



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE

DOCKET NO. 50-338

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 200
License No. NPF-4

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company et al., (the licensee) dated July 26, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.D.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-4 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 200, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 1, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 200

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-4

DOCKET NO. 50-338

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.*

| <u>Remove Pages</u> | <u>Insert Pages</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 2-5 | 2-5* |
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| B 3/4 4-2a | B 3/4 4-2a |

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The reactor trip system instrumentation setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

With a reactor trip system instrumentation setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

TABLE 2.2-1
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u> | <u>TRIP SETPOINT</u> | <u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u> |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Manual Reactor Trip | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |
| 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux | Low Setpoint - $\leq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint - $\leq 109\%^{**}$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | Low Setpoint - $\leq 26\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint - $\leq 110\%^{***}$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate | $\leq 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds | $\leq 5.5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds |
| 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate | $\leq 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds | $\leq 5.5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds |
| 5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux | $\leq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | $\leq 30\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux | $\leq 10^5$ counts per second | $\leq 1.3 \times 10^5$ counts per second |
| 7. Overtemperature ΔT | See Note 1 | See Note 3 |
| 8. Overpower ΔT | See Note 2 | See Note 3 |
| 9. Pressurizer Pressure - Low | ≥ 1870 psig | ≥ 1860 psig |
| 10. Pressurizer Pressure - High | ≤ 2360 psig | ≤ 2370 psig |
| 11. Pressurizer Water Level - High | $\leq 92\%$ of instrument span | $\leq 93\%$ of instrument span |
| 12. Loss of Flow | $\geq 90\%$ of design flow per loop* | $\geq 89\%$ of design flow per loop* |

* Design flow per loop is one-third of the minimum allowable Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate as specified in Table 3.2-1.

** The high trip setpoint for Power Range, Neutron Flux, shall be $\leq 103\%$ RATED THERMAL POWER for the period of operation until steam generator replacement.

*** The allowable value for the high trip setpoint for Power Range, Neutron Flux, is required to be $\leq 104\%$ RATED THERMAL POWER for the period of operation until steam generator replacement.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

ISOLATED LOOP STARTUP

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.5 A reactor coolant loop cold leg stop valve shall remain closed until:

- a. The isolated loop has been operating on a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 125 gpm for at least 90 minutes and the temperature at the cold leg of the isolated loop is within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops.
- b. The reactor is subcritical by at least 1.77 percent $\Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend startup of the isolated loop.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.5.1 The isolated loop cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

4.4.1.5.2 The reactor shall be determined to be subcritical by at least 1.77 percent $\Delta k/k$ within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3% as-found and \pm 1% as-left.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient condition of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG + 2% / - 3% average as-found with no single valve outside $\pm 3\%$, and $\pm 1\%$ per valve as-left.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal temperature and pressure.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

within 20°F of the operating loops. Making the reactor subcritical prior to loop startup prevents any power spike which could result from this cool water induced reactivity transient.

3/4.4.2 AND 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 380,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during hot shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, or the power operated relief valves (PORVs) will provide overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The safety valve tolerance requirement for Modes 1-3 is expressed as an average value. That is, the as-found error (expressed as a positive or negative percentage) of each tested safety valve is summed and divided by the number of valves tested. This average as-found value is compared to the acceptable range of + 2% to - 3%. In addition, no single valve is allowed to be outside of $\pm 3\%$.

An average tolerance of + 2% / - 3% was confirmed to be adequate for Modes 1-3 accident analyses. For the overpressure events, the analyses considered several combinations of valve tolerance with the arithmetic average of the three valves' tolerance equal to + 2% (with no valve outside of $\pm 3\%$). The case of a + 2% tolerance on each of the three valves provided the most limiting results. The - 3% tolerance is limiting for the DNB acceptance criterion.

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the power operated relief valves minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves is determined on the basis of their being capable of performing the following functions:

- a) Manual control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This is a function that may be used to mitigate certain accidents and for plant shutdown.
- b) Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This function is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
- c) Manual control of the block valve to (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item a, above), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item b, above).
- d) Automatic control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This function reduces challenges to the code safety valves for overpressurization events.
- e) Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

Surveillance Requirements provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their functions. Specification 4.4.3.2.1 addresses the PORVs and Specification 4.4.3.2.2 addresses the block valves. The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to operable status.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b.2 provides for the testing of the mechanical and electrical aspects of control systems for the PORVs.

