UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

Aug 30, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. Vito, Senior Allegation Coordinator

FROM: J. Durr, Chief, Projects Branch 4

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION FILE RECLOSURE RI-94-A-0185

By memorandum dated December 28, 1994, we attempted to closeout the subject allegation related to improper instructor assistance and post alteration of test answer sheets during the administration of general employee training (GET) and respiratory protection examinations for Oyster Creek site access. The concerns were given to the licensee (GPUN) by letter of September 28, 1994, and their response was received on October 27, 1994.

Our original review of the licensee's response resulted in findings that the licensee had completed an extensive review of this allegation and taken appropriate actions based on their review. These findings were based on the following facts.

- GPUN received the anonymous allegation on their ethics hotline telephone answering machine on August 9, 1994, one day after the resident inspectors received apparently the same data as an anonymous allegation. GPUN's formal investigation was initiated on August 18, 1994 and the report was signed out on October 5, 1994.

- The instructor that provided inappropriate assistance during the GET training was terminated.

- The temporary outage instructor that regraded the test answer sheets (changed the scoring) was counseled as to the inappropriateness of alterations and terminated upon completion of the temporary assignment (end of outage).

- Site access for the examined individual has been denied.

I understand that the issue of (a) violation(s) of NRC requirements has been discussed among Karla Smith, Ron Nimitz, Barry Letts, and yourself as indicated by Karla's E-mail of April 3, 1995. This is to provide DRP's evaluation of potential violation(s), and to attempt to reclose this old allegation.

The regulations suggested in the E-mail are:

1) 10 CFR 19.12 provides, in part, that all individuals working in or frequenting any portion of a restricted area shall be instructed in the health protection problems associated with exposure to such radioactive materials or radiation in precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, and in the purposes and functions of protective devices employed.

G1135

2) 10 CFR 20.1703(a)(3)(iv) provides, in part, that if the licensee uses respiratory protection equipment to limit intake, the licensee shall implement a respiratory protection program that includes supervision and training of personnel.

3) 10 CFR 50.5 provides, in part, that any employee of a licensee or any employee of a contractor who knowingly provides to any licensee goods or services may not deliberately submit to the licensee information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.

In one issue, the practice of providing on-the-spot instruction and regrading by one instructor was not allowed by GPUN. GPUN requires anyone who fails the GET exam to come back later for retraining and a retesting. The NRC has no requirements regarding the nature and administration of the examination.

In a second, but similar issue, a student altered his test answers after grading. These alterations were promptly detected and the employee admitted to the alterations. However, contrary to the warnings of the penalties for cheating, the instructor believed that the student had sufficient knowledge and regraded the examination to pass the student. As discussed above, the NRC does not have requirements regarding the administration of the examination.

Overall, the NRC only requires instruction or training; examination records are not required. The allegation nor the findings support lack of adequate instruction or training. For both issues, the process that GPUN had established to control the administration of examinations was simply not followed by the instructors. Because the licensee took corrective actions to terminate the GPUN and contractor employees, terminated site access for the examined individual, and no submittal was made to the NRC, the information provided to the licensee was not material to the NRC. As a result, no violation of NRC requirements is identified.

not true { It is my understanding that OI has been provided the information contained in this allegation file and has chosen not to become involved. Therefore, I believe it's time to close this old allegation and move on to issues more important to reactor safety. Concurrence in this memorandum indicates agreement in this conclusion.

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G1136

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\BRANCH4\ALLEG-4B\COM94185.OC
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE	DRP/RI		DRP/RI		RC/RI		OI/RI		SAC/RI	
NAME	EConner*		JRogge*		KSmith		BLetts		DVito	
DATE	08/10/95 8/30		08/16/95		08/ /95		08/ /95		08/ /95	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE PAGE

RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: Oyster Creek

ALLEGATION NO.: RI-92-A-0181

DATE: _____ (Panel No. 1 2 3 4 5)

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DD BC SC

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No

(See Allegation Receipt Report)

PANEL ATTENDEES:

Chairman - _____

Branch Chief - _____

Section Chief (AOC) - _____

Sr. Allegation Coord (SAC) _____

OI Representative - _____

(Other) _____

IS THERE A HARASSMENT/DISCRIMINATION ISSUE: Yes No

IF YES,

1) has the individual been informed of the DOL process and the need to file a complaint within 30 days Yes No

2) has the individual filed a complaint with DOL Yes No

3) has a letter been sent to the complainant seeking any safety concerns Yes No

IS A CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

IF YES, HAS IT BEEN SENT Yes No

HAS THE LICENSEE RESPONDED TO THE CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

ACTION: (State each specific action, including acknowledgment letter, as well as responsibility and ECD)

	RESP	ECD
1) Resident inspectors drive out to bridge and ensure repairs are complete and bridge is open to general traffic. Document with memo from residents to allegation file.	DRP	
2) If bridge is open, closeout allegation with memo to file. Closeout letter to alleger is not required.	SAC	
3) If bridge is closed, document in closeout memo to file that per resident inspector discussion with licensee, licensee was aware that bridge work was in progress and bridge was available for use in case of emergency. Residents will monitor bridge work until complete. Closeout letter to	SAC	

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ALLEGATION RI-93-A-0224
ISSUE 2 AND 3

Issue 2

Allegation - A warehouse break-in was not handled well.

