

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Wolf Creek Generating Station

Docket No.: 50-482  
Facility Operating License No.: NPF-42

ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

Report No.: 11

Reporting Period: January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1995

SUMMARY

This report provides a brief description of changes, tests, and experiments performed at Wolf Creek Generating Station pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1). This report includes summaries of the associated safety evaluations that were reviewed and found to be acceptable by the Plant Safety Review Committee for the period beginning January 1, 1995 and ending December 31, 1995. This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2).

On the basis of these evaluations of changes, the following has been determined:

- There is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).
- There is no possibility that an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR may be created.
- The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Therefore, all items reported herein were determined not to involve an unreviewed safety question.

Safety Evaluation: 59 92-0164 Revision: 1

**Freeze Seal on Spent Fuel Pool Piping**

This temporary modification provides for an isolation boundary by utilizing a freeze seal between the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and an isolation valve (ECV018) in the 10 inch line which supplies or led flow back to the SFP from the "B" Train Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger. Valve ECV018 has a non-active leak on the bonnet to bonnet flange connection. This valve's bonnet needs to be removed to enable installation of a new type of gasket. No permanent means of isolation exists between ECV018 at the 2002' elevation and the SFP which has a normal water level at elevation 2046'. The 10" cooling line after ECV018 runs vertically up to the 2044'-6" elevation before running horizontally and then down into the pool to the distribution manifold. An antisiphon vent is located on the 2042'-11" elevation of this line as it runs down into the pool.

The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System(SFPCC) is described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.1 and shown on figures 9.1-3 Sheets 1 and 2. Installation of the freeze seal will remove "B" Train of fuel pool cooling, making it unavailable. The removal of this train is acceptable and does not involve an entry into any Technical Specification limiting condition of operation. Section 9.1 of the USAR states that two trains are provided for fuel pool cooling. The freeze seal will provide for an isolation boundary to enable work on ECV018. Installation of the gasket by utilizing a freeze seal is not the normal means described in the USAR for removal of a system from service for maintenance nor is this isolation device reflected on USAR Figure 9.1-3.

Sudden and gross failure of the freeze seal remains within the consequences of previously evaluated drainage events because it would not drain pool level below the acceptable limit of 2040' listed in Technical Specification 5.6.2. There are no credible malfunctions of equipment important to safety which may be directly or indirectly affected by the freeze seal.

This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 93-0211 **Revision:** 0

**Main Steam Isolation Actuator Upgrade Modification**

This modification affects the safety related portion of the Main Steam Supply System (MSSS) by adding a thermal relief valve, manual isolation valve, manual bypass valve, restriction orifice, and gamma ray source/detector accumulator position switch to each of the accumulators for the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Thermal relief valve, manual isolation valve, manual bypass valve, and the restriction orifice provide automatic and manual pressure relief for the hydraulic portion of the MSIV actuators. The gamma ray source/detector accumulator position switch is to provide status indication when a potentially less-than-adequate amount of hydraulic fluid is contained in the accumulator.

This modification is designed to the original Codes, standards and materials used for the MSSS. The design satisfies the safety design bases requirements identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.3.1, which include designing for earthquakes, floods, missiles, fire, pipe breaks, and single failures. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a Loss Of Coolant Accident or any Design Basis Accident is not increased.

This modification does not play a direct role in mitigating the radiological consequences of an accident described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, nor does it alter any actions described or assumed in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident discussed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This modification does not impact any fission product barriers required to prevent potential off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR 100. Therefore this change will not result in an increase in dose from any accident above that previously reviewed and approved by the NRC as part of the licensing basis for the plant.

The modifications to the MSIV actuators will not have an adverse affect on the safety-related function of these valves. Therefore, the proper functioning of the modified portion of the MSSS is maintained. This modification increases reliability and therefore, the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment is decreased.

The ability of the MSIVs to perform their design basis function is unaffected by this modification. Therefore, this change will not result in an increase in the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

This modification does not affect the safety-related portions of the MSSS. Therefore, this modification will not create an accident of a different type than evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 3 of 158

The only equipment malfunction that could result from this modification is the failure of one actuation train for one MSIV. This type of malfunction is already analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and redundant equipment is available.

This modification does not affect any of the setpoints, response times, or other bases defined in technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not affected.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 93-0224 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Auxiliary Steam Condensate Recovery Tank Conductivity Cell**

This modification removes the auxiliary steam condensate recovery tank conductivity cell (FBRE0051) from service. FBRE0051 is designed to detect in-leakage from potentially radioactive systems and components served by the Auxiliary Steam System. This modification does not alter any safety-related design functions or increase challenges to any system, structure or component. FBRE0051 has no safety-related function and it is not associated with equipment or components that perform safety-related functions.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0016 **Revision:** 1

**Disabling of Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Motor-Operated Valves**

This modification has been previously reported by Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD) 94-0016 Revision 0. The previous evaluation did not consider the seismic effect on the valves impacted by the modification. This revision supplements USQD 94-0016, Revision 0 by evaluating the seismic considerations.

All valves are well supported by the pipes. Restraints are provided on both sides of the valves. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no adverse effect on the system by the removal of these actuators. It has been determined that seismic stresses are reduced significantly by the removal of the valve actuators because of reduced weight on the piping.

This modification, as previously reported in Revision 0 of USQD 94-0016, is shown below.

This modification abandons in place the following Emergency Diesel Generator System Starting Air valve KJHV0001, (Essential Service Water System "A" to Starting Air Compressor After Coolers 5A/B Isolation); KJHV0002, "Starting Air Compressor After Coolers 5A/B Essential Service Water "A" Return Isolation Valve), KJHV0101, (Essential Service Water "B" to Starting Air Compressor After Coolers 5C/D Isolation Valve), and KJHV0102 (Starting Air Compressor After Coolers 5C/D ESW "B" Return Isolation Valve). All valves affected by this modification will be left in the closed position permanently.

These Emergency Diesel Generator System motor-operated valves are boundary valves for the Essential Service Water System that supplies cooling water to the starting air compressor after coolers (EKJ05A, EKJ05B, EKJ05C, and EKJ05D). The air compressors, dryers, and after coolers of the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System are non-safety related. The air reservoir tanks are the beginning of the safety related portion of the system. The tanks are sized large enough to start the Emergency Diesel Generator without having to be recharged. The cooling water supply is non-safety related and is isolated on a Safety Injection Signal. The design of the air compressor allows the discharge to be adequately cooled before the compressed air exits the compressor unit.

The accident position of the affected valves is closed and the Updated Safety Analysis Report specifically states in Section 9.5.6.2.2 that loss of cooling water does not damage the after cooler and the other components in the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System. Because the valves will be disabled, no malfunction can occur and the consequences of an accident are not increased. This modification does

not affect the operability or function of the Emergency Diesel Generators and does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Based on the above discussion, this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0155 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Revision to Correct Component Numbering Descrepancies**

This modification revises Drawing M-12EG02, "P&ID Component Cooling Water System," to correct a discrepancy on the drawing. The P&ID incorrectly references components EGHIS0015 and EGHV0016 as the control switches for the Component Cooling Water supply/return valves (EGHV0053 and EGHV0054). Field verification and review of applicable design documents indicate these Main Control Board hand switches are not indicating switches. The indicator lamps are separate from the control switches and the correct component identification numbers are being changed to EGHS0015 and EGHS0016.

This change is editorial in nature. Therefore, this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0167 **Revision:** 1

**Revision to Table 3.11(B)-2 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) is being implemented to correct an inconsistency between the design basis M-000, "Mechanical/Nuclear Design Criteria," and Table 3.11(B)-2 of the USAR. The Design Basis Accident room temperature and humidity for Control Building mechanical equipment rooms 3415 and 3416 are shown differently in the USAR than in M-000. This revision to the USAR changes values in Table 3.11(B)-2 from 90 degrees Fahrenheit to 104 degrees Fahrenheit and from 70 percent relative humidity to 95 percent relative humidity. The design basis temperature and humidity for these rooms is currently 104 degrees Fahrenheit and 95 percent relative humidity in accordance with M-000. Therefore, this revision does not constitute a design change. This revision also deletes Note 17 which is not applicable because there are no Engineered Safeguards Features coolers in these rooms.

Review of the accidents documented in Chapter 15 of the USAR does not reveal any accident which would be initiated by room temperature of humidity in rooms 3415 and 3416 of the Control Building. The consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the USAR are not affected by this revision. The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased because the equipment has been designed and built to standards which meet or exceed the corrected room environmental conditions. The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is unchanged. The failure modes and effects will be the same. Because the failure modes and effects are the same, there is no possibility of a different type of malfunction of equipment than previously analyzed. The Technical Specifications do not require these rooms to be maintained to a specific value of temperature or humidity. Therefore the margin of safety for any Technical Specification basis is not affected.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0173 **Revision:** 0

**Solid Radwaste Ultrasonic Level Transmitter Abandonment/Removal**

This modification to the Solid Radwaste System abandons in place level elements (HCLE0020, HCLE0025, and HCLE0034) for the Primary Evaporator Bottoms Tank, Secondary Evaporator Bottoms Tank and the Secondary Spent Resin Tank respectively. Indicating lights (HCLITS0020, HCLITS0025, and HCLITS0034) and hand indicating switches (HCHIS0020, HCHIS0025 and HCHIS0034) will be removed from Panels HC145 (Solid Radwaste Control Panel) and HC126 (Radwaste Control Station).

The design function of the ultrasonic level instrumentation which is being abandoned/removed is to measure liquid level in their respective tanks and to annunciate a Hi-Low alarm if the liquid level exceeds the Hi or Low level setpoints. The ultrasonic level instrumentation for the Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank is also used to detect the water-resin interface. The ultrasonic level instrumentation devices have been de-energized since 1989 because of low usage by operations and a high failure rate. The Primary Evaporator Bottoms Tank, the Secondary Evaporator Bottoms Tank and the Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank have another type of level instrumentation that indicates tank level and provides a Hi-Low level alarm similar to the ultrasonic level transmitters. The resin volume of the Secondary Spent Resin Tank is administratively controlled.

The Solid Radwaste System ultrasonic level instrumentation annunciates an alarm both locally and remotely upon high or low tank level and cannot create an accident described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Therefore, removal or abandonment cannot increase the probability of an accident previously described in the USAR.

The Solid Radwaste System ultrasonic level instrumentation serve no isolation function or control function; therefore, removing or abandoning equipment associated with the ultrasonic level instrumentation cannot increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR.

The Solid Radwaste System ultrasonic level instrumentation is not associated with any safety related equipment. Therefore, removal or abandonment cannot increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR.

This modification does not alter any safety related design functions or increase challenges to any system, structure, or component important to safety. Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased.

The Solid Radwaste System ultrasonic level instrumentation does not

provide any automatic safety functions nor is it required for safe shutdown. Therefore, this modification cannot create an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the USAR.

This modification will not introduce any new equipment failure modes, nor does it create the possibility of a single failure affecting multiple trains. Therefore, this modification does not create the possibility of an equipment malfunction of a different type.

There are no Technical Specifications associated with the Solid Radwaste System ultrasonic level instrumentation. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in any technical specification.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0174 **Revision:** 0

**Deletion of Reporting Requirements From the Updated Safety Analysis Report**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report deletes the reporting requirements from Section 16.3.1.2 (Relocated Technical Specification 3.3.3.3 Seismic Instrumentation) and reflects design changes made by Plant Modification Request 04023. Plant Modification Request 04023 was reported as Unresolved Safety Question Determination (USQD) 94-0180. This change deleted the requirement to submit a Special Report to the NRC when Seismic Instrumentation is inoperable for more than 30 days, and following a seismic event. (Reporting requirements from Section 16.3.1.2 of the USAR (Relocated TS 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation).

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report also reflects changes made by Plant Modification Request 04695 which was reported by USQD 94-0036 Revision 1. This modification addressed a change in the system trigger setpoint from .01g to .02g and relocated inputs for the system trigger and Operating Basis Earthquake and Safe Shutdown Earthquake alarm to the free field sensor.

