

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I

RO Inspection Report No.: RO:I 50-219 MAPP-74

Docket No.: 50-219

Licensee: Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant

License No.: DPR-16

Jersey Central Power and Light Company

- Priority: _____

U. S. Route 9, Waretown

- Category: C

Location: Lacey Township, New Jersey

Type of Licensee: BWR

Type of Inspection: plant Protection-Unannounced

Dates of Inspection: October 11 and 19, 1973

Dates of Previous Inspection: Initial

Reporting Inspector: *J. W. Devlin*
J. W. Devlin

11/14/73
Date

Accompanying Inspectors: *M. King*
M. King

11/15/73
Date

_____ Date

_____ Date

_____ Date

Other Accompanying Personnel: *W. Martin*
W. Martin

11/15/73
Date

Reviewed by: *W. Martin*
W. Martin

11/15/73
Date

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10CFR Part 2-790/d

_____ Date

all

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Enforcement Action

None

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters

None

New Unresolved Items

None

Design Changes

None

Unusual Occurrences

None

Other Significant Findings

The inspection uncovered several weaknesses in the overall physical protection program. The security of this site is at best marginal because of the lack of supervision of the program and the inefficient utilization of manpower and equipment. The licensee has installed potentially adequate fencing but does not maintain its effectiveness by neglecting to correct a soil erosion problem. Also installed on the fence is an intrusion alarm system that is disregarded, as explained under the details section of this report. To detect trespassers and/or intruders at the water intake and discharge canals, the licensee has an electronic surveillance system (CCTV) that is in need of repairs thereby only partially effective. In addition, because of the lack of adequate lighting the utilization of this equipment is only on a daylight or part-time basis.

No emphasis or additional controls have been considered for the protection of vital areas or equipment, particularly the control room or diesel generating building. At the time of the inspection no written physical protection procedures, instructions or orders were available.

An important aspect of this inspection was the determination that access to the site by strangers is easily attainable. In two instances on the

day of the inspection AEC personnel drove onto the site without being challenged and also exited through the same gate without being challenged or questioned even though a uniformed watchmen was assigned to this gate.

Management Interview

An interview to report the results of this inspection was held with Mr. R. Russo, GPU Corporate Manager of Security and Mr. R. Hunter, JCP&L Company Manager, Safety and Security on October 19, 1973 at the GPU offices in Parsippany, New Jersey. Representing the AEC were W. Martin, Chief, MAPP, M. King, Physical Protection Inspector and J. Devlin, Investigation Specialist. No exit interview was held on the site at the conclusion of the inspection because neither the Plant Superintendent, his assistant nor the person responsible for the site security supervision, J. Molner, were available on the day of this unannounced inspection. The results of the inspection, however, were discussed with W. Riggle, R. Swift and J. Sullivan. Mr. Riggle requested that a formal exit interview be conducted with the persons responsible for the physical protection program.

Mr. Russo was advised that the physical protection program at Oyster Creek was deemed ineffective because of the lack of a management control system of the physical protection force and of the inspection and maintenance of the physical protection equipment. Specifically, the following weakness found in the program were recited:

1. The inspectors were able to enter and exit from the site, passing by a manned control point, in a private and in a government vehicle without being stopped or challenged.
2. The inspectors were able to walk through a second gate at the side of the facility and return to the entrance of the administration building without being challenged.
3. The watchmen on duty in the main lobby did not ask for any identification or inquire as to the reason why we were not wearing "Visitor Badges," an indication that he was not aware of visitor control procedures or the procedures are not generally enforced.
4. The fence alarm which should be relied upon to detect intruders was found not fully operational and, although this condition was indicated on the alarm monitor panel, no action was taken to correct it. This condition existed over a period of at least, three, 8 hour shifts.

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5. Electronic surveillance equipment (CCTV) is not being properly maintained in a fully operational condition.
6. The perimeter fence which constitutes the primary and only barrier to the protected area and all vital equipment is defective due to poor installation at the railroad gate and due to soil erosion at the intake and discharge canals.
7. Vital areas and equipment are not afforded any additional protection as witnessed by the following conditions:
 - a. The pedestrian gate at the diesel generator building is not secured and the diesel generator control panel was open.
 - b. Ground level exterior doors are not locked and there is no procedure or schedule for locking these doors during night hours. The side door at the front of the main building, at the bottom of the stairwell, that leads to the third level, thereby affording access to the control room and other vital areas, cannot be locked because the key cylinder had been removed. This condition was not realized by the maintenance supervisor.
8. No written procedures or instructions on the subject of physical protection or security were available for review at the site.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

W. Riggle, Maintenance Superintendent
R. Swift, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent
J. Sullivan, Technical Engineer
E. Growney, Technical Supervisor
R. Russo, GPU Manager, Corporate Security
R. Hunter, Manager of Safety and Security

2. Security Organization

a. Description of Premises and Vicinity

The Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, a BWR, is located partly in Lacey and partly in Ocean Townships of Ocean County, New Jersey on U. S. Route 9. It is 2 miles inland from Barnegat Bay and 9 miles south of Toms River. The site consists of 800 acres with the reactor occupying a small portion at the south end of the tract. Adjacent to the site are several recently developed and continually expanding summer resort communities on numerous manmade lagoons. Generally the entire surrounding area is growing in population.

b. Physical Protection Personnel and Responsibilities

The overall physical protection responsibility for Oyster Creek is the GPU corporate Security Manager, R. Russo with R. Hunter, JCP&L Company Manager of Safety and Security responsible for inaugurating and evaluating the physical protection program. The onsite implementation of the program is the responsibility of one J. Molnar, Shift Superintendent and includes the supervision of a group of watchmen supplied by Wackenhut Corporation, a contractor guard force agency. The onsite physical protection responsibilities are secondary duties for Mr. Molnar.