Response - The warehouse breakin was in a warehouse outside the protected area. During Inspection 93-26 the incident was reviewed. The review of the Security incident report by the inspector disclosed that the truck driver who broke into the warehouse was on a Security CCTV camera at all times during the incident and the Security response to the incident was timely and appropriate. Follow-up actions were also thorough and comprehensive.

Note: Because the break-in occurred in a warehouse outside the Protected Area, this incident was treated as an industrial security issue, not a nuclear security issue. Also, any material taken from the warehouse into the restricted area would have to be searched first.

Issue 3

Allegation - Security guards pulling guns on individuals not involved in security drills.

This issue was reviewed during inspection 93-26. All drills are conducted during back shifts when the plant population is at a minimum. The control room is notified prior to the drills starting and attempt is made to determine if anyone is working in the area the drills will be conducted so that they can be individually notified. All drills are conducted with unloaded weapons. However, with all the safeguards in place there will be some persons who don't get the word and there is a possibility that an unloaded, drill weapon will be pointed at that person during the drill. While having a weapon pointed at an individual during a drill can be unsettling, with the precautions in place it is not a major safety issue.

G:\Branch4\safeTW.all

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COURSE OF ACTION FOR ALLEGATION RI-92-A-0247

1) • Send an acknowledgement letter to the alleger requesting more information. State in the letter that NRC inspections into radiological control practices during the last two refueling outages have not indicated a problem as described. State that more specific information is needed to allow the NRC to follow-up on the allegation.

• If the alleger responds with more information, repanel.

• If the alleger does not respond within 30 days or does not provide specific information, closeout allegation with letter to the alleger.

2) • No underlying safety issues in the H&I allegation. SRI has given DOL information to the alleger.

• Include standard DOL information in the acknowledgement letter to the alleger. No further action is needed on this issue.

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PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION FOR ALLEGATION RI-92-A-0181

- From discussion with the licensee by the resident inspectors, it was determined that the bridge was never removed from service. It was blocked off to protect the workers from oncoming cars. If necessary, cars could have travelled across the bridge.

- The licensee was aware of the situation and no contingency arrangements to the emergency plan were necessary.

- The bridge work was scheduled to be completed 9/14/92.

- Have the Resident Inspector drive out to the bridge to ensure the repairs are complete and the bridge is open to general traffic. This would be documented in an memo to the allegation file from the residents.

- Closeout allegation with memo to file outlining above information and actions taken. Letter to alleger not required since alleger did not provide address or phone number and stated that they did not request a response.

6/14/92

OYSTER CREEK CONCERNS

A. DEPTH OF INVESTIGATION

1. What was the IRTs charter, scope, number of members, and expertise level?

   A1: IRT's charter was to identify and address anomalies and discrepancies inherent to the tours conducted by the Operations personnel.

   A2: The scope of the investigation was not addressed but appeared limited in that other departments were not investigated, no licensed operators were investigated, training was not addressed, management culpability was not addressed, and human factors concerns were not addressed in any depth.

   A3: The basic team consisted of 4 security type personnel. Their expertise was not addressed. Limited help was also received from the Rad Waste Operations Manager and a technical analyst. Independence of the team was not apparent in that they daily briefed OC management of their findings.

   A4: The expertise level of the IRT members could not be determined from the report. However based on both phase one and two reports it appears they had little operational experience.

2. Adequacy of IRT investigation

   a. Was the investigation period long enough to adequately determine the depth of the problem?

      A1: The investigation period was from December 1, 1991, to February 29, 1992. The IRT investigated 12 days of turbine building rounds, 1 day of reactor building rounds, and 0 days of intake area rounds during this time period.

      C1: Why did the investigation only focus on the turbine building rounds?

      C2: Was a 13 day sample period large enough to assess the depth of the problem at OC?

   b. Did the IRT investigate other departments possible involvement?

      A1: Not addressed in the report.

   c. Was any data analysis done to help determine root cause?

      A1: Not addressed in the report

d. What was the percentage of the operating staff investigated?

