

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit #1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 12 12 10					PAGE (3) 1 OF 012	
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TITLE (4) Reactor Scram During Surveillance Test																
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
1	1	1	2	8	4	8	4	0	1	7	0	0	1	2	1	1	8	4	0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0		20.402(b)		20.406(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)								
		20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(a)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)								
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)								
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
		20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Robert Randall, Supervisor, Technical Support												TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5				

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>														

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

## ABSTRACT

During a plant shutdown, with all rods inserted, for repairs on the turbine electro hydraulic control system, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was actuated initiating a scram. This was caused by the removal of a fuse as part of a surveillance test procedure to test the Main Steam Isolation Valve Full Closure Scram.

This scram occurred as a result of deficient preliminary steps in the implementation of a new procedure N1-ST-V8.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Nine Mile Point Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  05000220	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		84	017	00	02	OF	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's.)

TEXT

On November 12, 1984, during a maintenance outage, the reactor was in hot shutdown and subcritical, reactor vessel pressure was less than 600 psig, the mode switch was set to "refuel" and all control rods were fully inserted. At 11:29 hrs, operator surveillance test N1-ST-V8 "Main Steam Isolation Valve Full Closure Test" was being performed. This test is conducted by closing one MSIV at a time and verifying valve full closure and reactor auto trip signals. Prior to stroking of the MSIVs, fuse #F-27 must be pulled to unbypass the MSIV scram bypass when reactor pressure is less than 600 psig. However, when fuse #F-27 was removed, the RPS bypass on low condenser vacuum was also removed thus enabling the low vacuum scram. Also when #F-27 was pulled, the bypass on the 7" vacuum switch in the vessel isolation circuitry was removed. Thus, a vessel isolation signal also occurred.

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences arising out of this event because:

- 1) The plant is designed so that the low condenser vacuum MSIV closure scram relays are connected in parallel with the low condenser vacuum MSIV closure scram bypass below 600 psig relays. Consequently, the system responded as designed.
- 2) The reactor was shutdown and subcritical.
- 3) The mode switch was set to "refuel".
- 4) All control rods were fully inserted during the event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The surveillance procedure N1-ST-V8 will be reviewed and changed to incorporate the corrections which will prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.

## NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST  
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

December 10, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555Re: Docket No. 50-220  
LER 84-17


Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following  
Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-17      Which is being submitted in accordance with  
10 CFR 50.73, (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or  
condition that resulted in manual or automatic  
actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF),  
including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).  
However actuation of an ESF, including the RPS,  
that resulted from and was part of the preplanned  
sequence during testing or reactor operation need  
not be reported."

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022,  
dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges  
Vice President  
Nuclear GenerationRGR/lo  
Attachments (3 copies)  
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional AdministratorLE22  
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