This revision does not affect system operability or functionality requirements. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0175 **Revision:** 0

**Site Loop Gai-tronics Upgrade**

This modification provides for a two conductor supplemental power cable for the site portion of the Public Address System. Previous configuration provided two single conductor cables. This modification affects only the non-safety related Public Address System. Therefore, no previously evaluated accident is affected, nor is the probability of any evaluated accident increased. This revision has no affect on any safety related systems, structures or components. The Control Room to Refueling area communications link, which is identified in Technical Specifications, is not affected in any way.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0178 **Revision:** 0

**Essential Service Water Valve Normal Position**

This modification to safety related equipment provides for changing the normal position of ESW A Return From Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger A valve (EPHV0059) on Drawing M-12EF02 "P&ID Essential Service Water system," from normally open to normally closed. Note 2 on Drawing M-11EF01, "System Flow Diagram Essential Service Water," will be changed to agree with the normal function. The design function of EPHV0059 does not change because the valve can be throttled to supplement the Loss of Coolant Accident flow provided by the manual valve.

This modification will show ESW B return From Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger B valves (EPHV0059 and EPHV0060) to be normally closed versus one normally open and one normally closed. The valves safety positions are closed by a Safety Injection Signal or a Loss of Off-site Power. Therefore, with the valves in their safety position, the safety function of the service/essential service water system will not change. However, the normal function was evaluated to determine the results of the change on systems involved when reducing the flow and the modification was found to have no impact on the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0184 **Revision:** 0

**Duct Drain in Turbine Building**

This non-safety related modification adds a new drain in ductwork GE-079-5NL-14 (Condenser Air Removal System) in the Turbine Building. The new drain is being connected to the existing drain. This drain is being added to ensure more complete draining of the ductwork.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 94-0190 **Revision:** 0

**Revision to Quality Assurance Program**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report revises the Quality Assurance Program to change the reporting mechanism for in-plant nonconformances from the Corrective Work Request to the Nonconformance Report. This revision also changes the name of the Quality Assurance organization to Quality Evaluations and changes the review responsibility of Performance Improvement Requests.

This change is administrative in nature. No structures, systems nor components are affected by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0002 **Revision:** 0

**Deletion of Locked Valve Information From the Updated Safety Analysis Report**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) removes the, "locked status," of valves from USAR Figures. The status of locked components was previously removed from Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID) and reported as USQD 94-0063. The status of locked components is controlled entirely by ADM 02-102, "Control of Locked Component Status." This revision to the USAR will allow USAR figures to reflect the same information as the P&IDs. A note in the "Symbols and Legend" section of the P&IDs directs the user to ADM 02-102 for locked valve information.

This revision is a documentation change only. No systems, structures or components are affected by this revision. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0003 **Revision:** 0

**Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Clarification**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, (USAR) clarifies the intended examination schedule of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) flywheels. This revision provides for RCP flywheel inspection to be performed during motor replacement/refurbishment (a spare motor is shared with the Callaway plant for such purpose). This inspection schedule is an exception to Section C.4(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.14, "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel integrity," Revision 1.

The USAR states that the flywheel provides coastdown capabilities for the pumps under the most adverse case of blackout coincident with a safe shutdown event. This revision does not affect flywheel integrity and it's ability to provide the inertial rotation for pump coastdown.

The USAR discusses the possibility of a pump impeller rubbing on a stationary member and then seizing. If this were to occur, the shaft will fail, thus disengaging the flywheel. The motor will continue to run without overspeed and because of additional support for the flywheel, it will maintain integrity. This revision does not affect the ability of the flywheel to maintain it's integrity during thus type of malfunction.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0004 **Revision:** 0

**Organizational Changes in Chemistry**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) in the Plant Support and Chemistry areas. This revision adds the resume' of Marcy A. Blow and Steven A. Henry to the USAR and deletes the resume' of Ralph L. Logsdon. Table 13.1-1 is being revised to add the position of Senior Engineer Chemistry and to add footnote (14). This change is being implemented because Ms. Blow does not have one year experience in radiochemistry as required by Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training," and ANS/ANSI 3.1 1978, "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." Mr. Henry has the necessary qualifications and the will to act as the responsible person in the area of radiochemistry until Ms. Blow is qualified in this area.

This revision to the USAR is administrative in nature. No systems, structures, or components are affected. Equipment important to safety is not affected by this revision. For these reasons, this revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0006 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Potable Water Line**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for permanent abandonment in place of the existing two inch rural water district line which terminates in the potable water pumphouse. This two inch line is referenced in the Updated Safety Analysis Report as a back up potable water supply. If the Control Room is isolated, to respond to an emergency, a backup supply of bottled water is reserved to supply 25 personnel for one week.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0007 **Revision:** 0

**Normally Open to Normally Closed Configuration Change**

This modification changes the normal position of Nitrogen to Steam Generator Blowdown PIC-1 Sensing Line Isolation valve (EPV-0121) from open to closed. Closing valve EPV-0121 will add one more line of defense to protect the Bourdon Tube in the pressure indicating controller (EP PIC-0001).

Controller EP PIC-0001 does not perform any required function at power. No procedures require the use of EP PIC-001. Closing valve EPV-0121 will have no detrimental effect on plant operation.

Valve EPV-0121 is a non safety-related valve and is not part of the accident analysis. Closing valve EPV-0121 will reduce the chances of high pressure steam from entering the Bourdon Tube in EP PIC-0001, which is rated for 50 pounds per square inch. Pressure will be contained in piping that has been analyzed to handle 110% of Steam generator design pressure. The USAR states that no accident will exceed 110% of Steam Generator design pressure. Valve EPV-0121 does not isolate or have any effect on any safety related component. Neither valve EP-0121 nor the involved piping is defined in Technical Specifications.

Based on the above discussion, this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0008 **Revision:** 0

**Blocking Open Steam Generator Blowdown Regenerative Heat Exchanger Valve**

This temporary modification re-installs the shear pin and disconnects the air from the Steam Generator Blowdown Regenerative Heat Exchanger Valve (BMTV0040) and blocks the valve open. Blocking open BMTV0040 allows a path for a portion of the condensate to flow through the regenerative heat exchanger to the heater drain tank.

This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0009 **Revision:** 0

**Quality Control Organization Changes**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for a change in the reporting relationship of the organization responsible for performing nondestructive examinations and pressure test verifications. This organization will now report to the Vice-President Engineering. All testing functions and the performance of the examinations will remain unchanged. In addition, the title of the Vice-President Nuclear Assurance is being changed to Vice-President Technical Services.

This revision is administrative in nature. No systems, structures, or components are affected by this revision. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0010 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Correction on Makeup Demineralizer System**

This modification revises Drawing M-0025, "P&ID Makeup Demineralizer System," to reflect the as-built configuration which will show the vent header line for Sand Filters (1WM01FA, 1WM01FB, and 1WM01FC) and Carbon Filters (1WM02FA, 1WM02FB and 1WM02FC). In addition, M-0025 will be revised to show gate valves instead of diaphragm valves for components 1WM0594, 1WM0603, 1WM0609, 1WM0619, 1WM0625, and 1WM063. These revisions to this non-safety related Makeup Demineralizer System reflect the as-built configuration and do not represent any physical changes to systems, structures, or components.

Because this modification is being implemented to show the as-built configuration and correct valve symbols, this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0011 **Revision:** 0

**Turbine Exhaust Hood Local Temperature Indicators**

This modification provides for the revision of Drawing M-12AC03, " P&ID Main Turbine," to show permanently installed turbine exhaust hood local temperature indicators. This is a document change only with no affect on plant equipment or performance. This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0012 **Revision:** 0

**Liquid Radwaste Drawing Clarification**

This modification provides for the revision of Drawing M-12HB01, "P&ID Liquid Radwaste System," to indicate the correct location for casing drain lines (046-HCD-1" and 047-HCD-1") on the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pumps (PHB02A and PHB02B). This modification will revise a drawing discrepancy that exists with Drawing M-12HB01 and MS-01, "Piping Class Summary For WCGS." This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0013 **Revision:** 0

**Temporary Storage for Combustibles**

This Combustible Materials Permit provides for the temporary storage of flammable liquids inside an approved flammable liquids cabinet located in Diesel Generator Room 5203. The flammable liquids include paint, solvents and thinners to be used for painting the Diesel Generators.

There is no impact on assumptions used in the accidents evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Appendix R safe shutdown requirements are not affected and this is not a reduction in fire protection. This change will have no impact on the probability of a diesel engine failure as the material will be in an approved storage cabinet when in the stored condition. During periods of use, required compensatory measures will be in place. There are no new failure modes as a result of this change.

This change will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0014 **Revision:** 0

**Recycle Holdup Tank Eductor Replacement**

This modification replaces the existing undersized Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor (SHE01) with the correct size to meet the design flow requirement. This modification clarifies the code/safety classification of various components. The new eductor meets the requirements of ANSI B31.1, "Power Piping," and Regulatory Guide 1.143, "Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management Systems, Structures, and Components Installed in Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." This modification also changes the eductor's line class from "HBC" to HBD."

The new eductor and the flow transmitters meet or exceed the original design requirements established by Regulatory Guide 1.143. The systems assumed to function in accident are not affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0016 **Revision:** 0

**Spent Fuel Pool Surveillance Level Indicator**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for installation of a passive level indicator (non-safety related) in the spent fuel pool to assist plant personnel in evaluating water levels during surveillance walk through inspections. The new level indicator will be bolted to an existing spent fuel pool lighting bracket for support and extend into the water to distinguish normal, spent fuel pool pump trip, and Technical Specification water levels. This level indicator was installed by Plant Modification Request 04249.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0017 Revision: 0

**Hagan and Honeywell Recorder Replacement**

This non-safety related modification replaces Hagan Optimac and Honeywell chart recorders used on the Main Control Board with Johnson Yokogawa recorders. Chart recorders being replaced are Ink Recorder for Eccentricity, Speed and Control Valve Position - RL028 (ACUR0143), Pressurizer Level Control (BBLR0459), Boric Acid Tank A (BGLR0102), Boric Acid Transfer Pump Discharge (BGFR0110), Reactor Coolant Pump 4 Seal 1 Water Leak Off (BGFR0154), Reactor Coolant Pump 3 Seal Water Leak Off (BGFR0155), Reactor Coolant Pump 2 Seal 1 Water Leak Off (BGFR0156), Reactor Coolant Pump 1 Seal 1 Water Leak Off (BGFR0157), Refueling Water Storage Tank Level (BNLR0930), Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Discharge Temperature (EJTR0612), Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Discharge Temperature (EJTR0613), Containment Atmosphere (GNPR0934), Containment Atmosphere (GNPR0934), Computer Trend Recorder (RJUR0001), Computer Trend Recorder (RJUR0002), Trend Recorder (RJUR0003) and Over Pressure Over Temperature Recorder (SETR0411).

Plant operation and control are not affected by the replacement of these recorders. The new recorders do not perform and safety related functions. The new recorders meet seismic requirements for the Main Control Board.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0018 **Revision:** 0

**Changes to the Operations Organization**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report reflects changes in the organizational structure of Operations. Revisions include: changing the title of, "Superintendent Operations Support," to, "Supervisor Operations Support;" Revision of figure 13.1-2b to reflect the current organizational structure; changing the title of the, "Water Treatment Coordinator," to "Supervisor Water Treatment," and to reflect that the Supervisor Water Treatment and the Supervisor Radwaste report to the Supervisor Operations Support. These changes are administrative in nature. No structure, systems, or components are affected by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0019 **Revision:** 0

**Revision to Accumulator Safety Injection Operation Procedure**

Revision 15 to procedure SYS EP-200, "Accumulator Safety Injection Operation," incorporates a note to inform operators how to reduce accumulator leakage, to correct typographical errors, and to provide clarification. This revision insures the closure of Residual Heat Removal Pump to Accumulator Injection Line Check Valves (EP8818A/B/C/D) by depressurizing the Residual Heat Removal side of the EP8818 valves while allowing the Safety Injection Pump to continue running after the Accumulator has been filled.