A1: Eighteen out of 25 (?) operators were interviewed. It was determined however that 24/25 operators did not complete both rounds of their tours. Five operators missed both inspections of an area per shift one or more times.

C1: Were any licensed operators investigated?
C2: Did all 24 operators who had not completed both of their rounds falsify their round sheets or leave them blank?

e. Did the NPOs falsify their round sheets or just fail to perform the inspection rounds and left the round sheets blank?

A1: The report indicated that it was a mixture of both.

C1: Where was management supervision regarding round sheets left blank?

B. MANAGEMENT CULPABILITY

1. How were management's expectations regarding inspection rounds relayed to NPOs?

A1: Not addressed in the report

2. Did the procedures governing inspection rounds adequately address integrity issues and provide guidance on how to perform inspection rounds?

A1: Not addressed in the report

3. Was there appropriate supervisory oversight of inspection rounds?

A1: Not addressed in the report

4. Prior to the INPO inspection, had anyone in management received information that this problem existed (i.e. QA audit results, general knowledge, etc)?

A1: Not addressed in the report

C. TRAINING DEPARTMENTS CULPABILITY

1. Did the NPO training program adequately address integrity issues?

A1: Not addressed in the report

2. Did the NPO training program regarding inspection rounds have clear cut measurable training objectives?

A1: Not addressed in the report

3. Did the Operations/Training departments have a program for identifying NPO performance deficiencies and responding in a timely manner?

A1: Not addressed in the report.

D. MANAGEMENTS RESPONSIVENESS FOR ASSURING SAFETY

1. What immediate actions did management take upon discovery of the problem?

A1: Director of OC directed investigation based on INPO concerns.

C1: Reports did not address whether management determined that the missed inspections represented a safety concern or not.

C2: Report did not address what other immediate actions management took when they learned of the problem. Did they talk to the NPOs, were memos sent to the staff, etc.?

2. What is managements long term plan for getting well?

A1: Not addressed in the report

C1: It appears as if there is a definite training problem, management oversight problem and procedural problems which were not addressed in the report.

3. What disciplinary actions were taken?

A1: The five NPOs who missed both inspections of an area during their shift were given 5 day suspensions and them met with upper management to discuss integrity type issues.

C1: For two of the operators involved it appeared that a serious training problem existed. Why wasn't this addressed by the licensee?

C2: Why weren't the other operators disciplined who had missed inspections on their rounds?

C3: Why wasn't their different levels of discipline administered based on the seriousness and number of the missed inspections?

E. QUESTIONS RELATED DIRECTLY TO PHASE TWO REPORT

1. page 2: "One anomaly was identified..."

   Q1: What was this **one** anomaly? What about the 5 operators identified on page 4?

2. page 4: "Most nuclear plant operators did not make two complete tours ..."

   Q1: Did these NPOs falsify their round sheets or leave them blank? (One is an integrity issue and the other is a management issue.)

3. page 4: "7) Several operators did not accurately record readings ..."

   Q1: Is this a falsification issue?
   Q2: Identify the NPOs by number?

4. page 12: "Corrective Responses" "Similar meetings occurred between the **previously** identified NPOs and ..."

   Q1: Which NPOs are these? Are they the remaining 19/24 NPOs who had missed the second inspections of their rounds or are they those NPOs who were identified in the phase 1 report?

5. page 15: Item 7) "Although interviews of NPOs...was not pursued..."

   Q1: Why wasn't an investigation of these other NPOs conducted?

APPENDIX 3.1

Detailed Description of Allegation:

Not Series just
Administrative in nature.
- A Integrity of Emergency Plans is the issue
Public Communication Plans do not
exist. Company knows but is in a
a deadlock for wk after a 50.59
is required. At TMI QA identified nine months ago
however nothing has changed. At Oyster
Creek it exist only in a word processor.

Should expect a call from alleger at 10:00.
to Bill Rushland for details
Alleger would like to see the deadlock
broken loose. He feels he will be identified

G/142

Nuclear

Additional Remarks and Special Instructions

Coverage Plan.

DATE 3/6/05

PAGE 3 of 3

(5) Immediate work area is very dusty and will be wiped down prior to working. Scaffold shall be wiped down prior to removal.

Prepared By (Print/Sign)	Rad Con Approval (Print/Sign)
Tobey R Humphrey	T S Hess

ALARA/FORMS1/1

RADCON management or GRCS determination?

[ ]-Y [ ]-N Is this work expected to accumulate in excess of 0.1 Person Rem? NOTE: RWPs for a number of separate tasks (Job Orders) each with dose estimates less than 0.1 Person REM do not meet this criteria, even though the total dose estimate exceeds 0.1 Person REM.

