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ESK-96-032

March 15, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attn: Document Control Desk

Subject: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
Submittal of Core Shroud Reinspection Plan for Quad Cities Unit 2
NRC Docket No. 50-265

References: (1) BWRVIP Guidelines for Reinspection of BWR Core Shrouds (BWRVIP-07), dated February 1996.

(2) ComEd Response to NRC Generic Letter 94-03, "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water Reactors", Quad Cities Unit 2 Core Shroud Inspection Plan, dated January 16, 1995.

(3) J.L. Schrage (ComEd) to USNRC letter, Quad Cities Unit 2 Core Shroud Examination Results, dated May 2, 1995.

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Reinspection Plan of the Repaired Core Shroud for Quad Cities Unit 2.

ComEd has reviewed the BWRVIP "Guidelines for Reinspection of BWR Core Shrouds" (Reference 1) and has concluded that section 4, "Reinspection of BWRs with Repaired Core Shrouds" is applicable to Quad Cities Unit 2, which is a Category C plant with a repaired core shroud.

Quad Cities Station implemented repair of the core shroud during refuel outage Q2R13 and in conjunction, performed extensive pre-repair inspections of the core shroud as committed to in our response to USNRC Generic Letter 94-03 (Reference 2). The results of the pre-repair inspections were transmitted per Reference 3.

During the upcoming refuel outage Q2R14 and during future refuel outages, Quad Cities Station currently plans on inspecting the repaired core shroud in accordance with the BWRVIP recommendations.

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Repair Component Inspections

A minimum of 25 percent of the repair components (one tie-rod assembly) will be VT-3 visually examined to verify accessible locking devices, contact points/gaps, bolt tightness and in general, overall condition. The VT-3 examination will be performed as defined in the ASME Section XI 1989 edition.

Repair Anchorage Inspections

The repair hardware is anchored directly to the shroud support plate and as such there are no load bearing welds as defined in the Guidelines, therefore no inspections of load bearing welds are planned. The repair hardware anchorage inspection is included in the Repair Component Inspections.

Core Shroud Weld Inspections

The horizontal circumferential shroud welds (H1 through H7 inclusive) are structurally replaced by the previously installed repair. Therefore, no future inspections are required.

During the upcoming Q2R14 refuel outage, no inspections are planned for the vertical shroud welds. Prior to installation of the repair hardware, extensive examinations of the vertical welds were performed with no reportable indications (Reference 3). Based on the Guidelines, no inspections are required at the first outage following repair using Option B requirements as approximately 36 percent of the total equivalent vertical weld length was examined versus the 25 percent required. In accordance with Reference 1, Quad Cities Station currently plans to examine at least 25 percent of the cumulative length of all vertical welds during the Q2R15 refuel outage.

During the upcoming Q2R14 refuel outage, no inspections are planned for the ring segment welds. Prior to installation of the repair hardware, extensive examinations of the ring segments and ring segment welds were performed with no reportable indications associated with the ring segment welds (Reference 3). Based on the Guidelines, no inspections are required at the first outage following repair using Option B requirements as 100 percent of the accessible portions of the ring segments were examined versus the 25 percent required. In accordance with Reference 1, Quad Cities Station currently plans to examine at least 25 percent of the cumulative length of all accessible ring segment welds during the Q2R15 refuel outage.

In summary, a minimum of one shroud repair assembly (e.g. one tie-rod) will be visually inspected per the requirements of Reference 1. Based on the results of the extensive pre-repair inspections performed during Q2R13, no additional shroud weld inspections will be performed during the upcoming Q2R14 refuel outage. This reinspection plan is in accordance with the recommendations provided in the BWRVIP Guidelines.

In regard to the recent issuance of the BWRVIP Guidelines to the industry and to the regulatory agencies, ComEd will review future revisions to the Guidelines including the pending safety evaluation report and may adjust the reinspection plan as necessary. Future

reinspections of the repaired core shroud (including repair hardware) will be performed in accordance with the BWRVIP "Guidelines for Reinspection of BWR Core Shrouds" (Reference 1).

Please address any further comments or questions regarding this matter to this office.

Respectfully,

E. S. Kraft, Jr.
Site Vice President
Quad Cities Station

cc: H.J. Miller, Regional Administrator - RIII
R.M. Pulsifer, Project Manager - NRR
C.G. Miller, Senior resident Inspector - Quad Cities Station
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