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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-382/96-01

License: NPF-38

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 8  
Killona, Louisiana

Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: January 8-26, 1996

Inspector: T. W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist  
Plant Support Branch

Approved:

Blaine Murray  
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch  
Division of Reactor Safety

2/15/96  
Date

Inspection Summary

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Physical Security program including: management support, management effectiveness, protected area barrier, intrusion detection systems and lighting, records and reports, testing and maintenance, compensatory measures, security training and qualification, protected area access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles, and review of previous inspection findings.

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Results:

Plant Support

- The security program received very good support from senior management (Section 1.1).
- The security program was managed by a adequately qualified security staff. Security supervisors were generally responsive to identified concerns or discrepancies, and corrective actions were normally implemented upon discovery. The turnover rate within the contract security force was low (Section 1.2).
- The protected area barrier, isolation zones and lighting were effectively maintained in accordance with the physical security plan (Section 1.3).
- Records and reports were on file and generally maintained current. Three violations were identified involving posting of unarmed security personnel at open vital area doors, escorting more than five visitors into a vital area with only one escort, and the failure to record a security event within 24 hours of discovery (Section 1.4).
- Testing records for protected and vital area detection aids, metal and explosive detectors, and x-ray devices, contained all required data and were completed within the period committed to in the physical security plan. One metal detector in standby status did not detect the test weapon at one test position (Section 1.5).
- Proper compensatory measures were implemented for degraded security systems. Although security personnel were, at times, working up to 72-73 hours in a six-day period during the refueling outage; overtime hours for compensatory measures generally were not as extensive during other periods because equipment repairs were generally completed in a timely manner (Section 1.6).
- Required training had been conducted in accordance with the security program plans and was properly documented (Section 1.7).
- The licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the protected area (Section 1.8).

Summary of Inspection Findings:

- Violation 382/9601-01 was opened (Section 1.4).
- Violation 382/9601-02 was opened (Section 1.4).
- Violation 382/9601-03 was opened (Section 1.4).
- Violation 382/9404-02 was closed (Section 2.1).
- Inspection Followup Item 382/9512-02 was closed (Section 2.2).

Attachment:

- Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting.