## SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W. ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos	.: 50-348/92-06 and 50-364/92-06		
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295		
Docket Nos	.: 50-348 and 50-364	License Nos.:	NPF-2 and NPF-8
Facility N	ame: Farley 1 and 2		
	Conducted: February 24-28, 1992		
intpectors	D. Th npspn, Safeguards Inspector		3 - 18 - 92 Date Signed
	A. Tillman, Sateguards Inspector	in meneria mina menangkan meneria di sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai sebagai s	3-19-92 Date Signed
Approved b	y: D. R. McGuire, Chief Safeguards Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safegua Division of Radiation Safety and Saf		3-19-92 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of Physical Security Program for Power Reactors, including: Management Support; Security Program Plan and Audit; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers; Testing and Maintenance; Compensatory Measures; Detection and Assessment Aids; and Communications.

Results:

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In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. Review and observation of security operational activities confirmed that the management and operational effectiveness of the security program continues to be maintained. Security personnel continued to demonstrate a high level of job knowledge and professionalism in the performance of routine duties. Continued efforts to improve the security program efficiency and effectiveness were evidenced by the new primary access portal, intrusion detection system, security computer, and upgraded alarm stations.

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Based on inspection results, it was concluded that the security organization was adequately staffed, trained, equipped, managed, and was capable of providing an acceptable level of protection of the facility, except as noted below.

The Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER), during the February 3-7, 1986 inspection, stated that there was a "Weakness with Perimeter Alarm Assessment at Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)," they stated that there were concerns in closed circuit television (CCTV) contrast; length of the area covered by some of the cameras; structure components adjacent to the microwave detection pattern blocking assessment capabilities; and that an intruder could run out of the isolation zone and hide behind a structure without being assessed. It was noted during this inspection that all RER deficiencies were corrected with the exception of a long zone and one area where a person could pass through the zone of detection and not be observed. The licensee had identified assessment concerns at the SWIS and was providing compensatory measures for the deficiencies. This will be an Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) and is further discussed in Paragraph 8. One Licensee Identified Violation, containing Compensatory Measures was noted and is further discussed in Paragraph 7.

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