[ ]-Y [ ]-N Are significant DAC Hrs (> 10) planned for any individual?

[ ]-Y [ ]-N Does this task involve the breaching of a contaminated system with the potential to cause unacceptable contamination spread?

[ ]-Y [ ]-N Is special monitoring or surveys required by RADCON? Examples: Start Of Job, Go-With or Continuous Monitoring.
NOTE: Breathing Zone Air samples (BZAs) for specific evolutions and system breach surveys, specifically identified on the RWP, do not meet this criteria. Start Of Job surveys to determine specific local radiological conditions do meet this criteria; Start Of Job surveys to verify or confirm general radiological conditions do not meet this criteria.

If the answers to all the above are "NO", then a Pre-Job Briefing is not required and a Pre-Job Discussion may be opted. If the answer to any one of the above is "YES", then a Pre-Job Briefing is required.

Select the type of Pre-Job Briefing requirements based on the following guidance:

[ ] **Initial Pre-Job Briefing which can be downgraded to subsequent discussions by the cognizant GRCS.** This option is to be used for those jobs where initial coordination is needed but for which daily or shiftly discussions with the GRCS and or RCT will be adequate once the job is into production. Workers added to the job after the initial Pre-Job briefing has been completed are not required to be briefed but may participate in the daily / shiftly discussions.

[ ] **Pre-Job Briefing required. Workers added to the job are required to receive a briefing but they may be briefed separately. Rebriefing the entire crew is not required.** This option is to be used for those tasks where each individual must be aware of the Radiological conditions and requirements but where coordination and communication at the job is not impaired.

[ ] **Pre-Job Briefing required. Any changes to the personnel assigned to this task will require a complete rebriefing of the entire crew.** This option is to be used for those tasks where each individual must be aware of the Radiological Conditions and requirements and where coordination and communication at the job are impaired or where time spent communicating or providing instructions could cost significant dose.

- G1143

SPU Nuclear

450096	
DATE 3/1/95	
PAGE 2 of 3	

Additional Remarks and Special Instructions

NOTE: (Use of Self Reading Dosimeters, SRDs)
When a 0-500 mR SRD is required because of expected dose accumulation, a 0-200 SRD is NOT needed. In addition, a 0-500 mR SRD may be substituted for a 0-200 mR SRD when only a 0-200 SRD is called for. (6632-92-0032) ESRDs may be substituted for gamma SRDs (6632-93-014B)

This RWP covers activities which ([X] -are / [ ] -are not) expected to produce Airborne Radioactivity in levels of at least 0.30 DAC. This RWP ([X] -does / [ ] does not) cover work activities which are to be performed in area(s) known or expected to have Airborne Activities of at least 0.30 DAC. Each individual with the probability of exceeding 0.40 DAC-hours shall have a breathing zone air sample. (6632-93-014/6630-ADM-4212.01-02)

This RWP covers activities which ([X] are / [ ] are not) to be done within a posted High Radiation Area. This RWP covers activities where transient High Radiation conditions ([ ] are / [X] are not) expected during this task. Any individual who enters a Posted High Radiation Area SHALL have either a digital alarming dosimeter or a Dose Rate meter. (6632-93-014)
Entries into a Very High Radiation Area (10CFR20.1602) or Exclusion Area ([ ] are / [X] are NOT) authorized by this RWP.

Workers not involved with the Radiologically significant portion of the task may be specifically exempted from attending the pre-job briefing by GRCS or ALARA Review. Workers exempted from the briefing must be identified by name or work function (outside man, runner, etc.) Workers/functions so exempted are:

Clean Area Support

An initial Pre-Job briefing is required with the personnel assigned to the task identified on the front of this RWP, except as exempted above, in attendance. A Pre-job discussion may be opted by the GRCS for all subsequent uses of this RWP as long a Radiological Conditions remain relatively constant. GRCS will determine the need for either a briefing for or a discussion with new workers assigned to this task.

Prepared By (Print/Sign)	Rad Con Approval (Print/Sign)
	BKlerck

ALARA/FORMS1/4

RWP SUPPLEMENT - STANDARD PROTECTIVE CLOTHING SETS

PARTIALS:

1-surgeons cap
1-pair cotton glove liners
1-pair rubber gloves
1-set booties
1-set rubber shoe covers (totes)
NOTE: Surgeons gloves may be substituted for fine/detailed work see RWP

LOW CONTAMINATION:

1-surgeons cap
1-pair cotton coveralls
1-pair cotton glove liners
2-pair rubber gloves - tape inner pair to coveralls at wrists
1-set booties - tape at ankles
1-set rubber shoe covers
NOTE: Surgeons gloves may be substituted for fine/detailed work see RWP
Dosimetry to be worn on outside of PCs with face uncovered. Dosimetry to be worn on inside of PC outside modesty garments, with face covered by respirator or face shield.