A review of Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Chapter 15 accidents has been completed. The valve lineup provided by this revision does not affect the initiating variables of any previously evaluated accident.

This revision does not increase the amount of radioactive material in the plant, nor change or degrade the physical or operational barriers of the plant to confine or mitigate the release of these materials. This revision does not degrade or change equipment important to safety evaluated in the USAR. This revision does not adversely challenge any equipment important to safety.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0020 **Revision:** 0

**Instrument Air Compressor Cooling Water**

This modification provides for the chilled water line tapping of supply/return of chilled water lines and installation of isolation valves for supply/return of chilled water to/from the new Instrument and Service Air Compressor (CKA01C). The Chilled Water System is a non-safety related system and is not used for any safety related function. The components and equipment installed by this modification will meet the design basis structural requirements.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0021 **Revision:** 0

**Short Circuit Protection for Solid State Protection System in Turbine Building**

This modification to safety related equipment provides fused short circuit protection for the 120 Volt Alternating Current power that is used to supply anticipatory trip logic to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). Three ampere fuses will be used to protect the SSPS power supplies from ground faults in the Turbine building anticipatory circuits. These fuses improve the protection of power to the SSPS 48 and 15 Volt Direct Current power supplies. The anticipatory trip circuits affected by this modification are not used to evaluate any accidents in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0022 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Owner Controlled Area Boundary Fence**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report changes Drawing 8025 C KG1202, "Site Plan Layout," to show the removal of the Owner Controlled Area Boundary fence that encloses the Construction Administration Building, Executive Office Building, Materials Management Trailers, and Communications trailers. There no systems, structures or components important to safety affected by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0023 **Revision:** 0

**Decontamination Spray Booth Drain**

This modification changes the Decontamination Spray Booth drain. The equipment drain system currently handles drainage from the Decontamination Spray Booth. This modification will route drainage from the Decontamination Spray Booth to the Hot Machine Shop via a floor drain. This modification will improve the draining of the Decontamination Spray Booth.

The Decontamination Spray Booth has no safety related function. There are no safety related systems, structures, or components affected by this modification. This drain is being modified in accordance with original design criteria and the function is maintained in accordance with the design basis.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0024 **Revision:** 0

**Air Compressors Cooling Water Flow**

This modification revises Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Figure 9.3-1 and documents the approved disposition of Revision 2 to Design Change Package (DCP) 05027. DCP 05027 provided for the removal of internals from Valve Service Water Down Stream Bleed Off Cooler (KATCV1362), and CKA01B Cooling Water Down Stream (KATCV1404) valves. This modification is a document change only with no effect on the previously approved Design Change Package. This change has no effect on any safety related or special scope equipment or equipment performance. All equipment malfunction scenarios, accident scenarios, probability assessments and effects of these scenarios and assessments documented in the USAR are unaffected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0025 **Revision:** 0

**New Drain Line for the Compressed Air System**

This modification to non-safety related equipment provides for the addition of a new drain trap and drain line to the Compressed Air System. In addition, existing drain traps (KADT0066, KADT0067, KADT0072, and KADT0073) are being replaced with a new model.

No accident identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is initiated by a Compressed Air System failure. A failure of the Compressed Air System causes safety related equipment to fail in the safe position. Any equipment important to safety, that relies on the non-safety related Compressed Air System would fail in a safe position. This modification does not change any system operational modes or accident effects and could not cause an accident of a different type than previously evaluated.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0026 **Revision:** 0

**Installation of Freeze Seals on Central Chilled Water System**

This temporary modification provides for the establishment of two freeze seals on the Central Chilled Water Return Line (GB-010-HBD-2½") in the Communications Corridor. This temporary modification will allow the installation of new isolation valve (GB-V780) and associated piping without shutting down the operating chiller. The freeze seals will be applied using approved procedures.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0027 **Revision:** 0

**Installation of Freeze Seals on Central Chilled Water System**

This temporary modification provides for the establishment of two freeze seals on the Central Chilled Water Return Line (GB-009-HBD-2½") in the Communications Corridor. This temporary modification will allow the installation of new isolation valve (GB-V779) and associated piping without shutting down the operating chiller. The freeze seals will be applied using approved procedures.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0028 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of a "T" and Isolation Valve to Instrument Air Line**

This modification adds a "T," an isolation valve, and cap to the instrument air line upstream of Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) AB PV-0001, AB PV-0002, AB PV-0003, and AB PV-0004. This modification will be installed downstream of the instrument air manual isolation valve. This addition will save time, reduce the chance of equipment damage and increase personnel safety. This modification will reduce the time required to perform stroke testing of the ARVs and decrease the potential for equipment damage when the instrument air lines are removed during the test.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0029 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Classification Human Factor Considerations**

Revision 43 to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EPP 01-2.1, "Emergency Action Levels," and EPP 01-1.0 "Control Room Organization," incorporate human factor considerations which enhance emergency classification. In addition, the reporting location of the Onsite Public Information Coordinator is being changed.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0030 **Revision:** 0

**Lockset Upgrade and Card Reader Modification**

This modification makes the use of card readers optional for selected doors and protected area barrier gates, deletes selected patrol tour card readers, and changes the outside lockset trim on some of the power block doors. The modification to locksets and exit devices affect only the security function of the doors and are being made to allow easier access to plant areas. The patrol tour card readers, which are being deleted, are in the vicinity of other patrol tour card readers. Patrols of the affected areas remain adequate to detect abnormal conditions or suspicious activities.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0033 **Revision:** 0

**Fire Area Combustible Load Evaluation**

This modification revises the fixed combustible load in room 1404 of Fire Area A-3 to reflect the storage of rubber hose, Boric acid in barrels, and equipment needed by Operations as a normal function of plant operation. This modification has no affect on the inputs, assumptions, or components involved in the accidents evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The fixed fire load remains below the fire barrier rating.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0034 **Revision:** 0

**Fire Area Combustible Load Evaluation**

This modification provides for additional combustible material storage in Fire Area A-26 to support day to day plant operations. This modification has no affect on the inputs, assumptions or components involved in the accidents evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The fire load in Fire Area A-26 will be maintained below the fire barrier ratings and safe shutdown can be achieved in the event a design basis fire occurs.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 45 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0035 **Revision:** 0

**Correction of Drawing Error in the Public Address Riser Diagram**

This modification revises Drawing E-1L9903, "Public Address Riser Diagram," to reflect changes inadvertently omitted or removed during the drawing revision process after implementing a modification. This is an administrative modification which is being implemented to correct a drafting error. This modification will have no effect on any structure, component, or system.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0036 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of Borated Water to Containment Sumps**

This temporary modification provides for the addition of 2000 gallons of unborated water to the containment sumps to enhance the margin for operability for motor operated valves (EJHV881 A & B, ENHV001, and EMHV0007). This temporary modification will provide additional assurance that pressure locking/thermal binding will not occur in these valves. This temporary modification will only affect the recirculation phase of Emergency Core Cooling System Operation

Evaluation of this temporary modification concludes that a significant safety concern will not be created by implementing this temporary modification for the remainder of this cycle. This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0037 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Abandoned Fire Protection Piping**

This modification provides for the cutting ,capping and removal of abandoned fire protection piping outside of the power block. This piping runs from the main header east of the warehouse to the potable water pump house. The fire protection piping is independent of all other plant piping and cannot initiate an accident.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0039 **Revision:** 0

**Deletion of Requirement to Tightness Test Valves**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) deletes the reference to the Main Turbine stop and control valve tightness testing in Section 10.2.3.6.

Valve inspection frequencies are extended from 3-5 year frequencies to 6 year frequencies. Turbine missile probability is the only possible scenario affected by this revision. Equivalent means of determining valve tightness by observation during normal plant evolutions and valve inspections on 6 year intervals, is the accepted insurance industry standard. Reliability of the Main Turbine stop and control valves will be maintained as originally evaluated to ensure the missile probability calculations are still valid. Turbine missile trajectory calculations and probability of impacting safety related structures, systems, or components does not change as originally addressed in the USAR. There are no field modifications and operating parameters have not been changed. Main Turbine valve tightness testing is not addressed in Technical Specifications.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0040 **Revision:** 0

**Service Water Leak in Turbine Building**

This temporary modification provides for the installation of two pumps and associated piping and valves required to pump the service water/ground water leaking through the turbine building west wall, from a temporary tank, to the circulating water system. This temporary modification will pump the water into the 120 inch circulation water outlet structure. Installation of this temporary equipment and piping to divert the leaking service water and ground water to the circulation water system does not affect any accidents previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, nor does it effect the safe shutdown of the plant. Consequences of an accident previously evaluated are unchanged. Malfunction of equipment is not affected and the margin of safety is unchanged.

This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0041 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Abandoned Fire Protection Valve**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) involves removing an abandoned underground fire protection valve that appears on USAR Figure 9.5.1. This valve (FP0615) and associated piping were cut and capped and are isolated from the active fire protection piping. FP0615 is outside the power block area.

Fire protection piping is independent of all other plant piping systems. The abandoned non-safety related fire protection valve does not interface with safety related equipment.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0043 **Revision:** 0

**Organization Changes**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for an organization change. The Vice-President Engineering has retired and that position will be filled by the Vice-President Technical Services. In addition, Nuclear Engineering will report to the Vice President Engineering and Information Services will report to the Chief Administrative Officer. Performance Assessment will report directly to the President and Chief Executive Officer and Quality Control will report to Performance Assessment. The position of Director Corporate Development has been deleted.

These changes are administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this revision. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0044 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of 4000 Gallons of Borated Water to Containment Recirculation Sumps**

This temporary modification provides for the addition of 4000 gallons of cool borated water to the Containment Recirculation Sumps. This modification will enhance the operability of the Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Removal Pump A Suction Valve (EJHV8811A), Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Removal Pump B Suction Valve (EJHV8811B), Containment Recirculation Sump to Containment Spray Pump A Isolation Valve (ENHV0001), and Containment Recirculation Sump to Containment Spray Pump B Isolation Valve (ENHV0007) by providing a buffer layer of cool water in contact with the valves.

Although loss of secondary coolant accidents rely on the actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) to mitigate the consequences of the event, these events would not be impacted by this temporary modification because the ECCS recirculation is not expected to be required because of shorter duration and lower Refueling Water Storage Tank depletion rate associated with these accidents. Therefore, this temporary modification will only affect the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analyses and LOCA related calculations.

For the large break LOCA, the existence of lower concentrated boric solution in the containment sump will have no effect on the current Updated Safety Analysis Report large break LOCA analysis.

For the small break LOCA, the dilution effect as a result of a lower concentrated boric acid solution residing in the sump prior to occurrence of a postulated LOCA does not alter the conclusions of the small break LOCA analysis.

For Post-LOCA long-term core cooling/subcriticality, the temporary ECCS configuration change to allow addition of lower concentrated boric acid solution to the sumps will not challenge the ECCS capability to perform its safety function of maintaining the core in subcritical conditions following a LOCA for the remainder of the operating cycle.

