

March 19, 1992

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #85-035-01, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G. J. Diederich

LaSalle County Station

GJD/MWM/tsh

Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III Administrator INPO - Records Center IDNS Resident Inspector

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	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE	R) Form Rev 2 0
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Event Date (5)	LER Number (6) Report Date (7)	
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Name Michael W. McLain, Extens	ion 2701	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 + 6 7 6 1
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On July 23, 1885, Guring the performance of LaSalle Special Test (LST) 85-103, Set Pressure Verification Device (SPVD) Operational Test, Safety Relief Valve (SRV-SB) 2B21-F013E was inadvertently opened twice and Safety Relief Valve 2B21-F013N was inadvertently opened once.

At the time of this event LaSalle Unit 2 was in Operating Condition 1 at 23% power. The cause of the inadvertent actuations was performance of the SPVD Operational Test at an excessive pressure (955 psig). The SPVD is designed to test the SRV setpoints at a system pressure of 300 psig below the nameplate set pressure of the SRV. This results in a test pressure range of 850-905 psig reactor pressure.

This event was of minimal significance because both SRV's reclosed as indicated by the tailpipe temperatures returning to their prelift values.

The SRV's were verified to be closed by observing tailpipe temperatures. The SPVD Operational lest was terminated to preclude any additional SRV actuations. Future testing of the Set Pressure Verification Device will only be performed at a reactor pressure between 850-905 psig.

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On July 23, 1985, during the performance of LaSalle Special Test (LST) 85-103, Set Pressure Verification Device (SPVD) Operational Test, Safety Relief Valve 2821-F013E was inadvertently opened twice and Safety Relief Valve 2821-F013N was inadvertently opened once.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

At the time of this event, LaSalle Unit 2 was in Operating Condition 1 at approximately 23% power. At the start of testing, Station personnel were not aware of any maximum pressure restrictions for SPVD testing, i.e., none are listed in the SPVD technical manual. The cause of these inadvertent Safety Relief Valve (SRV-SB) actuations was performance of the SPVD operational test at an excessive system pressure (955 psig). Following these two valve actuations, a Crosby Valve and Gage Company representative informed Station personnel that the SPVD was designed to test the set pressure of the SRV's at a system pressure of 300 psig below the nameplate set pressure of the SRV. This results in a pressure range of 850-905 psig, reactor pressure, in which this test can be performed. Due to the excessive pressure, the force on the under side of the valve disc is sufficient to cause the SRV to fully open when nitrogen is admitted to the SPVD bellows assembly, mounted on the top of the SRV, during the test. When the nitrogen pressure was vented from the bellows, the SRV's reclosed. These valves are 6 X R X 10 style HB-65-BP Dual Function Safety Relief Valves, manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage Company.

D. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

This event was of minimal significance because the SRV's both reclosed as indicated by the tailpipe temperature returning to their prelift values.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev 2.0							
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E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The SRV's were verified to be closed by verifying the SRV tailpipe temperatures returned to the prelift value. The Set Pressure Verification Device Operational Test, LST-85-103, was terminated to preclude any additional SRV actuations. Future testing of the Set Pressure Verification Device, on the Unit 2 SRV's will only be performed at a reactor pressure between 850-905 psig. Action Item Record 374-200-85-00128 determined that a SPVD Operational Test was not needed, based on cost effectiveness of in-house setpoint testing. At the present time LaSalle County Station sends SRV's to Wyle Labs for setpoint testing and seat leakage determination and repair.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

None.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None.