HIGH CONTAMINATION:

1-surgeons cap & hood
2-pair cotton coveralls
1-pair cotton glove liners
2-pair rubber gloves - tape inner pair to coveralls at wrists
1-set booties - tape at ankles
1-set rubber shoe covers
NOTE: Surgeons gloves may be substituted for fine/detailed work see RWP
Dosimetry to be worn on outside of PCs with face uncovered. Dosimetry to be worn on inside of PC outside modesty garments, with face covered by respirator of face shield.

VERY HIGH CONTAMINATION/WET

1-surgeons cap & hood
1-pair cotton coveralls
1-set waterproof outers
1-pair cotton glove liners
2-pair rubber gloves - tape inner pair to coveralls at wrists
1 or 2 sets of booties - tape inner pair to inner coveralls at ankles
1-set rubber shoe covers
NOTES: 1 set of booties if working in low contam area (one SOP) 1 or 2 sets of booties if working in High Contamination area (two SOPs). Surgeons gloves may be substituted for fine/detailed work see RWP.
Dosimetry to be worn on outside of PCs with face uncovered. Dosimetry to be worn on inside of PC outside modesty garments, with face covered by respirator or face shield.

See RWP for Additions/deletions/changes to the Standard Sets for your specific worker type.

Form 6630-ADM-4010.02-2

RER REVIEW FORM

RER #95010B

V-16-103 J.O.#60617

Rad Engineering and Plant Engineering postulated several solutions to the leakage occurring from V-16-103.

1. Abandon in place and cap the drain. Response= Vessel construction code requires a relief on a vessel.

2. Reposition the valve. Response= The carbon steel line would add Iron to the Clean-up System and need to be replaced. This would result in much more dose.

3. Prefab special scaffolding to be installed in the room. Response= The welder needs ~~and~~ sufficient platform to work and with the obstacles that are in the way the welder walked down the job and needs full scaffolding. Some requirements have been eliminated to make building the scaffolding quicker in the locked high radiation area.

Other situations were also reviewed.

Work Plan:
1. Erect scaffolding and take hanger measurements for shilding support
2. Install shielding
3. Area wipedown
4. Cut-out V-16-103 with a small PVU
5. Weld in New Valve with a small PVU
6. Remove shielding and scaffolding

Robert A. Heffner

Robert A. Heffner

G1145

WR# 766616 OLMC GPU NUCLEAR REV 00 PAGE: 1
PRI 1 CYCLE 15 JOB ORDER SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 MLSTN NA ATTACHMENT STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

1.0 SCOPE:

1.1 THE SCOPE OF THIS JOB ORDER IS TO REPLACE RBCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFTEY RELIEF VALVE V-16-0103 WITH NEW STYLE SS# 000-485-9430.1

1.2 THE WORK PERFORMED ON THIS JOB ORDER IS BEING CONTROLLED USING "CONTROLLED APPROVED PROCEDURES"

1.3 THE WORK PERFORMED ON THIS JOB ORDER IS CLASSIFIED AS "OTHER" AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OQA PLAN.

1.4 THIS WORK IS CONSIDERED A "ALTERNATE REPLACEMENT". THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURE 108.4 DO NOT APPLY PER CONVERSATION WITH F.CIGANIK J.C 030995

2.0 DOCUMENTS:

2.1 REFERENCES

2.1.1 DRAWINGS:

A) DRAWING:GE 148F444 SHI

2.1.2 PROCEDURES:

A) PROCEDURE:A100-GMM-3900.51 CLASS "B" CLEAMLINESS
B) PROCEDURE:A100-SMM-3900.08 IN SERVICE LEAK TEST

2.1.3 GPUN WELDING PACKAGE

2.2 ATTACHMENTS:

2.2.1 PROCEDURE EXHIBITS/DATA SHEETS/ETC...

A) PROCEDURE:A100-GMM-3900.51 EXHIBIT 4
B) PROCEDURE:A100-SMM-3900.08 EXHIBIT 1

2.2.2 GPUN WELDING PACKAGE

6/146

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

2.3 MATRIX:

DOCUMENTS THAT DISPOSITION/RESOLVE DISCREPANCIES, PROVIDE VALUES, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, TEST PARTS FOR MATERIAL UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS (FOR NSR USE), OR EVALUATE DATA SUCH AS 125-1 FORMS, 125.2.2 EXHIBIT #4, AND MNCR'S SHALL BE ADDED TO THIS MATRIX.

