



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL.*
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-445
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 11
License No. NPF-87

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) acting for itself and as agent for Texas Municipal Power Agency (licensees) dated November 27, 1991, as supplemented by letters dated May 4 and May 27, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

*The current owners of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station are: Texas Utilities Electric Company and Texas Municipal Power Agency. Transfer of ownership from Texas Municipal Power Agency to Texas Utilities Electric Company was previously authorized by Amendment No. 9 to Construction Permit CPPR-126 on August 25, 1988 to take place in 10 installments as set forth in the Agreement attached to the application for Amendment dated March 4, 1988. At the completion thereof, Texas Municipal Power Agency will no longer retain any ownership interest.

9207090324 920629
PDR ADOCK 05000445
P FDR


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 11, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Suzanne C. Black, Director
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 29, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 11

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87

DOCKET NO. 50-445

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 4-11
3/4 4-12
3/4 4-23
3/4 4-28
B 3/4 4-2
B 3/4 4-13

INSERT

3/4 4-11
3/4 4-12
3/4 4-23
3/4 4-28
B 3/4 4-2
B 3/4 4-13

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORVs inoperable, because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one or both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to operable status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel, and
- b. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.8 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any 1-hour period, and
- c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.8.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.8.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-2. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 3.4-2, 3.4-3 and 3.4-4.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORVs inoperable, because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one or both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to operable status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel, and
- b. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

RELIEF VALVES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b or c in Specification 3.4.4.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.8 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any 1-hour period, and
- c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.8.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.8.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-2. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 3.4-2, 3.4-3 and 3.4-4.

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL PLATE R1108-1

INITIAL RT_{NDT}: 0°F

RT_{NDT} AFTER 16 EFPY: 1/4T, 85°F
3/4T, 70°F

CURVES APPLICABLE FOR HEATUP RATES UP TO 100°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 16 EFPY. CONTAINS MARGIN OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS.




FIGURE 3.4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 16 EFPY

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any 1-hour period.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.8.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8.3 At least one of the following groups of two Overpressure Protection devices shall be OPERABLE when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not vented through a 2.98 square inch or larger vent.

- a. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings which vary with RCS temperature and which do not exceed the limits established in Figure 3.4-4, or
- b. Two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a setpoint of 450 psig \pm 3%, or
- c. One RHR suction relief valve and one PORV with setpoints as prescribed above.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4*, MODE 5 and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the two required Overpressure Protection devices inoperable in MODE 4, restore two Overpressure Protection devices to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.98 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- b. With one of the two required Overpressure Protection devices inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either (1) restore two Overpressure Protection devices to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2.98 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- c. With both of the two required Overpressure Protection devices inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2.98 square inch vent within 8 hours.
- d. With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b, or c, verify the vent pathway by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.4.8.3.3.
- e. In the event either the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

*Specification 3.4.8.3 is not applicable if all RCS cold legs are greater than 320°F and the following conditions are met:

1. At least one reactor coolant pump is in operation
2. Pressurizer level is less than or equal to 92%
3. The plant heatup rate shall be limited to 60°F in any one hour period.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat, even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the operability of the required steam generators is based on maintaining a sufficient level to guarantee tube coverage to assure heat transfer capability.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting an RCP with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 350°F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50 Appendix G. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50° above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation. Pressurizer heater groups are powered from sources that meet the requirements of Item II.E.3.1 of NUREG-0737.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and a steam bubble in the pressurizer function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. The PORVs also function to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture and for plant cooldown in compliance with Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

The PORVs are equipped with automatic actuation circuitry and manual control capability. Because no credit for automatic PORV operation is taken in the FSAR analyses for Mode 1, 2 & 3 transients, the PORVs are considered OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. It should be noted that the automatic mode is the preferred configuration, as this provides pressure relieving capability without reliance on operator action.

The Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements are consistent with Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability,' and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)."

3/4.4.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.5.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS Leakage Detection Systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These Detection Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

HEATUP (Continued)

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

The new 10 CFR 50 Appendix G rule addresses the metal temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions. This rule states that the minimum metal temperature of the closure flange region should be at least 120 degrees-F higher than the limiting RT_{NDT} for these regions when the pressure exceeds 20 percent of the preservice hydrostatic test pressure (621 psig for Westinghouse plants). For Comanche Peak Unit 1, the minimum temperature of the closure flange and vessel flange regions is 160 degrees-F since the limiting RT_{NDT} is 40 degrees-F (see Table B 3/4.4-1). The Comanche Peak Unit 1 cooldown curves shown in Figure 3.4-3 are impacted by this new rule, and therefore the "notch" in the cooldown curves.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs, two RHR suction relief valves, the combination of one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve, or an RCS vent opening of at least 2.98 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50 Appendix G when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350°F. Either PORV or either RHR relief valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures, or (2) the start of two charging pumps and their injection into a water-solid RCS.

The maximum Nominal Allowed PORV Setpoint curve is derived from analyses which model the performance of the overpressure protection system for a range of mass input and heat input transients. Figure 3.4-4 is based upon this analysis including consideration of the maximum pressure overshoot beyond the PORV setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (Continued)

and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. For the transients noted, the resulting pressure will not exceed the nominal 16 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) Appendix G reactor vessel NDT limits and the forces generated due to PORV cycling do not exceed PORV piping and structural limitations.

To ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require the lockout of all safety injection pumps and one charging pump while in MODES 4, 5 and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed, and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50°F above primary temperature.

Operation below 350°F but greater than 325°F with charging and safety injection pumps OPERABLE is allowed for up to 4 hours. Given the short time duration that this condition is allowed initiation of both trains of safety injection during this 4-hour time frame due to operator error or a single failure occurring during testing of a redundant channel are not considered to be credible accidents.

Plant specific analysis has shown that the Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) arming temperature may be reduced from 350°F to 320°F if the following additional restrictions are met:

1. At least one reactor coolant pump must be in operation.
2. Pressurizer level is less than or equal to 92%.
3. The plant heatup rate shall be limited to 60°F in any one hour period.

These conditions apply whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than 350°F but all RCS cold legs are greater than or equal to 320°F. When any of the RCS cold leg temperatures drop below 320°F, the original requirements on low temperature operation apply.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the LTOPS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-2.

3/4.4.9 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code edition and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1980 Edition.