Other concerns considered for implementation of this temporary modification include, hot leg switch over to prevent boron precipitation, sump pH value, containment pressure rise, injection of a slug of lower concentrated boric acid water solution into the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal pumps when changing from injection mode to recirculation mode, boron plating of the sump level transmitter, corrosion of the liner plate, and impact of flood level increase on environmentally qualified equipment. Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that a significant safety concern does

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 53 of 158

not exist if the temporary modification is implemented for the remainder of this cycle.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0045 **Revision:** 0

**Component Identification Correction in Condensate Demineralizer System Drawings**

This modification corrects a component numbering error on Drawing M-12AK02, "Condensate Demineralizer System." Limit Switch AKZS0421 is incorrectly numbered as AKZS0427. This modification is editorial in nature and does not affect any structures, systems, or components.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0046 **Revision:** 0

**Optional Opening on Between Room 1203 and Room 1204**

This modification allows an "optional opening" between rooms 1203 and 1204. Allowing the optional opening between these rooms will allow the Design Basis Accident environments, which have been calculated for these rooms in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 3.11, to be altered by the increased cross connection of environments. The rooms are analyzed by Calculation YY-49 for an existing connecting opening between the two rooms along their western sides of 108.24 square feet. This opening occurs at the top of a partial height wall on the east side of both rooms. It has been determined that the additional opening would significantly change the pressure and temperature curves resulting from the YY-49 calculation. Review of the specifications for the components located in rooms 1203 and 1204 indicates that all the components are qualified to more general higher environmental requirements than the minimum room requirements.

The floodrate in room 1203 is 5500 gallons per minute and in room 1204 it is 2510 gallons per minute. Flooding in these rooms does not occur because the capacity of the floor drains and other openings exceeds the flood rate.

The structural capacity of the wall is not reduced significantly by this opening and the wall in which the opening occurs is not a fire wall. No new missile hazards are created by this opening.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the USAR. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0047 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Revision to Reflect As-Built Configuration for Component Tag Number**

This modification revises Drawings M-12KJ02 and M-12KJ05, "P&ID Standby Diesel Generator," to correct a component tag discrepancy and to reflect the current field configuration. Component tags in the field are correctly identified. Component tags which are currently incorrectly identified are in-line discharge filters on the Starting Air System for the Emergency Diesel Generators. This change is editorial in nature and does not affect any structure, system of component.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0048 **Revision:** 0

**Turbine Laboratory Eye-Wash Modification**

This modification provides a new eye-wash station on the 2010 level of the Turbine Building and removes three existing eye-wash stations. This modification is a design enhancement.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0049 **Revision:** 0

**Installation of a Manual Isolation Valve**

This modification adds a new 3/4" manual isolation valve to test line EM119BCD-3/4". This modification will provide a positive isolation of the test line for "A" train High Pressure Injection and loop 2 and 3 Accumulator Injection check valve lines. The test piping in which the new valve is installed is non-safety related. The line is normally isolated from safety related lines and cannot have the possibility of increasing the probability of an accident previously evaluated. No postulated accidents involve this non-safety related piping. The new valve is non-safety related. The component is classified as a II/I concern and has been appropriately designed.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0050 **Revision:** 0

**Potable Water System Upgrade**

This modification provides for removal of a construction berm outside the protected area boundary and installation of a new tank foundation in the same approximate location. In addition, a new 6" potable water line to Rural Water District #3, a new concrete pad, and removal of all abandoned equipment in the pump house is provided by this modification. Underground piping and appropriate cathodic protection will be installed. The potable water system is non-safety related and does not interact with any power block systems.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0052 **Revision:** 0

**Configuration Change Process Clarification**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report adds a statement to emphasize that the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11 are met in the Configuration Change Process. This addition to Section 17.2.3.7 will resolve the question as to whether the Configuration Change Process meets the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11. This change further documents the commitment to ANSI N45.2.11 in the Configuration Change Process. This revision is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0053 **Revision:** 0

**Residual Heat Removal Discharge Pressure Gauge Installation**

This modification provides for the installation of an "interim" pressure gauge downstream of valve EJVO053 to monitor Residual Heat Removal System piping pressure. The gauge is rated at higher than design pressure and will be valved in for only a short period with an operator present. The gauge is located at the test connection downstream of both safety related and non-safety related isolation valves.

The addition of a pressure gauge to the test connection will not increase the probability of occurrence of any previously evaluated accident. A loss of coolant accident through an opening of this magnitude is bounded by the loss of coolant accident analysis described in Section 15.6.2 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. A pipe break has been analyzed and the installation of the pressure gauge does not increase the consequences of a malfunction.

The only Technical Specification that could be affected by this change is the Reactor Coolant System operational leakage 3.4.6.2. The basis for this Technical Specification is early detection of Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leakage. Any leakage cause by the gauge installation would not be pressure boundary leak and would be observed by the operator and isolated immediately.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0054 **Revision:** 0

**Revision 25 to the Wolf Creek Generating Station Security Plan**

This revision to the Wolf Creek Generating Station Security Plan provides for the addition of a Secondary Access Facility, changes the title of the Manager of Security, and changes figure drawings to allow for the optional installation of Automated Controlled Access Terminals. This revision deletes temporary construction procedures in chapter 10, removes video tape recorders, revises response capabilities of local law enforcement agencies, and adds an exemption for hands on search.

This revision does not affect the design basis or plant equipment and does not reduce the protection of plant equipment. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 63 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0056 **Revision:** 0

**Revision to Emergency Action Levels and Radiological Emergency Response Plan**

Revision 44 to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan incorporates human factors improvements as well as additional clarification for the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Charts and the bases for EAL Charts. EALs are based on Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors."

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0057 **Revision:** 0

**Minimum Acceptance Criteria for Centrifugal Charging Pump B**

This revision to Procedure STS BG-100B "Centrifugal Charging System "B" Train Inservice Pump Test," provides a lower acceptance criteria for Centrifugal Charging Pump (PBG05B) minimum recirculation flow. The current requirement for minimum recirculation flow is 60 gallons per minute. The revised minimum recirculation flow criteria is 58 gallons per minute.

The minimum recirculation limit for PBG05B may be lowered to equal to or greater than 58 gallons per minute without affecting the pump's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident or to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition. PBG05B will not experience any long term detrimental effects by lowering the minimum recirculation limits. The pump will be able to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition if the events analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Appendix 5A, were to occur or if it was deemed necessary to throttle the discharge flow during recovery efforts following a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break. The analyses of a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break are not affected by this reduction in acceptance criteria. A reduction in pump recirculation flow would actually result in more flow being injected to the reactor in the conditions of the analysis where it is assumed that the pump recirculation motor operated valve remains open.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0058 **Revision:** 0

**Bearing Temperature Monitor for Standby Diesel Generators**

This modification provides for the replacement of Chromalox monitors, used to monitor engine bearing temperatures for the Standby Diesel Generators, with IMC monitors. Chromalox monitors are no longer available. This modification revises Drawings M-12KJ02 and M-12KJ05, "P&ID Standby Diesel Generator," to reflect the as-built configuration and to incorporate the equipment changes implemented through this modification. Evaluation of the IMC monitors has shown that they are an acceptable replacement for the Chromalox monitors.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0060 **Revision:** 0

**Residual Heat Removal Depressurization**

This temporary procedure will install a hose between a drain line on the A train Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cold Leg discharge piping and a drain line on the Safety Injection test line to provide an alternate path for depressurizing the RHR piping when the Safety Injection test line valves are closed for maintenance and testing. The A train RHR piping is susceptible to pressurization because of leakage through the Reactor Coolant System boundary check valves. A dedicated individual will be stationed at the hose whenever it is valved in to isolate the drain valves if necessary. This dedicated individual will maintain the seismic integrity of the RHR system pressure boundary. The fluid leaked into the RHR system is at relatively high temperature but is of very low volume. After mixing with the RHR System fluid, it will be low temperature. In the unlikely event of a hose failure, the dedicated individual will be capable of closing the drain valve since the fluid will be low temperature and low pressure. Equipment in the area where this procedure is to be performed is designed for spray conditions.

Previously evaluated accidents identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) have been reviewed and it has been determined that the probability of occurrence will not be increased by performing this temporary procedure. Based on a review of the USAR the probability of occurrence of RHR System malfunctions will not be increased.

This temporary procedure will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0061 **Revision:** 0

**Transient Cable Separation Criteria**

This modification provides separation distances for transient cables in use throughout the plant. A clarification between permanent plant cables and transient cables had not been made in the past. This modification allows for decreased separation criteria for transient cables based on cable energy levels, industry testing, and the new revision to IEEE 384-1992. The reduced separation will not result in an increase of the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

A reduction in separation for transient cables will not adversely impact non-safety related nor safety related structures, systems, or components. The separation guidelines insure that all cable systems will perform their safety functions as designed.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0062 **Revision:** 0

**Containment Recirculation Sump Level Scale Modification**

This modification provides for the relocation of the level gauges for the Containment Recirculation Sumps. It has been determined that these level gauges are installed 7" higher than the instrumentation's scale graduations indicate. This modification corrects this discrepancy and changes the scales to read out in elevation rather than inches above the sump floor. This modification affects Control Room instrumentation used to indicate water level in the Containment Recirculation Sumps. This modification will more accurately reflect the fluid level in the sumps.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0063 **Revision:** 0

**Biennial Relevancy Procedure Review Revision**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) changes the biennial relevancy review requirements for site procedures by modifying the commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operational)." Regulatory Guide 1.33 endorses ANSI N18.7-1976, "Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." This revision provides for alternate review processes equivalent to ANSI N18.7-1976. Emergency Plan Procedures, Off Normal Procedures, and Emergency Procedures remain under the requirements of ANSI N18.7-1976.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0064 **Revision:** 0

**High Pressure Turbine Extraction Piping Replacement**

This modification provides for the replacement of piping to mitigate abnormal pipe-wall thinning because of Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) in the eighteen inch pipe sections of the High Pressure Turbine Extraction to Heaters 5A and 5B. This modification replaces existing carbon steel piping spools (AC06S001, AC06S007, and AC06S008) with low alloy steel (2 1/4 Cr- 1 Moly), which is more resistant to FAC wear.

The Main Turbine System does not contain any safety related components or equipment. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0065 **Revision:** 0

**Replacement of Piping in Third Stage Extraction to Heaters**

This modification provides for the replacement of piping to mitigate abnormal pipe-wall thinning because of Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) in the sixteen inch pipe sections of the third stage extraction to Heaters 7A and 7B. This modification replaces existing carbon steel piping spools (AC08S005, AC008S011, and AC08S014) with low alloy steel (2 1/4 Cr- 1 Moly), which is more resistant to FAC wear.

The Main Turbine System does not contain any safety related components or equipment. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0066 **Revision:** 0

**Replacement of Piping in Third Stage Extraction to Moisture Separator Reheaters**

This modification provides for the replacement of piping to mitigate abnormal pipe-wall thinning because of Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) in the sixteen inch pipe sections of the third stage extraction to moisture separator reheaters. This modification replaces existing carbon steel piping spools (AC13S002, and AC13S007) and the "T" fitting of a piping spool (AC13S003), with low alloy steel (2 1/4 Cr-1 Moly), which is more resistant to FAC wear.

The Main Turbine System does not contain any safety related components or equipment. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0067 **Revision:** 0

**Replacement of Rosemount Transmitter with Barton Transmitter**

This modification replaces a Rosemount flow transmitter, for the Centrifugal Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank flow (EMFT0917A), with a Barton flow transmitter. The Rosemount transmitter has unique calibration requirements which affect accuracy in this application. The Barton transmitter is not calibrated in the same way and provides better accuracy in this application.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0068 Revision: 0

**Replacement of Air Compressor**

This modification replaces the existing Ingersoll-Rand Air Compressor (CKA01C) with a larger capacity and more reliable Atlas-Copco compressor. To provide cooling water, chilled water supply and return lines will be routed from Chilled Water Supply valve (GBV0779) and Chilled Water Return valve (GBV0780) to the location of the new compressor. The abandoned service water lines which were used for cooling the Ingersoll-Rand compressor will be capped at a convenient location. A larger capacity power cable will be installed to the new compressor in place of the existing cable.

A failure mode and effects analysis performed on the engineered safety feature systems equipment indicates that a loss of instrument air cannot cause safety limits, as given in the technical specifications, to be exceeded. The loss of instrument air does not adversely affect the core or the reactor system not prevent an orderly shutdown, if necessary. All pneumatically operated valves and controls assume a preferred operating position upon loss of instrument air. Chapter 15 or the Updated Safety Analysis Report does not take any credit for the instrument air system.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 75 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0069 **Revision:** 0

**Updated Safety Analysis Report Revision to Reflect Organization Changes**

This revision to Chapter 17 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides an update of organizational titles and positions. In addition, minor clarifications to allow implementation of the electronic work controls process are included in this revision.