Testing of PORVs in HOT STANDBY or HOT SHUTDOWN is required in order to simulate the temperature and pressure environmental effects on PORVs. Testing at COLD SHUTDOWN is not considered to be a representative test for assessing PORV performance under normal plant operating conditions.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
DOCKET NO. 50-339
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 181
License No. NPF-7

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company et al., (the licensee) dated July 26, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-7 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 181, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 1, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 181

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-7

DOCKET NO. 50-339

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.*

Remove Pages

2-6

3/4 4-5

3/4 4-6

3/4 4-7

B 3/4 4-2

B 3/4 4-2a

Insert Pages

2-6

3/4 4-5*

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B 3/4 4-2

B 3/4 4-2a

TABLE 2.2-1
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u> | <u>TRIP SETPOINT</u> | <u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u> |
|--|--|--|
| 1. Manual Reactor Trip | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |
| 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux | Low Setpoint - $\leq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint - $\leq 109\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | Low Setpoint - $\leq 26\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint - $\leq 110\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate | $\leq 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds | $\leq 5.5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds |
| 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate | $\leq 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds | $\leq 5.5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 seconds |
| 5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux | $\leq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | $\leq 30\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux | $\leq 10^5$ counts per second | $\leq 1.3 \times 10^5$ counts per second |
| 7. Overtemperature ΔT | See Note 1 | See Note 3 |
| 8. Overpower ΔT | See Note 2 | See Note 3 |
| 9. Pressurizer Pressure - Low | ≥ 1870 psig | ≥ 1860 psig |
| 10. Pressurizer Pressure - High | ≤ 2360 psig | ≤ 2370 psig |
| 11. Pressurizer Water Level - High | $\leq 92\%$ of instrument span | $\leq 93\%$ of instrument span |
| 12. Loss of Flow | $\geq 90\%$ of design flow per loop* | $\geq 89\%$ of design flow per loop* |

* Design flow per loop is one-third of the minimum allowable Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate as specified in Table 3.2-1.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

ISOLATED LOOP STARTUP

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.1.5 A reactor coolant loop cold leg stop valve shall remain closed until:
- a. The isolated loop has been operating on a recirculation flow greater than or equal to 125 gpm for at least 90 minutes and the temperature at the cold leg of the isolated loop is within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops.
 - b. The reactor is subcritical by at least 1.77 percent $\Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend startup of the isolated loop.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.5.1 The isolated loop cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

4.4.1.5.2 The reactor shall be determined to be subcritical by at least 1.77 percent $\Delta k/k$ within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG $\pm 3\%$ as-found and $\pm 1\%$ as-left.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient condition of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG + 2% / - 3% average as-found with no single valve outside $\pm 3\%$, and $\pm 1\%$ per valve as-left.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.2 AND 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 380,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during hot shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, or the power operated relief valves (PORVs) will provide overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The safety valve tolerance requirement for Modes 1-3 is expressed as an average value. That is, the as-found error (expressed as a positive or negative percentage) of each tested safety valve is summed and divided by the number of valves tested. This average as-found value is compared to the acceptable range of + 2% to - 3%. In addition, no single valve is allowed to be outside of $\pm 3\%$.

An average tolerance of + 2% / - 3% was confirmed to be adequate for Modes 1-3 accident analyses. For the overpressure events, the analyses considered several combinations of valve tolerance with the arithmetic average of the three valves' tolerance equal to + 2% (with no valve outside of $\pm 3\%$). The case of a + 2% tolerance on each of the three valves provided the most limiting results. The - 3% tolerance is limiting for the DNB acceptance criterion.

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves is determined on the basis of their being capable of performing the following functions:

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

- a) Manual control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This is a function that may be used to mitigate certain accidents and for plant shutdown.
- b) Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This function is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
- c) Manual control of the block valve to (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item a, above), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item b, above).
- d) Automatic control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This function reduces challenges to the code safety valves for overpressurization events.
- e) Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

Surveillance Requirements provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their functions. Specification 4.4.3.2.1 addresses the PORVs and Specification 4.4.3.2.2 addresses the block valves. The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to operable status.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b.2 provides for the testing of the mechanical and electrical aspects of control systems for the PORVs.

Testing of PORVs in HOT STANDBY or HOT SHUTDOWN is required in order to simulate the temperature and pressure environmental effects on PORVs. Testing at COLD SHUTDOWN is not considered to be a representative test for assessing PORV performance under normal plant operating conditions.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE ensures that the plant will be able to establish natural circulation.