 an inservice valve test was performed on two isolation valves, PCV 1310A and B, located in series on the main steam inlet to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The valves are designed to terminate steam flow in the event of a steam line break in the room which contains the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

The valves failed to stroke due to a lack of power to the solenoid valves controlling air to the air operator. The valves were left in the open position and a roll-up door in the room was opened to provide a steam vent path. Power was subsequently restored to the solenoid valves.

The cause of the event was the disconnection of and subsequent failure to reconnect the power feeds to the solenoid valves during installation of a modification to the auxiliary boiler feedwater pump recirculation valve in the summer of 1984.

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On November 27, 1984 while at full power during the course of an inservice valve test it was observed that both isolation valves located in series on the steam inlet line to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump did not stroke. It was further determined that valve inoperability was due to lack of power to the solenoid valves controlling the air supply to the isolation valve air operators.

The isolation valves are designed to terminate steam flow in the event of a steam line break downstream of the valves in the room which contains the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Only one valve is required to perform the isolation function. In the event of a steam line leak or break, if the valves did not function the remaining safety-related equipment in the room might be exposed to excessive temperatures.

The isolation valves were left in the as found (open) position. An equipment roll up door was opened to provide a vent path in the unlikely event of steam release and a guard posted for security until power was restored to the solenoid valves.

The cause of the incident was the inadvertent disconnection of the power supplies to the isolation valve solenoids during a recent wiring modification. In that modification, instructions to disconnect and reconnect certain wires were stated on the applicable drawing, however, there were variations between the design document and the field condition with respect to the terminal block configuration and the power feeds to the solenoid valves which were in the same location. The variation with the terminal block configuration was reported in accordance with procedure but the variation associated with the power feeds was not identified. In performing this work the power feeds to the solenoids were disconnected in addition to the wires associated with the planned modification. The rewiring modification was completed but the solenoid wires were not reconnected.

Procedures and associated training will be reviewed to determine if they can be modified to reduce the possibility for a reoccurrence.

The previous surveillance test on these valves was performed on March 4, 1984 and the isolation valves were found operable. The modification of concern was performed during the summer of 1984 when the plant was at cold shutdown for a refueling maintenance outage. The plant operated without an operational demand for the disabled isolation valves from startup in October until detection. At no time was the operability of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump affected. There was no adverse impact on the safety of the public as a result of this event.

John D. O'Toole
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
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Telephone (212) 460-2533

December 27, 1984

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER-84-022-00

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER-84-022-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.73.

Very truly yours,

for J. O'Toole

attach.
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley,
Regional Administrator-Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Senior Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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