NO ADDITIONAL WORK SHALL BE PERFORMED UNTIL APPLICABLE INDIVIDUALS, DETERMINED BY THE PLANNER/SUPERVISOR AND CONCURRED WITH BY QV PROGRAMS (IF THE JOB ORDER IS MARKED QV REQUIRED "Y")HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE TYPE AND SCOPE OF THE WORK TO BE PERFORMED AND HAVE SIGNED OR BEEN ADDED PER TELECON BY THE PLANNER AND/OR SUPERVISOR IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE IN THE MATRIX.

DURING OUTAGES ANY ADDITIONS TO THIS MATRIX MUST BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH OUTAGE MANAGEMENT DIRECTION FOR SCOPE ADDITIONS.

125-1,PE FILE #/ 125.2.2EX #4 /124.2 /WR/MNCR#	JOB PLANNER	JOB SUPV.	AREA SUPT/ CONST MGR (RTR)	QV PROGRAMS IF "Y"	GSS/GOS (GRSS) (SEE NOTE)	
125-1 PE FILE # 0712-95 ISSUED WITH JOB ORDER						

********** NOTE **********
* JOB SUPERVISOR AND GSS/GOS (GRSS F/RADWASTE) SHALL ALSO REVIEW *
* CURRENT SWITCHING AND TAGGING TO ASSURE IT IS SUFFICIENT TO *
* ALLOW ADDITONAL WORK SCOPE TO BEGIN OR TO CORRECT SWITCHING *
* AND TAGGING BOUNDARY TO ALLOW WORK TO RECOMMENCE. *
****

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

3.0 PREREQUISITES:

3.1 VERIFY THE TAGOUT, AS APPLICABLE, BEFORE EACH START OF WORK.

3.2 THE JOB SPECIFIC PREREQUISITES ARE AS FOLLOWS;

3.2.1 CONTACT RAD CON PRIOR TO THE START OF WORK FOR THE LATEST SURVEYS AND RWP REQUIREMENTS.

4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS:

4.1 THE JOB SPECIFIC PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS;

4.1.2 PRIOR TO REMOVING RELIEF VALVE V-16-0103 FROM SYSTEM,CLEAN AND PREP INLET/OUTLET PIPING IN AREA WHERE CUTTING IS REQUIRED TO REMOVE OLD VALVE AND INSTALL NEW VALVE/PIPPING .

WR# 766616 OLMC GPU NUCLEAR REV 00 PAGE: 4
PRI 1 CYCLE 15 JOB ORDER SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 MLSTN NA ATTACHMENT STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

5.0 WORK SEQUENCE:

********** NOTE **********
THE FOLLOWING WORK STEP,AT THE DIRERTION OF THE JOB SUPERVISIOR MAY BE WORK OUT OF SEQUENCE.
****

5.1 BORE HALF OF THREADED COUPLING (SS#17202541001) TO MEASUREMENT IN 125-1 # 072-95 TO ADAPT OF SOCKET WELD.

5.2 FIT UP NEW VALVE,PIPPING AND FITTING USING DIMENSION IN ATTACHED DRAWING USE FOR REMOVING V-16-0103 FROM CLEAN-UP SYSTEM AND PLANT ENGINEERING 125-1 # 072-95

5.3 PERFORM SHOP WELD'S ON NEW VALVE AND PIPPING/CONNECTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GPUN WELDING PACKAGE.

********** NOTE **********
* MINIMIZE THE HEAT BUILDUP IN THE VALVE DURING COUPLING SEAL WELD. *
****

5.4 ERECT SCAFFOLDING UNDER V-16-0103 IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE 105.2

5.5 TO REMOVE V-16-0103 FORM SYSTEM CUT INLET AND OUTLET LINE'S IN AREA OF ATACHED DRAWING.

5.6 INSTALL NEW V-16-0103 RELIEF VALVE IN ACCORDANCE PLANT ENGINEERING 125-1 P.E FILE # 072-95 AND GPUN WELDING PACKAGE.

(1) 5.7 UPON A SUCCESSFUL PMT REMOVE SCAFFOLDING FROM CLEAN UP VALVE ROOM.

Not Done See Comments 3-14-95

5.8 THIS WORK REQUIRES UPDATE TO THE COMPONENT DATA BASE AND CONTROLLED DRAWINGS. ISSUE FCN FOR CHANGES.

WR# 766616 OLMC GPU NUCLEAR REV 00 PAGE: 5
PRI 1 CYCLE 15 JOB ORDER SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 MLSTN NA ATTACHMENT STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

6.0 TESTING:

6.1 THE PMT FOR THIS JOB ORDER IS TO PERFORM IN-SERVICE LEAK TEST ON WELD CONNECT,S AND THAT VALVE IS NOT LEAKING BY,(CHECK OUTLET DRAIN LINE A HUB DRAIN,RIGHT OF WEST DOOR) IN ACCORDANCE WITH 6.3 OF PROCEDURE A100-SMM-3900.08

6.2 SUMMIT FCN # C-121509 C. LEFFLER SITE PROJ ENGR NEW OFFICE BLDG O.C, TO REVISE THE GMS2 CONPENT DATA BASE WITH VALVE NAME PLATE DATA.