This revision is administrative in nature and will not affect and structures, systems, or components. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0070 **Revision:** 0

**Organization Changes**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report reflects changes to the organizational structure at Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. The changes include: 1) Performance Assessment will report to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) instead of the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 2) Regulatory Compliance will report to the Manager Performance Assessment, 3) Licensing will report to the Manager Nuclear Engineering, 4) Emergency Planning will report directly to the CAO.

This change in organizational structure does not delete any organizational functions. This is an administrative change only. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this change.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0072 **Revision:** 0

**Operations Organization Changes**

This Updated Safety Analysis Report revision provides for organization changes in the Operations department. Positions affected by this revision include the Superintendent Operations and Shift Supervisor. Resumes for the personnel involved in the organization changes are provided by this revision. This revision also deletes one resume from the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

The changes are administrative in nature. All of the personnel are fully qualified and meet the minimum qualifications for their position. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0073 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Fuel Oil System Underground Piping**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides a correction to Sections 9.5.4.2.2d and 9.5.4.3. These sections incorrectly state that all emergency fuel oil system under ground piping drains back to the storage tank. There is a check valve in the supply line which prevents it from draining back, so the underground supply line remains full. Engineering has analyzed this condition and determined that the as-built condition is acceptable for use.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0074 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Correction for Shop Building Piping**

This modification provides for the revision to Drawings M-0025, "P&ID Makeup Demineralizer System," M-12WT01, "P&ID Waste Water Treatment Facility," and Updated Safety Analysis Report Figure 9.2-5 to reflect the addition of an overflow line for tanks 1WM14TA/TB (Shop Building Mixed Bed Demineralizer Tanks). These drawings will be revised to reflect the actual plant configuration. The changes to these drawings were approved and implemented in accordance with Plant Modification Request 03088.

This modification to the non-safety related drawings does not affect any structures, systems, or components. The close out effort for Plant Modification Request 03088 did not identify the above referenced drawings for revision. These changes are administrative in nature to correct an oversight.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0075 **Revision:** 0

**Component Identification Modification**

This modification provides for a revision to Drawings M-0037, "P&ID Service Air System Shop Building," and M-0025, "P&ID Makeup Demineralizer System to reflect the as-built configuration and to identify seven isolation valves pertaining to the Service Air System. There are no structures, systems, or components affected by this modification. This modification is administrative in nature.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0077 **Revision:** 0

**Steam Generator Blowdown Drawing Correction**

This modification provides for revision of Drawing M-12RM01, "P&ID Process Sampling System," to remove Steam Generator Blowdown Process Sample Isolation Valves (BMV0006, BMV0017, BMV0028, and BMV0039) from the drawing. This modification is being implemented to remove a discrepancy which exists between Drawing M-12RM01 and Drawing M-12BM01, "P&ID Steam Generator Blowdown System." The valves in question appear on Drawing M-12BM01 and their removal from Drawing M-12RM01 will eliminate the component duplication. This change is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0078 **Revision:** 0

**New Site Sewage Lagoon**

This modification adds a new site sewage lagoon that will provide a dammed containment of approximately 48 acre feet additional storage in the Wolf Creek water shed for sanitary waste. The new site sewage lagoon does not affect any safety related or non-safety related components. The consequences of a dam failure were evaluated and shown to non-consequential to the maximum water surface elevation.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0079 Revision: 0

**Main Feedwater Pump Seal Supply Pressure**

This modification to the Condensate and Feedwater System provides a self contained pressure control valve, two isolation valves, a bypass valve, a pressure gage, and a drain valve in the common header (AD-072-GBD-2). This common header supplies water to steam generator feedwater pump and heater drain pump seals. The purpose of the new pressure control valve is to reduce the differential pressure accross steam generator feed water pump seal water supply control valves and heater drain pump seal water supply control valves.

This modification will improve the performance and reliability of the existing seal water supply control valves (AEPDV0052, AEPDV0058, AFPV0087, and AFPV0088). The Condensate and Feedwater System is not important to safety except for the section between the steam generator and the steam generator isolation valves. This section is safety related and is required to function following a design basis accident and to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. This modification does not affect this section of the condensate feedwater system.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0080 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Surge Relay**

This modification provides for the addition of overexcitation protective relays to the diesel generator protective relay panels NE106 and NE107. The volts per hertz relay addition to the diesel generators protective relay panels isolates in the event of an emergency/loop start/run demand on the diesels and therefore cannot increase the frequency of occurrence of any accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) nor increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The relay only functions to protect the generator/transformer under normal start/run diesel generator operation in the event of overexcitation and does not increase the frequency of occurrence of any malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR because the relay trip contact is isolated during an emergency start/run demand on the diesel and redundancy and independence is not compromised by the relay addition. The addition of this relay provides no new radiological release pathways not prevents any loading to the diesel generator not previously analyzed in the USAR.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0081 **Revision:** 0

**Installation of Freeze Seal to Relocate Essential Service Water Valve**

This temporary modification provides for a freeze seal on the Essential Service Water supply line (EFV0081). This piping line is the supply to Class IE Switchgear A/C Condenser B, (SGK05B). The purpose of the freeze seal is to allow the relocation of valve EFV0081. EFV0081 is the Essential Service Water B Train to IE Switchgear A/C Condenser 5B Isolation Valve.

This modification will be completed well within the Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation time frame for SGK05B. This temporary modification does not impact anticipated operational transients or the postulated design basis accidents described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The freeze seal is performed with emergency contingency plans in place. System redundancy is not degraded.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0082 **Revision:** 0

**Refuel Machine Upgrade (Operator Console Replacement)**

This modification provides for replacement of the existing operator's console and hoist motor control center for the Fuel Handling System. The operator's console will be removable and includes programmable logic control (PLC), an industrialized personal computer, a computer/touch screen video monitor, variable speed DC drives and operator controls. A gear rack is mounted parallel to the bridge rail and to the trolley rail to determine position. All operating limits remain the same, but they are controlled by the PLC instead of limit switches. This modification will improve the reliability, troubleshooting techniques and operator interface of the refueling machine controls. This modification serves to utilize improved technology in control systems and speed control. Failure of the PLC results in automatic stoppage of the system and shutdown of the refueling machine.

The changes provided by this modification address the movement boundary zones and how the hoist loads are sensed, displayed and controlled for the bridge, trolley and hoist. This modification does not affect the structural design of the buildings, impact the ability to withstand a Safe Shutdown Earthquake, affect the seismic category or increase the chances of a fuel handling accident. This modification will not increase the probability of a fuel drop from a lifting device or of improper operation of the transfer equipment or cranes. The improved operator interface should provide a lower probability of improper operation of the equipment.

The most severe credible accident would be dropping a spent fuel assembly. This accident is analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 15.7.4. The consequences of an accident as described in Section 15.7.4 remain the same.

The changes made by this modification do not effect the load lifting capability of the refueling machine. Therefore, the changes do to reduce the margin of safety. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0084 **Revision:** 0

**Flow Accelerated Corrosion Information Added to Piping and Instrument Diagrams**

This modification provides for the revision of various piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID) to add a note which states "For Erosion/Corrosion concerns, carbon steel piping on this P&ID may have sections of 2 1/4 CR-1 Moly low alloy steel and/or stainless steel piping. For details see isometrics." This revision does not authorize replacement of carbon steel piping with Cr-Moly or Stainless steel piping. The note to the P&IDs is being added only to ensure users of the P&IDs will reference isometrics for the exact piping materials used.

This modification is an administrative change only. No structures, systems or components are affected by this modification. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0086 **Revision:** 0

**Vehical Barrier System**

This modification provides for the installation of a Vehicle Barrier System consisting of rods, bollards, crash barrier gates for protection of all vital equipment required to shutdown the plant in the event of a land vehicle bomb threat as defined by the NRC in the amended rule. The Vehicle Barrier System is generally provided around the exterior of the main Protected Area Barrier (PAB). A subsequent revision to this evaluation will include the results of the analysis to demonstrate the ability to shut down the plant in the event of a bomb attack rendering certain vital equipment outside of the main power block inoperable. This modification is being performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.68 "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants."

This modification involves a non-safety related system which has no direct ties to a safety related system nor was this system identified as an initiator of any accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This system does not connect to any primary barriers (fuel cladding, primary pressure boundary or containment) which limit the consequences of an accident. Operation of this system will not directly or indirectly result in a challenge to or failure of the barriers. The operation, performance, or failure of this system does not impact the performance of any safety related system. The Vehicle Barrier System does not require a change to Technical Specifications or change a parameter or equipment operating condition specified in Technical Specifications.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0086 **Revision:** 1

**Vehicle Barrier System**

This modification expands the scope of the Vehicle Barrier System modification reported as USQD 59 95-0086 Revision 0. The function of the Vehicle Barrier System, in conjunction with other security measures, is to provide protection against the malevolent use of a land vehicle to transport several persons and their hand carried equipment including a bomb to the proximity of vital areas. The location of the barrier is sufficiently far enough away from all vital areas such that vital equipment required to shutdown the plant can not be damaged by the effects of the design bases explosive device. The bases for this has been documented by the comparison of actual placement of the Vehicle Barrier System with the criteria provided in Regulatory Guide 5.68, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG/CR 6190 Volume 1 "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.

This modification involves a non-safety related system which has no direct ties to a safety related system nor was this system identified as an initiator of any accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This system does not connect to any primary barriers (fuel cladding, primary pressure boundary or containment) which limit the consequences of an accident. Operation of this system will not directly or indirectly result in a challenge to or failure of the barriers. The operation, performance, or failure of this system does not impact the performance of any safety related system. The Vehicle Barrier System does not require a change to Technical Specifications or change a parameter or equipment operating condition specified in Technical Specifications.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0087 **Revision:** 0

**Armaflex Insulation Installation**

This modification provides for the installation of closed cell rubber anti sweat Armaflex insulation to plant systems. Armaflex insulation is a closed cell rubber material used to prevent the formation of condensate piping. The only function of this insulation is to prevent condensation which is a housekeeping issue. It does not serve any other system or plant function. Armaflex is a relatively light and soft material and therefore would not impact other equipment if it came loose and fell on other equipment during a seismic event. It is not used in Containment, therefore it will not clog the recirculation sumps. It is not installed on stainless steel piping. It will not initiate or accelerate corrosion on carbon steel piping when installed in accordance with plant maintenance procedures. It is classified as a combustible material, but in practice, it will not sustain combustion once an external ignition source is removed. The quantities of this material being added are insignificant when compared to the capabilities of the plant fire barriers. The addition of relatively small quantities of Armaflex insulation in the power block outside of Containment does not adversely impact any plant systems, structures or equipment.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0094 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of Current Unbalance Relay and Current Transformers**

This modification provides for the installation of a current unbalance relay and ring-type current transformers in the emergency diesel generator Control Panels (NE106 and NE107). The output of the current unbalance relay will be annunciated locally and remotely in the Control Room. The addition of the current unbalance relay and the current transformers to the diesel generator does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Installation of these devices does not violate separation criteria or create a new type of accident nor increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The failure of any of the new components would result in a false "trouble" alarm. The current unbalance relay functions only to annunciate an unbalanced current condition on the exciter power transformer.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0095 **Revision:** 0

**Air Pressure Supplied to Accumulators**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.3.1.2.3 provides correction and clarification to reflect the correct air pressure supplied to the pressure-regulating valves downstream of the accumulators. The USAR incorrectly states that the pressure-regulating valves are set at 10 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) less than instrument air pressure which is approximately 122 psig. The air pressure setting used in the plant is in accordance with design documents. The pressure reducing valves have been set at 90 psig since startup in accordance with design requirements. This revision will reflect that design pressure. This revision is a documentation change only.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0096 **Revision:** 0

**Manager Maintenance Personnel Change**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for a revised resume for the Maintenance Manager. This revision involves a change of personnel. No organizational functions have been deleted. This change is administrative in nature. No systems, structures, or components are affected.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0098 **Revision:** 0

**Service Water Pump Discharge Drain Valve**

This modification provides for a three inch drain valve to be added to each full flow service water pump discharge piping. In addition a two inch penetration is added to the check cover with a ball vent valve. These changes are required to safely assemble the check valve when the isolation valve does not hold.

