

Docket No. 50-336

ATTACHMENT 1  
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

December, 1984

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## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

- a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts or the outage equipment door is installed,
- b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
  1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, or special device, or
  2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specifications not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve within 72 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 31 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment by:

- a. Verifying the penetrations are in their isolated condition, or
- b. Testing the containment purge valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2.

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ATTACHMENT 2  
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
INFORMATION TO SUPPORT PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

December, 1984

## Attachment 2

The Millstone Unit No. 2 containment building includes an equipment hatch, nineteen (19) feet in diameter, provided to permit transfer of large components into and out of the containment. It is fitted with a double gasketed flange around the dished door to minimize leakage in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA). Additional details and drawings of the equipment hatch door are included in Section 5.2.7 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Technical Specification 3/4.9.4 specifies the required status of certain containment penetrations during core alternations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. These requirements ensure that a release of radioactive material within the containment will be restricted from direct leakage to the environment. The radioactive material released from a postulated fuel element rupture would be contained within the building due to the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the refueling mode coupled with the penetration integrity requirements.

The outage equipment hatch door proposed consists of a circular 1/4 inch steel plate with stiffeners. The door will be mounted to the 3/4 inch thick, 8 inch wide embedded plate which circles the exterior end of the equipment hatch containment penetration. It will be secured in place by thirteen (13) studs which will be welded to the embedded plate. An O-ring gasket is located between the outage door and the embedded plate to provide an "air tight" seal between the containment and the enclosure building.

Ten (10) six inch diameter penetrations through the door are provided for various hose and electrical cables. The outage door is designed to maintain primary containment penetration integrity required by Technical Specification 3.9.4 during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

The ten (10) penetrations will be isolated by blind flanges when not in use. Penetrations in which cables or hoses pass through will be sealed with silicone RTV fire-resistant foam to provide the required sealing. The hoses and cables will be supported by scaffolding on both sides of the outage equipment door. Therefore, the dead weight loads and vibrations of the hoses will not interfere with the integrity of the foam seal.

If one of the foam seal barriers fails during refueling operations, the technical specifications require that all refueling activities be immediately suspended. Should a fuel handling accident occur, the hoses will not be a potential leakage path.

The features incorporated into the design of this outage equipment hatch door ensure that containment integrity will be maintained while core alterations or fuel movements are conducted within the containment considering the negligible pressure gradient which will exist across the equipment hatch penetration.