POST MAINTENANCE TESTING SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED:

SIGNATURE: William K Miller DATE 3-13-95

WR# 766616 OLMC GPU NUCLEAR REV 00 PAGE: 6
PRI 1 CYCLE 15 JOB ORDER SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 MLSTN NA ATTACHMENT STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

M&TE USAGE

M&TE ID#	TYPE OF INSTRUMENT	RANGE & FUNCTION USED	CAL DUE DATE
1. AE155	AMP PROBE	0-300 AMPS	CALIBRATED 11-20-92
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			

REMARKS, DISCREPANCIES AND ACTIONS TAKEN:

USE ADDITIONAL SHEET(S) IF NECESSARY.

WR# 766616 OLMC | GPU NUCLEAR | REV 00 | PAGE: 7
PRI 1 | CYCLE 15 | JOB ORDER | SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 | MLSTN NA | ATTACHMENT | STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

ADDITIONAL WORK PERFORMED COMMENTS

Not Used

USE THIS SHEET AFTER THE JOB ORDER SHEET IS FILLED. INCLUDED CONDITIONS FOUND, ACTIONS TAKEN, RESULTS AND NAME/DATE/TIME WORK WAS PERFORMED.

WR# 766616	OLMC	GPU NUCLEAR	REV 00	PAGE: 9
PRI 1	CYCLE 15	JOB ORDER	SO# CR812	
JO# 00060617	MLSTN NA	ATTACHMENT	STAT AUTH	

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY REL'EF VALVE

JOB ORDER REVIEW FORM

JOB ORDER #_____ DATE _____

1. WAS THERE ANYTHING MISSING FROM THE JOB PACKAGE, THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE INCLUDED.

2. WERE PROCEDURES AND/OR WORK INSTRUCTIONS EASILY UNDERSTOOD, EASILY FOLLOWED AND OF SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL DETAIL TO ALLOW TIMELY AND EFFICENT COMPLETION OF TASK? (YES) (NØ) EXPLAIN BELOW..

3. HOW DO YOU THINK THIS JOB ORDER PACKAGE COULD BE IMPROVED?

4. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

NAME (OPTIONAL)_____

PLEASE FORWARD TO M. COLANGELO, NMB, OYSTER CREEK.

USE ADDITIONAL SHEET(S) IF NECESSARY.

========== OFFICIAL ==========

WR# 766616 OLMC GPU NUCLEAR REV 00 PAGE: 1
PRI 1 CYCLE 15 MATERIALS LIST SO# CR812
JO# 00060617 MLSTN NA STAT AUTH

COMP: V-16-0103 VALVE LOC RB75-3
COMP DESC: RWCU SYSTEM DEMINERALIZER INLET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

SSN/IDN	UI	EST QTY	ACT QTY	TOOL R	DESCRIPTION	PQA TAG#	PO/PR#
17202541001	EA	1					
000856981	STOCK LOC: 1-N068-P				COUPLING,PIPE,A182 F316,THRD,1"NPT,3000#		
17202536001	EA	1					
025619011	STOCK LOC: 1-N068-X				COUPLING,PIPE,A182 F316,SW,1"NPS,3000#		
23361244001	EA	1					
026017491	STOCK LOC: 1-N074-B				ELBOW,PIPE,A105 CS,45 DEG,SW,1"NPS,3000#		
51262623001	FT	1					
000028241	STOCK LOC: 1-H075-G				PIPE,SEAMLESS,A106 GR B,CS,1"-SCH40		
51262611001	FT	1					067082
000328971	STOCK LOC: 1-H089-H				PIPE,SEAMLESS,ASTM A312 TY 316,SST,1"-SC		
000485743o 1	STOCK LOC:		1		VALVE, RELIEF 1" x 1"		
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						
	STOCK LOC:						

REMOVAL OF V-16-0103



TOP VIEW



SIDE VIEW

G/147

2 3/8
5/8

5th

2 [X] JOB SPECIFIC [ ] STANDING [ ] RECURRING [ ] [ ]

WORK DESCRIPTION

3 INVESTIGATE AND REPAIR V-16-0103

Job Category 7 [0] [X]