The installation of an additional drain valve on the service water pump discharge line and a vent on the check valve will not impair safety related equipment from performing their shutdown function. This passive component design change does not affect the results of the loss of condenser vacuum and other events resulting in a turbine trip or any other accidents evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Installing these components in the non-safety related service water system will not impair the Essential Service Water System or other safety related equipment from performing their intended safety function.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0099 **Revision:** 0

**Organizational Change in Operations**

This revision to Chapter 13 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides for the addition of qualifications for a new Shift Supervisor. This USAR revision will add the resume of a newly qualified Shift Supervisor. This revision is an organizational change and does not affect any structures, systems, or components.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0100 **Revision:** 0

**Engineering Department Organization Changes**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides for organization changes in the Engineering department and voids USAR Change Request 95-031. This is a change to the organizational structure. No organizational functions have been deleted. This is an administrative change and does not affect the accidents previously evaluated. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this revision. All position qualifications continue to meet all requirements. This change does not affect the operation of the plant or plant equipment.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0101 **Revision:** 0

**Electric Equipment Room Cooler Thermostat Setpoint Change**

This modification changes the setpoint for the Auxiliary Building Electrical Equipment Room Cooler (SGL02) from 75 degrees Fahrenheit +/- 5 degrees to maintain the room temperature between 60 and 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Controlling room temperature within this acceptable design range of 60 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit will not increase the consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Important safety equipment and components are located in this room including the reactor trip switchgear and control rod circuitry. However as long as the bulk room temperature is maintained in the acceptable range there should be no affect on the accident evaluations.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0102 **Revision:** 0

**Temporary Procedure for Sparging the Fuel Pool Clean-up Demineralizer**

Temporary Procedure TMP 95-ENG-185 "Sparging the Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer" provides for sparging the Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer (FEC03) with plant service air to loosen resin in the Radwaste Building. FEC03 has no nuclear safety design basis to bring or maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

Credible accidents associated with this procedure have been evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Isolation valves exist to isolate FEC03 from the temporary hardware in case a rupture of lead in the temporary hardware occurs. The possibility of a rupture of FEC03 and associated piping has not been increased because the pressure boundary integrity of this equipment is not degraded or challenged by the sparging process. No new or different release pathways have been created by the temporary connection of plant service air to FEC03. Therefore, all temporary hardware failure consequences remain bounded by USAR analysis.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 99 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0103 **Revision:** 0

**Revision 45 to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan**

Revision 45 to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan corrects typographical errors, clarifies barrier breach definitions, and incorporates a condition (1000 X) of normal radiation monitor reading into the Emergency Action Levels flow charts. This revision does not affect any structures, systems nor components.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0104 **Revision:** 0

**Defeat of Interlocks on Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane for Inspection Activities**

This revision to procedure MGE KE-003 "Defeat Interlocks on SFP Bridge Crane for Fuel Reconstitution and Inspection Activities" provides for defeating the Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane (HKE04) interlocks during inspection activities and updates the procedure throughout. Defeating the interlocks between the Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane and the New Fuel Elevator (HKE10) will be performed during fuel reconstitution or fuel assembly inspections which simultaneously uses both HKE04 and HKE10. This activity is controlled by administrative procedure. The consequences of a fuel handling accident have been analyzed in Section 15.7.4 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Fuel reconstitution and fuel assembly inspections is considered part of fuel handling activities. Defeating the interlock between this equipment does not effect the crane design basis functions and structural integrity is maintained. Technical Specifications are not impacted by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0105 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Revision to Depict Removal of Startup Strainers**

This modification provides for revisions to Piping and Instrument Diagrams and Isometric Drawings to remove the depiction of temporary start-up strainers. New symbols will be added to depict spacer rings. The purpose of this modification is to reflect the as-built configuration of the pump suction pipe spools.

This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0107 **Revision:** 0

**Clarification of Secondary Side Radiation Releases**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) clarifies the possibility of controlled radioactive release via a Secondary Side Waste Water release path. A controlled release in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the USAR. This revision clarifies that Secondary Side Waste Water may contain radioactive elements and does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of safety related equipment. No accident scenario will be created by monitoring and controlling radioactive release via the Secondary Side Waste Water. Radioactive releases are already allowed. This revision is acknowledging the possibility of releases through the Secondary Side Waste Water Systems.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0108 **Revision:** 0

**Keepwarm Lube Oil Pump Replacement**

This modification provides for the replacement of an ASME Section III Class 3 Keep Warm Lube Oil Pump (PKJ03A) with a safety related non-ASME Viking pump. The Viking pump is equivalent to the Crane Deming ASME Section III Class 3 pump. The only difference is the Viking is designed and fabricated to manufactures' standards rather than ASME Section III. Controls commensurate with Section III were used for the Viking pump and it is still seismically qualified. The Viking pump has had a better performance record at the Callaway Plant than the Crane Deming pump. As a passive safety related lube oil pressure boundary the pumps are technically equivalent. There is in effect a relevant margin of safety defined in a qualitative sense, as there is a license condition requiring an ASME Section III pump when other guidance documents do not specifically require an ASME Section III pump for this application.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0109 **Revision:** 0

**Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Exhaust Line Upgrade**

This modification upgrades Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Exhaust Line (FC 049-HBD-10") and support (1-FC01-H010/448) from a non-safety related classification to special scope II/I. It has been hypothesized that a severe crimp in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine exhaust line could hinder operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine. However, the current structure, building and line are sufficient to handle all accident scenarios. Upgrading the line assures it will remain intact and not contribute to the consequences of an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine malfunction.

This upgrade of line FC-049-HDB-10" decreases the possibility of an accident of a different type from being created. The exhaust pipe, supports, structure and building were all considered adequately classified as non safety related by the original design. However, the concern is with future treatment of these components. By upgrading the component, the possibility of creating a different type of equipment malfunction is decreased.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 105 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0110 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Revision to Reflect Correct Status of Dummy Breaker**

This modification provides for a revision to Drawing KD-7496 "Ultimate One Line Diagram," to show a dummy disconnect (13-29) associated with the non-safety related 13.8 KV switchgear bus (SL-3) rather than bus (SL-4). This is a document change only with no effect on plant equipment or equipment performance.

This modification is a drawing change only. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0111 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Power From Circulation Water Warming Line**

This modification removes electrical power from Circulating Water Return Thaw Valve (1CW002). The Limitorque operator will remain on the valve for manual operation.

This non-safety related valve is not involved as an initiator of any previously evaluated event. Safety related equipment is not affected by this modification. The non-safety related secondary systems are not affected by the position of 1CW002 nor are they affected by whether the valve is operated electrically or manually.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0112 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of Relief Valves to the Process Sample System**

This non-safety related modification provides for the installation of four relief valves on the Process Sample Panel (RM 172). As a result of a plant trip flow meters on the RM 172 Process Sample Panel were damaged. This modification will provide pressure relief to preclude recurrence of this event.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0113 **Revision:** 0

**Service Water System Drawing Change to Reflect Air Release Valves**

This modification issues design and vendor documents to reflect as-built configuration of Service Water System Air Release Valves (EAV0112 and EAV0113). The actual inlet port for valves EAV0112 and EAV0113 is two inches in diameter. Design documents show these ports as one inch in diameter. These valves are neither safety related, nor important to safety. This is a documentation change only. There is no physical modification to the plant.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0114 **Revision:** 0

**Replacement of Service Water Pump Isolation Valves with Stainless Steel**

This modification provides for the replacement of carbon steel rubber seated butterfly valves used for Service Water Pump isolation. Replacement valves will be stainless steel metal seated torque close valves. The replacement valves will be drop in replacement with no piping alterations. This modification will provide more reliable isolation for the Service Water Pumps and discharge check valves. This modification does not affect the function of these valves nor does it affect any safety related equipment.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0115 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Revision to Reflect the As-Built Configuration of the Residual Heat Removal System**

This modification provides for revision of Drawing M-12EJ01, "P&ID Residual Heat Removal System," to reflect the as-built installation of Residual Heat Removal Pump "B" Seal Cooler Return Valve (EJV0198). This valve is a vent valve. This modification also revises interim Drawing WIP-M-12EJ01-07 B, "P&ID Residual Heat Removal System," to reflect the intended location of Seal Cooler Vent Valve (EJV0197). In addition this modification makes an editorial change that corrects the number of a piping line (62-EBC-3/4").

Addition of vent valves will not increase the probability of an accident because the added valves and fittings are safety related and are rated at higher than design pressure. The valves will normally be closed and are only opened by an operator during specific plant evolutions. A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) through an opening of this magnitude is bounded by the LOCA analysis described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Venting the seal cooler will prolong the pump shaft seal life and reduce the probability of occurrence of an equipment malfunction. The calculated peak cladding temperature resulting from such a failure will be significantly lower than the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit in the Emergency Core Cooling System Subsystem design basis.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0116 **Revision:** 0

**Replacement of the Hydrazine Analyzer**

This modification replaces the Beckman Hydrazine analyzer (RMAIT0164) with an Orion Research Model No. 1818A0 analyzer. The replacement is required because spare parts can no longer be obtained for the Beckman analyzer.

The original and replacement analyzers have the same effects on safety related plant equipment and failure of the replacement analyzer will have the same consequences as failure of the original Beckman analyzer.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 112 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0117 **Revision:** 0

**Correction of Service Water System Drawing Discrepancy**

This non-safety related modification provides for an administrative change to Drawings M-0022, "P&ID Plant Service Water System," and M-0096, "Circulating Water Screen House Piping." This modification will reflect the as-built configuration of valve drain line (1WS-V019).

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0118 **Revision:** 0

**Block Normal Exhaust Dampers in Equipment Rooms**

This modification will block closed the normal exhaust dampers (SGK04A and SGK04B) to preclude a potential unmonitored release path from the Auxiliary Building. This modification does not affect any safety related flow balances and will not significantly affect the Control Building normal supply or exhaust flow balances.

These registers and associated ducts are not currently seismically supported and are not located over any safety related equipment. The rooms affected by this modification will be under slightly more positive pressure than before. However, this slight increase will not affect any Updated Safety Analysis Report criteria.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 114 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0120 **Revision:** 0

**Revision 26 to the Security Plan**

This revision to the Security Plan incorporates the hand geometry biometrics system, changes the format of the Training and Qualification Plan, moves a definition from the Physical Security Plan to the Training and Qualification Plan and adds mace, tear gas and non-lethal gas as an alternative to the baton.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 115 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0121 **Revision:** 0

**Drawing Corrections to Reflect As-Built Configuration of the Makeup Demineralizer System**

This modification provides for the revision of Drawings M-0025, "P&ID Makeup Demineralizer System," and M-0037, "P&ID Service Air System Shop Building," to reflect the as-built configuration and correct drafting errors. These changes are administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0122 **Revision:** 0

**Drain Valve Addition to the Seal Water Heat Exchanger**

This modification provides for the addition of a drain valve to the shell side of each of the waterbox venting pump seal water coolers (EDA01A/B/C). There are no initiating events created by the condenser waterbox venting system in the accident analysis. The waterbox venting system does not function to mitigate the consequences of an accident nor is it directly related to any accidents in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The waterbox venting system is non-safety related and does not impact/affect equipment that could cause equipment important to safety to malfunction.

