

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <u>Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1</u>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <u>0 5 0 0 0 4 1 1 3</u>	PAGE (3) <u>1 OF 0 3</u>
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TITLE (4)  
Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Flowpath

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
<u>11</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>022</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>84</u>			<u>0 5 0 0 0</u>

OPERATING MODE (9) <u>4</u>	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10) <u>01010</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME <u>Roger W. Ouellette, Assistant Engineer - Licensing</u>	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: <u>7104</u> NUMBER: <u>3173-175310</u>
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 15, 1984, at approximately 1300 hours, the containment sump intake screen doors were opened by personnel working in the Unit 1 Reactor Building pipe chase. Since the screen doors were open when Unit 1 entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) at 1658 hours, Technical Specification 3.5.3.d and 3.6.2 were not satisfied. The screens were discovered open at 1749 hours, reclosed, and declared operable at 1849 hours on November 15, 1984.

On November 16, 1984, at 0917 hours, the containment sump intake screen doors were reopened by one of the same workers who had opened the screens the day before. A QA Inspector, who had just arrived in the pipe chase, saw the workers opening the screens. Since the QA Inspector knew that opening the screen doors would cause noncompliance with Technical Specifications, he immediately called the Shift Supervisor so that corrective action could be taken. The screen doors were reclosed at 1020 hours on November 16, 1984.

This event is classified as a Personnel Error. The workers in question should not have operated equipment which they had no knowledge of.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Section (a) (2) (i).

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The Containment Sump Intake Screens, located at elevation 552', 179° in the Reactor Building Pipe Chase, are designed to prevent debris from entering the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or the Containment Spray (NS) System during the recirculation phase of an ECCS or NS actuation. The screens have two sets of doors that are normally open during Modes 5 and 6 to facilitate thoroughfare in the pipe chase. However, the screen doors are to be closed per Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.5.3.d in Mode 4 and Tech Spec 3.6.2 in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 so that the ECCS and the NS Systems can be operable. Tech Spec 3.5.3.d requires that as a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of a flowpath capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation shall be operable. Tech Spec 3.6.2 states "Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be operable with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the containment sump".

Prior to entry into Mode 4, Periodic Test PT/O/A/4200/02 (Containment Cleanliness Inspection) is required to be performed. The containment sump intake screen doors were closed per Work Request 3145SWR at 1220 hours during the performance of that periodic test. At approximately 1300 hours, cleaning personnel entered the pipe chase to clean in the Lower Containment Ventilation Unit 1C fan room. Instead of bypassing the first set of screen doors to access the ladder to the fan room, the first set of doors were opened. About the same time, another person arrived at the screens and needed to go past both sets of the screen doors. Since the second person was unaware of the significance of opening the screen doors, he opened the other set and left them open. Both sets of screen doors were open as Unit 1 entered Mode 4 at 1658 hours.

At 1749 hours the screen doors were found open. The Shift Supervisor was notified immediately and Work Request 1398MNT was written to close the screen doors. The screen doors were closed and declared operable at 1849 hours.

At a 0730 turnover meeting on 11-16-84, the incident was discussed between the pertinent groups. Supervisors were instructed to reemphasize to their crews the importance of keeping the screens closed in Modes 1-4. One of the Supervisors recalled having a worker in the pipe chase about the time the incident occurred. While the Supervisor was researching the cause of the incident, the original cleaning personnel had returned to the pipe chase to continue cleaning. At 0917 hours, the screen doors were reopened. A QA Inspector, who happened to be in the pipe chase at that time, saw the cleaning personnel opening the doors.

The Shift Supervisor was then notified, and Work Request 12839OPS was written to close the screen doors. Because QA had a problem in obtaining the necessary paperwork to signoff the work request, cooldown was started at 1017 hours per Tech Specs 3.5.3.d and 3.6.2. However, the screen doors were closed and declared operable at 1020 hours.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The screen doors were closed.

Personnel have been warned of the significance of opening the screen doors.

Locks are to be installed on the containment sump intake screen doors and the key to locks will be administratively controlled.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

The screens were opened twice while Unit 1 was in Mode 4. Pump damage could have occurred if large debris had entered the suction piping of the ECCS and NS Systems. However, during the time that the screens were opened, there was neither an ECCS or NS actuation to cause the suction of these pumps to swapover to the Containment Sump. Even then, the pumps would have swapped over to the Containment Sump only on Refueling Water Storage Tank Low and Low-Low Levels respectively.

The health and safety of the public were unaffected by this incident.

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE  
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December 14, 1984


Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-413

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Section (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 413/84-22 concerning an inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Flowpath. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

RWO:slb

Attachment

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
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