4 Job location(s) Reactor bldg. 75' in Clean UP Valve Aisle

Auto Access [X] Y [ ] N

950103 Rev 3, 2/8/95

JO # K06117 10 RER # [illegible] 12 COMEC 2/1/10 6 EXPIRATION 12/31/95

BAS 3/02900 11 ETN REFD16V14 13 REQ EXP [illegible]300 m m d d y y

[ ] Rad Con Mon/training
[ ] GO - WITH AUTHORIZED
[ ] GO - WITH Downgraded
By
Date/Time
[X] Continuous 4
[ ] Intermittent (1)
[X] System Breach
[ ] Post Job Survey
[ ] See coverage plan
[X] Other Every New Entry Scaffold (2)

5 Radiation levels

MAX 800 mR/hr
AT "Hot Spot" on Pipe
GEN 10-200 mR/hr
MAX B' 4/HR mRad/hr
Contamination levels
MAX Fluoghr Sept 1995 dpm/100cm2
AT FLOOR
GEN 4K-200K dpm/100cm2
Survey # REC-95-1064
Survey #

Airborne Activity

Sample #
1) 151895
2)
uCi/cc
1) 2.9E-9
2)
DAC Fraction
1) .15
2)

14 DOSIMETRY

DOSIMETRY	WORKER TYPE 1	2	3	4	5	6
WHOLE BODY TLD	X	X	X	X		
EXTREMITY TLD						
ESRD	X	X	X	X		
SRD 0-200mR						
SRD [ ] 0-500mR [ ] 0-1/1.5R						
ALARMING DOSIMETER						
NEUTRON [ ] Panasonic [ ] Landauer						
MULTIPLE SETS						

WORKER TYPE / LOCATION DESCRIPTION / PROTECTIVE CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS

TYPE # 1: Building Scaffold
PROT CLOTHING High Contam Set
Additions/deletions 1 pr. of Coveralls for hour Stay 3/7/95

TYPE # 2: Remove Valve / Grind / Weld
PROT CLOTHING ~~Cloth~~ High Contam ~~Hood~~ 3/7/95
Additions/deletions ~~Basics taped on Arriving~~ 3/7/95

TYPE # 3: Remove Scaffold
PROT CLOTHING High Contam Set
Additions/deletions 1 pr. of Coveralls for hour Stay 3/7/95

TYPE # 4: Clean Area Support
PROT CLOTHING None.
Additions/deletions

TYPE # 5:
PROT CLOTHING
Additions/deletions 3/7/95

TYPE # 6:
PROT CLOTHING
Additions/deletions

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

[X] Notify GRCS or area RCT, daily, prior to start of job
[X] Dosimetry placement per RCT / GRCS
[ ] Dose Rate Meter may be used in HS Rad areas [ ] in lieu of
OR [ ] in addition to Alarming Dosimeter - one per person
[ ] Full Containment
[X] Laydown Area (4)
[ ] HEPA Ventilation
[ ] Hot Particle Controls
[ ] Catch bag / drape
[X] (4) (5)

[X] See attached survey, survey status board or contact RAD CON
[ ] Follow HRP requirements
[X] All personnel to read and comply with RER #950103
[ ] Contact GRCS or area RCT for work above 7 feet.
[ ] Partial PCs may be authorized by RCT for each entry
[X] G/A Air sample [ ] CAM [ ] ROUTINE [X] See note (3)

15 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS (1) RCT to Provide Continuous Coverage when valve is removed. (2) If any Cutting / Grinding is required RCT is to perform Survey in area prior to this activity. (3) To be used if door is to be left open. (4) To be required if "EAST" door is to be left open. SEE CONTINUATION SHEET

16 Requested By Jeffrey P. Murphy / Tim Sheridan 3/7/95
Prepared By Jeffrey P. Murphy / Tim Sheridan 3/7/95
Approved Tim Sheridan 3/8/95
Go With Approval
Termination
Date

14 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

	WORKER TYPE 1	2	3	4	5	6
FFHP FULL FACE NEG PRESSURE						
PAPR POS PRESS AIR PURIFYING						
FACE SHIELD		X	X			
BZA SAMPLE 1 PER WORK GROUP	X					
BZA SAMPLE 1 PER WORKER		X	X			
PRE JOB DISCUSSION Attach	X	X	X	X		
PRE JOB BRIEFING Tailgate	X	X	X			

[X] Job Supv [X] GRCS [ ] Rad Eng [X] Non Exempted Workers
[X] RCT [ ] R/W Shipping

17 ATTACHMENT SHEET TRACKING

ATTACHMENT 10.1 EQUIV

Proc 6630 ADM 4110.04 Rev. 3

G1148

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39