This modification will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the USAR. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0123 **Revision:** 0

**Verification of Plant Emergency Lighting Adequacy**

This temporary procedure will verify the adequacy of plant emergency lighting by shutting off plant normal and standby lighting and walking down the areas required to be illuminated. The walkdown will include areas in the Auxiliary Building, the Turbine Building, the Control Building, and the Diesel Generator area. Only selected lighting breakers will be opened to perform this procedure. There are no plant or process controls affected by de-energizing the lighting for these areas.

Performance of this temporary procedure will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0124 **Revision:** 0

**Freeze Seal on Lines to and from Air Compressor "C"**

This temporary modification provides for the installation of freeze seals on the 2 1/2 inch Service Water Cooling lines to and from Air Compressor "C" (CKA01C) to allow cutting and capping these lines and rerouting cooling from the chilled water system in accordance with the modification reported by USQD 95-0116. The freeze seals will be applied in accordance with approved procedures that ensure qualification and testing and that emergency contingency measures are in place. Equipment required for safe shutdown will not be affected by these freeze seals. This temporary modification does not create any other types of credible accidents nor effect equipment important to safety.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0125 **Revision:** 0

**Requisition and Procurement Process**

Revision 9 to Procedure KGP-1250 "Requisition & Procurement Process," changes the responsibility for the creation of purchase requisitions that are issued to purchase non-safety related items. Purchasing and Material Services will assume responsibility for establishing the procurement requirements for all non-safety related items, non-safety related spare parts configuration management, and material procurement requirements. Engineering will assume responsibility for all part number changes, establishing storage maintenance, and shelf life requirements for all safety related and special scope items.

This revision to KGP-1250 will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0126 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of New Tool Room Building**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides for incorporation of remodeling changes to the Support Building West and the construction of a two story building which will connect the Support Building West and the Maintenance Building.

This building addition involves a non-safety system which has no direct ties to a safety related system nor is this change an initiator of any accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The system being changed does not form or directly connect to the primary barriers which limit the consequences of an accident. Operation or failure of this system will not directly or indirectly result in a challenge to or failure of the barriers. This change does not involve any safety related equipment. Indirect and secondary failure modes previously evaluated in the USAR have been reviewed and no increase in probability of malfunction from these sources was identified. No technical specifications are affected by this revision.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the USAR. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0127 **Revision:** 0

**Lancing the Fuel Pool Clean-up Demineralizer**

Revision 0 Temporary Procedure TMP 95 ENG-188, "Lancing of Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer FEC03," provides for hydrodynamically lancing or sparging the resin in the Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer (FEC03), with reactor make-up water. The procedure isolates FEC03, drains and vents it, then opens it up for this resin loosening activity. Upon completion of this activity, FEC03 is filled and vented from the running Fuel Pool Cooling Pump. This procedural process provides a means to loosen the resin in FEC03, which is located in the Radwaste Building. FEC03 has no nuclear safety design basis to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition nor to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The failure of FEC03 will not affect the probability of equipment malfunction nor the consequences of an equipment malfunction of any equipment important to safety.

No new or different release pathways have been created by performance of this temporary procedure. Therefore, all temporary hardware failure consequences remain bounded within previous USAR failure analyses.

Performance of this temporary procedure will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0128 **Revision:** 0

**Addition of Ramps in Containment**

This modification will provide ramps in the Containment Building between the 2047' 6" level and the 2051' 0" levels. Ramps will be located in Areas 1 and 2 and will replace the existing stairs. The new ramps will have the same width as the existing stairs. These ramps are Category II/I.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0129 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Diesel Generator Design Explanation**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides clarification for how SAFETY DESIGN CRITERION SEVEN is met in Section 9.5.7 of the USAR by adding additional information to Section 9.5.7.2.1. This additional information defines that the lube oil volume in the Emergency Diesel Generator crankcase is sufficient to fulfill the design requirement for 7 days of continuous operation at rated load without replenishment. Because it is not required to take credit for the oil volume in the auxiliary lube oil storage tank, or the level control system/automatic makeup feature, these portions of the Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System are not required for emergency operations. Neither is it necessary to take credit for any Warehouse lube oil inventory to meet this design criterion. This revision also corrects the functional description of the auxiliary lubrication oil make-up tank.

This revision does not affect the ability of the Emergency Diesel Generator to start and to supply AC electrical power. This change explains that the engine oil sump has more than a sufficient quantity of oil to meet the requirement for 7 days continuous operation without replenishment. No other inventory of lube oil is necessary. No changes to design are occurring as a result of this revision. This revision is administrative and explanatory in nature. No hardware changes are being made. The lube oil capacity of the Emergency Diesel Generators is not a Technical Specification requirement.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0130 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank Cross Connecting Lines**

This modification provides for a revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.4.2.1 which states that "In addition, if one storage tank is being filled, and it is necessary to draw fuel oil, procedures provide for using the cross-connect line to take oil from the opposite tank." Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) has no procedure that allows a cross-connect between both Emergency Diesel Generator Storage Tanks, while filling a tank, without declaring the Diesel inoperable. Therefore this statement is being deleted from the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There are no design basis accidents, credible accidents, credible malfunctions of important equipment and acceptance limits of technical specifications that could impact this activity.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0131 **Revision:** 0

**Condensate Demineralizer System Sample Valve Identification**

This modification provides for revision of Drawings M-12AK02, "P&ID Condensate Demineralizer System," and M-12AK03, "P&ID Condensate Demineralizer System," to reflect the as-built configuration of the system by showing sampling isolation valves (AKV1014 and AKV1015) and the associated tubing. This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification. The Condensate Demineralizer System has no safety related design basis. Failure of the Condensate Demineralizer System will not compromise any safety related systems or prevent safe shutdown.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0132 **Revision:** 0

**Organization Changes in the Operations Department**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report reflects organizational changes and job rotation in the Operations department. Mr. Sheldon M. Walgren will no longer be routinely assigned to a specific operating shift crew as Shift Supervisor. The resume of Mr. J. E. Gilmore is being added as Shift Supervisor. Mr. Gilmore is fully qualified and meets the minimum qualifications for the Shift Supervisor position.

This revision is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, Or components are affected by this modification. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0133 **Revision:** 0

**Temperature Indicator Replacement**

This modification provides for the replacement of temperature indicator (HFT10816) at secondary liquid waste system panel (HF-137) with a suitable upgrade. The existing temperature indicator is obsolete and repair parts are unavailable. In addition, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Figure 10.4-12 Sheet 4, is being revised to reflect the as-built configuration by showing the eight temperature element inputs to indicator HFT10816. Inclusion of the additional inputs will not invalidate nor affect any statements, figures nor tables identified in the USAR.

HFT10816 provides indication only of secondary liquid waste system temperature parameters and provides no function in the event of an accident. HFT10816 neither provides nor affects other systems providing accident mitigation nor dose rate mitigation.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to WO 96-0038

Page 128 of 158

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0134 **Revision:** 0

**Condensate Demineralizer Acid Day Tank Drawing Update**

This modification provides for the revision of Drawing M-12AK03, "P&ID Condensate Demineralizer System," to correct a valve numbering discrepancy. The existing drawing shows two valves with the same tag number.

This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0135 **Revision:** 0

**Diesel Generator Lube Oil Drawing Correction**

This modification provides for revision of Drawings M-12KJ03, "P&ID Standby Diesel Generator A Lube Oil System," and M-12KJ06, "P&ID Standby Diesel Generator B Lube Oil System," to correctly reflect the normally closed position of the diesel generator lube oil level control valves (LCV0019 and LCV0119) during normal plant operation. Changing the depiction of the valves to normally closed will provide an accurate representation of the valves position during normal plant operation and provide consistency with other drawings.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0136 **Revision:** 0

**Procedure Revision to Sparge Fuel Pool Clean-up Demineralizer**

This revision to Temporary Procedure TMP 95-ENG-186 "Sparging the Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer" provides for sparging the Fuel Pool Clean-Up Demineralizer (FEC03) with plant service air to loosen resin which is located in the Radwaste Building. This procedure revision provides for the removal of a blind flange for inspection purposes both before and after sparging. This procedure installs a temporary connection between plant service air and the bottom outlet piping of FEC03 to enable air sparging of the resin. A temporary check valve is installed to prevent reverse flow in the event plant air is lost. FEC03 has no nuclear safety design basis to bring or maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Failure of this demineralizer, from any cause, will not affect the probability of occurrence of equipment malfunction nor will the consequences of an equipment malfunction important to safety be changed.

Credible accidents associated with this procedure have been evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Isolation valves exist to isolate FEC03 from the temporary hardware in case a rupture of lead in the temporary hardware occurs. The possibility of a rupture of FEC03 and associated piping has not been increased because the pressure boundary integrity of this equipment is not degraded or challenged by the sparging process. No new or different release pathways have been created by the temporary connection of plant service air to FEC03. Therefore, all temporary hardware failure consequences remain bounded within previous USAR failures.

This revision will have no impact on accidents and malfunctions evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. There is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications is not reduced.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0137 **Revision:** 0

**Relief Valves for Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Dryers**

This modification provides for the installation of a relief valve down stream of each emergency diesel generator starting air compressor (CKAK01A/B/C/D). The new relief valve will be set at 700 pounds per square inch gauge. This modification is in the non-safety related section of the starting air skid.

The purpose of this modification is to protect components down stream of the starting air compressors (CKAK01A/B/C/D) from over pressurization. There are no design basis accidents in the Updated Safety Analysis Report impacted by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0138 **Revision:** 0

**Correction of Load Center Breaker Labels on Drawings**

This modification provides for changing the labeling of cubicles on load centers (SL3A, SL4A and SL5A) in Drawings KD-7496 "Ultimate One Line Diagram," and Drawing E-1001, "Single Line Diagram Site Area Loads." This labeling change will reduce confusion when comparing the above drawings to other design documents. This modification is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0139 **Revision:** 0

**Drawings Revision to the Reflect As-built Configuration of the Makeup Demineralizer System**

This modification revises Drawing M-0025, "P&ID Makeup Demineralizer System," and Drawing M-C111, "2 Inch and Smaller Pipe System Water Treatment Plant Shop Building," to reflect the as-built configuration. Changes to the drawings included deletion of tube runs and valves that are not installed in the system, the inclusion of tube runs that exist in the field but do not appear on the drawings, the addition of tag numbers to valve panels and Sample Sink, and the correction of coordinate information where necessary.

Depiction of the as-built configuration on the drawings does not affect directly or indirectly any credible malfunction or any system or equipment important to safety. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0141 **Revision:** 0

**Installation of New Potable Water Storage Tank**

This modification provides for the installation of a 70,000 gallon potable water tank, pump skid, and all connecting piping and electrical connections in the potable water pump house to connect the Rural Water District # 3 supply line to the site potable water system. The existing potable water system will be abandoned.

The potable water system is a non-safety related system and located outside the power block. This system is not analyzed in Chapter 15 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report for a credible design basis accident. The addition of this 70,000 gallon tank will not change the flood analysis of the site. The potable water system does not have any equipment associated with or connected to safety or non-safety related power block systems. The potable water system is not associated with any technical specifications.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0143 **Revision:** 0

**Organization Changes in Operations**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report incorporates organization changes only. This revision provides for changes in personnel in the positions of Assistant to Vice-President Operations and Manager Plant Support. This revision also revises the Manager responsible for Emergency Planning. There are no changes in reporting structure.

This revision is administrative in nature. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0144 **Revision:** 0

**Install Nitrogen Sparging to the Condensate Storage Tank**

This modification will install a nitrogen sparging system on the Condensate Storage Tank to facilitate oxygen removal. A new line will tee into the existing nitrogen supply line to the Auxiliary Boiler and enter the Condensate Storage Tank at the Grab Sample Valve (APV0036). A tee and valves will be provided at the existing sample point so that sampling capability will still be available. A pressure control station will be provided in the Auxiliary Boiler room to regulate flow.

