

James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
315 342.3840



**New York Power
Authority**

Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Site Executive Officer

March 8, 1996
JAFF-96-0110

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

**SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Docket 50-333
Correction to Generic Letter 95-07 180 Day
Response**

Reference: 1. Letter to USNRC Document Control Desk from H.
P. Salmon, Jr., Evaluation Results for
Generic Letter 95-07 Pressure Locking and
Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-
Operated Gate Valves, (Serial Number JAFP-96-
0064), dated 2/13/96

Dear Sir:

The Power Authority has discovered an administrative error in our
Generic Letter 95-07 180-day response dated 2/13/96. This error
in no way affected the intent of the technical evaluation, and
the conclusions remain the same. The corrected page is enclosed.

I hope this error did not cause any inconvenience. If you have
any questions, please contact Mr. Arthur Zaremba at (315) 349-
6365.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harry P. Salmon, Jr."

Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Site Executive Officer

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HPS:RAP:las

cc: Project Directorate
Licensing File
RMS

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ATTACHMENT I

New York Power Authority
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated
Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding

- c. The assumed temperature (560°F) for 14MOV-12A(B) comes from the line designation table maximum operating temperature for line 10"-W23-902-5A(B). During normal operation 14MOV-12A(B) is closed with a dead water leg downstream to the reactor vessel. Heating of 14MOV-12A(B) may occur due to conduction along this dead leg and from slight leakage or pressure equalization flow during surveillance testing. Whatever heating and temperature change which may occur during normal surveillance testing would be essentially the same as for design basis operation (valve would not cool appreciably between accident depressurization and when signalled to open). Thus if thermal binding does not occur for surveillance it will not occur during design basis conditions.
- d. A review of maintenance history data has identified no previous thermal binding events for 14MOV-12A or 14MOV-12B.

Although available evidence indicates that 14MOV-12A(B) are not susceptible to thermal binding, the following actions will be performed during Refueling Outage 12 to provide additional assurance that thermal binding of 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B will not occur:

- a. 14MOV-12A Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to minimize pullout thrust.
- b. 14MOV-12B Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to minimize pullout thrust.