3. Physical Barriers

a. Protected Area

The power reactor complex is enclosed on three sides by a continuous 8' high, 11 gauge metal fence topped with three strands of barbed wire. Across the back of the reactor the barrier consists of the intake and discharge canals with a

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causeway separating the two canals. A double vehicle gate barricades the road on the causeway. Several gates are in the perimeter fence all of which are normally locked.

An examination of the fence reflected that adjacent to both the intake and discharge canals the ground under the fence has been washed away through erosion thus creating large openings. At the railroad entrance in the front of the site the gates have been so installed that large clearances exist between the bottom of the gates and the ground on each side of the road bed. These openings are estimated to be in excess of 30".

It was also noted that the composition of the ground in this region of New Jersey is primarily sand that is easily removed. In several places under the fence the sand was soft and loose and gave no resistance to being kicked away or scooped away with the hands. The use of a digging implement would lessen the time required to open a passage to minutes. According to the watchman on duty there is no procedure or schedule for patrolling the fence. Because a surreptitious entry by this method is conceivable it is felt a regular (hourly) patrol of this fence should be considered.

The fence is alarmed but the installation does not prohibit or detect intrusion in the above manner.

b. Vital Areas

No additional controls have been established to afford the vital equipment any extra protection, access past the perimeter barrier gives access to all other areas. Several ground level doors in the turbine and administration buildings were open and unattended and it could not be definitely ascertained if these doors are normally locked at night. A door to the side and in the front of the administration building at the foot of a stairwell that leads to the third level, where the control room and entrance to the containment building are located, could not be locked because of the removal of the key cylinder. This situation was not realized by Mr. Riggle, Maintenance Superintendent, therefore, it is not known how long this condition has existed.

The emergency diesel generators are housed in a building at the rear of the site a short distance from the discharge canal and fenceline where a soil erosion problem exists. The building housing the diesel is open and incapable of being locked. However, the metal shield over and around the diesels was secured but the control panel was open and susceptible to tampering.

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c. Access Controls

Procedures require that the watchman at the main gate stop all vehicles and pedestrians entering the premises. Employees upon being recognized are permitted to enter. Visitors are registered and announced to the person to be visited. The watchman in the lobby of the main building admits the visitors and detains them in the lobby until picked up by a proper escort.

On the day of the inspection the procedure was not implemented. The inspectors entered the premises at the main gate in two separate vehicles, one a private vehicle and one a government vehicle, without being challenged or stopped by the watchmen. In addition, the private vehicle was driven out through the main gate and again was not stopped or challenged. Both vehicles stopped at the gate and paused momentarily but when it was obvious that the watchman made no attempt to challenge or recognize the visitors the vehicles were driven into the parking lot. The inspectors walked to the side of the administration building through an open gate and then returned to the main door at the lobby and was admitted by the lobby watchmen and announced to Mr. Riggle. No identification was requested and no inquiry was made as to why the inspectors were not wearing "Visitor" badges.

Personal vehicles are parked within the protected area and are permitted to drive to the rear of the site and around the turbine building. The inspector's private vehicle was driven to and around the rear of the reactor site without question or permission from the licensee.

For after-hour access to the premises several employees have been issued card-keys that permit them to open the main gate and also the main door at the lobby. A telephone is installed at the main gate which is used to call the watchman located in the lobby. Through use of a CCTV the watchman can observe the gate and all traffic through it.

4. Personnel Identification and Control

Employees are identified by personal recognition, no badge system is used except for visitors, as explained above.

5. Protective Alarms

Installed on the perimeter fence is a "Peri-Gard" intrusion alarm system that is activated by pressure against the fence and is

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divided into several zones. It is monitored in the main lobby and also in the control room. During the inspection it was determined that at the south gate a plug in the main power feed line was disconnected thereby deactivating a large segment of the system. Inquiry determined that the line was disconnected the previous day during an inspection by the New Jersey State Environmental Department to permit them to use the south gate. The monitor panel indicated the "alarm" condition but nothing was done about it. The alarm was in this status for at least three 8 hour work shifts. From this information it can only be construed that the alarm is not being reliably used. No records of alarms, inspections, tests or maintenance were available.

In addition to the fence alarm the licensee has a closed circuit television system with three cameras and three monitors. One camera is focused on the main gate for after hour access control and cameras survey the intake and discharge canals. During daylight hours the cameras pick-up anybody on either side of the canal but during inclement weather and night hours the system is not effective.

The monitor that is connected to the camera covering the discharge canal is not operating properly thereby making this part of the system unreliable. It is understood that this equipment has not been operating properly for approximately two weeks and has not been replaced by any other type of surveillance or patrols.

6. Protective Personnel

The licensee employs uniformed, unarmed watchmen from the Wackenhut Corporation, a contractor security agency. Two men are assigned to the day shift seven days a week and one man per shift at all other times. Their primary duty consists of controlling access at the main gate and monitoring the peri-gard fence alarm and closed circuit television. They do not conduct any patrols. No written instructions were available and they do not maintain a shift log. They are supervised by Mr. Molnar, Shift Superintendent. They have available two way portable radios that connect them to the control room. The radios are carried by the watchmen when they respond to an alarm which requires that they leave the main lobby.

7. Sabotage Vulnerability

The physical protection program as implemented is no deterrent to an overt act of sabotage. The protective personnel do not function efficiently and the alarm systems are not being effectively utilized. Full reliance for protection must come from the local law enforcement

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agency. It was determined that good liaison has been established and response time is in the vicinity of three minutes. The Lacey Township police department is three miles away and has several radio equipped vehicles with at least two vehicles always on patrol.

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