Providing nitrogen sparging for the Condensate Storage Tank is an enhancement to help maintain lower dissolve oxygen levels in the Condensate Storage Tank. This modification has no affect on the ability of the Condensate Storage and Transfer System, the Gas Service System, or the Auxiliary Feedwater system to fulfill their design functions or on their failure modes of failure effects. Therefore, this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0145 **Revision:** 0

**Engineering Support Personnel Training and Qualification Program**

This revision to Procedure AP 30F-001, Revision 1, "Engineering Support Personnel Training and Qualification Program," supersedes procedures KGP-1851, Revision 4, "Training and Qualification Program for Engineering Support Personnel and Supervisory Personnel," and APF 30F-001, Revision 0, "Engineering Training." This revision also deletes document WCNOG-13A, "Engineering Support Personnel Qualification Manual."

These procedural changes do not change any administrative control which would reduce the level of qualification of WCNOG personnel, nor does it affect any structure, system, or component. This revision does not change the performance of activities that are important to the safe and reliable operation of the plant.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0147 **Revision:** 0

**Transfer of Minor Modification Planning Functions and Implementation to Maintenance**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report provides for the transfer of responsibility of modification planning functions and modification implementation to Maintenance and changes the responsibilities of the Manager of Maintenance. This revision is administrative in nature and does not affect any systems, structures, or components.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0148 **Revision:** 0

**Main Control Board Drawing Corrections**

This modification revises Drawings E-13RL06, "Main Control Board Section RL021/RL022," E-13RL08, "Main Control Board Section RL025/RL026/RL027/RL028," and J-1409(Q), "Main Control Board RL021 & RL022." Revisions to these drawings will reflect the removal of recorders (SENRO041, SENRO042, SENRO043, SENRO044, SENT0046, SENRO047, SFZR0412, and ACYR0141). Removal of these recorders was previously accomplished through Plant Modification Requests 03015 and 03989.

In addition, Drawing M-12CG01, "P&ID Condenser Air Removal," is being revised to indicate that vacuum pump spray valves (CGPV004, CGPV005, and CGPV006) fail open upon a loss of air which would prevent Turbine trip upon loss of vacuum. The valve logic has always been to fail open. Drawing M-12CG01 is being changed to correctly reflect the as-built condition.

The changes made by this modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0149 **Revision:** 0

**Inlet Air Filter and Lube Oil Filter for Compressed Air System**

This modification corrects a discrepancy on Drawing M-12KA01, "P&ID Diagram Compressed Air System." Filter tag numbers of the air inlet and lube oil filters for Instrument and Service Air Compressor (CKA01A) are incorrectly numbered. This modification corrects that discrepancy.

This modification is administrative in nature and does not change any structure, system, or component. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0150 **Revision:** 0

**Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate Revision**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides for changes to Sections 15.2.6 and 15.2.7 to reflect analyses based on revised auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flowrates. These analyses were revised assuming less AFW to be delivered to the steam generators to provide system engineering with greater margin in performing Technical Specification surveillance testing.

Plant specific analyses were performed for the Loss of Normal Feedwater and Loss of Non-Emergency AC events to demonstrate that the AFW flowrate assumed in the analyses could be reduced from 1000 gallons per minute to 700 gallons per minute and still provide sufficient primary system cooling to meet the acceptance criteria for an ANS Condition II event. Revision the AFW flowrate assumed in these analyses does not impact plant test, procedures, operations in any manner that would render information in the USAR incorrect outside of USAR Sections 15.2.6 and 15.2.7.

Changing the AFW flowrate assumed in these safety analyses neither adversely affects the capability of the AFW system to perform its safety function to mitigate accidents nor creates the possibility of a new or different type of accident. The revised USAR Sections 15.2.6 and 15.2.7 analyses demonstrate that revising the assumed AFW flowrate from 1000 gallons per minute to 700 gallons per minute results in a more conservative transient response while continuing to meet the acceptance criteria presented in NUREG 0800 Sections 15.2.6 and 15.2.7, as well as design criteria presented in ANSI N18.2-1973. Other non-loss of coolant accident analyses which assume AFW to provide accident mitigation assume an AFW flowrate below 700 gallons per minute.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0151 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Core Cooling System Flowrate Revision**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) changes Section 15.5.1 to assume increased emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flowrates to be consistent with the replacement of the positive displacement pump (PDP) with a normal charging pump (NCP). A plant specific analysis of the Inadvertent ECCS Actuation event was performed to demonstrate that the flowrates associated with two CCPs and an NCP supplying ECCS flow would not result in pressurizer overfilling and that the results of the event meet the ANS Condition II acceptance criteria. Revising the ECCS flowrate assumed in this analyses does not impact plant test, procedures or operations in any manner that would render information in the USAR incorrect outside of Section 15.5.1. Changing the ECCS flowrate assumed in this evaluation neither adversely affects the capability of the ECCS system to perform its safety function to mitigate accidents nor creates the possibility of a new or different accident. The revised analyses demonstrate that increasing the assumed ECCS flowrate results in a more conservative transient response while continuing to meet the acceptance criteria presented in NUREG 0800 section 15.5.1. This analysis is being incorporated into the USAR because it represents a more conservative analysis than the current licensing basis analysis.

This revision of the ECCS flowrate does not affect procedural or Technical Specification testing or operability requirements. There are no modifications to plant equipment based on revising the ECCS flowrate. Reanalysis of the event described in USAR Section 15.5.1 demonstrates that NUREG 0800 acceptance criteria is met using the revised ECCS flowrates. This analysis is concerned with pressurizer overfilling and assumes a single failure of one train of the reactor protection train. In addition to the single failure assumption, a direct reactor trip on safety injection is not credited in the analysis. Increasing the ECCS flowrate assumed in this analysis does not change the most limiting single failure. Therefore increasing the ECCS flow to be consistent with the flow delivered from to CCPs and an NCP does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR.

The possibility of an accident of a different type is not created because there are no changes to administrative controls or plant equipment associated with increasing the assumed ECCS flowrate in the USAR.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0153 **Revision:** 0

**Concentration of CO2 Required After Maintenance on the Main Turbine**

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) provides a change to Section 2.2.1.2.4.2, paragraph 5. The last sentence of paragraph 5 states that carbon dioxide in the generator can be purged with hydrogen when the carbon dioxide concentration leaving the vent line is 95 percent. This revision to the USAR revises the last sentence of paragraph 5 to read "The CO2 concentration leaving the vent line is measured and when the CO2 concentration is above 75%, then the generator can be purged with hydrogen." This is more conservative than vendor recommendations.

No design basis accidents are affected by this change. No credible accidents or equipment malfunctions were identified that could occur as a result of this change. This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0154 **Revision:** 0

**Essential Service Water Piping Barrier**

This modification provides for a wire cage to be installed around safety related Essential Service Water piping. This modification will not affect the Essential Service Water System in any way. The cage will withstand the worst case seismic loads as required by the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The wire cage will be anchored to a non-safety related structure in the power block. The capability to mitigate the consequences of an accident will not be degraded by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0155 **Revision:** 0

**Boric Acid Tank Volume**

Revision to Procedure ALR 00-36B "Boric Acid Tank Level Lo/Lo," disclosed a difference between the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) minimum required boric acid volume and the Technical Specification minimum required boric acid volume. USAR minimum required boric acid volume is 18,500 gallons. Technical Specification minimum required boric acid volume is 17,658 gallons. Both the USAR and Technical Specifications assume a four percent boric acid concentration.

Westinghouse Calculation No. CWS-SNP-453C, dated 11-14-83 demonstrates that the Technical Specification value is adequate. The USAR values are generally design nominal values that may not be identical to field operating conditions or approved calculation results. This evaluation verifies that the values in Technical Specifications are acceptable.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0156 **Revision:** 0

**Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Pump Removal and Removal of Thermal Relief Valve**

This modification provides for the permanent removal to the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) Thermal Relief Valve (EM8852) from the High Head Safety Injection System. This is an increase in the scope of Plant Modification Request which was evaluated and reported as USQD 59 93-0126. USQD 59 93-0126 evaluated the physical isolation of the boron recirculation portion of the Boron Injection System from the High Head Safety Injection System by cutting and capping the connecting pipes and removing the heaters from the BIT.

It has been determined that relief valve EM8852 is no longer required by the ASME code once all potential sources of over pressurization are physically removed or isolated. Removal of EM8852 is effectively not a change because the need for it is eliminated with the removal of the BIT heaters and isolation of the BIT recirculation pumps.

Overall performance of the High Head Safety Injection System is unaffected by the removal of EM8852. All design standards and functional requirements continue to be met including the ASME code. The structural integrity of the High Head Safety Injection System is maintained during all plant conditions. The High Head Safety Injection System will continue to operate within design limits.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0157 **Revision:** 0

**Fire Extinguishers in Containment**

This Unresolved Safety Question Determination evaluates the removal of portable fire extinguishers from the Containment building until they can be reinstalled at the beginning of Refuel 8. The accidents discussed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report Chapters 2, 3, and 15 have been reviewed and it has been determined that these accidents are not affected by the removal of the fire extinguishers from the Containment building. There are no personnel in the Containment building on a continual basis during power operation. The Containment building has been previously analyzed for the effects of fire. The analysis conservatively assumed no fire suppression was available. Therefore, the condition with the extinguishers out of containment is bounded by the previous analysis. The lack of extinguishers in the Containment building will not introduce any new malfunctions of equipment because of fire.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0158 Revision: 0

**Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications to the Updated Safety Analysis Report**

License Amendment No. 89 approved the relocation of selected technical specification Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements to Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Chapter 16. This evaluation addresses "editorial changes" needed to be made to some of the relocated specifications. These specifications reference one or more of Technical Specifications 3.0.3, 3.0.4, 4.0.3 and 4.0.4, which were "copied" into the relocated USAR in Sections 16.0.3 and 16.0.4. Therefore, the references to 3.0.3, etc., were changed to 16.0.3, etc. This evaluation also addresses the replacement of current USAR Chapter 16 pages with the relocated Technical Specifications which are also referred to as the "Operational Requirements Manual" based on the approved license amendment request.

In addition to changes incorporated into the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the new sections are revised with regard to shutdown requirements, Mode changes relying on Action statements, deferral of surveillances, and delay of Action statement requirements after missed surveillances. These changes were not reviewed by the NRC and are not covered by the Safety Evaluation Report accompanying License Amendment 89. Non-compliance with the relocated Limiting Condition of Operation does not warrant the plant transient associated with a Technical Specification 3.0.3 shutdown and appropriate actions are determined by plant management. The elimination of the restriction on Mode changes with reliance on Action statements is justified for these relocated specifications given that the Allowed Outage Times must still be met and that Mode change for non-safety significant specifications do not represent a safety concern. Relaxation of surveillance intervals and the delay of Action statement requirements after a missed surveillance are justified commensurate with the relative insignificance of the relocated specifications to plant safety.

This revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0160 **Revision:** 0

**125 Volt DC System Battery Replacement**

This safety related modification provides for replacement of Class 1E batteries NK11, NK12, NK13, and NK14 with AT&T round cell batteries supplied and qualified by WYLE Laboratories. The existing battery racks in each of the Class 1E battery rooms will also be replaced with battery racks specifically designed to hold the AT&T round cell battery. These racks will be supplied and qualified for Class 1E use by WYLE Laboratories.

The new AT&T round batteries exceed the requirements established by the battery sizing calculation. The new batteries will perform the same function and do not introduce any new failure modes. The new batteries have equivalent loading capacity and are capable of performing the same function as the old batteries. The new Class 1E batteries will function in the same capacity as the old NK batteries.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0162 **Revision:** 0

**Core Operating Limits Report Change For End of Life Moderator Temperature Coefficient**

This modification provides for a revision to the end of life (EOL) moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) limit in the Core Operating Limit Report (COLR) to  $-50$  pcm/ $^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit. The results of the evaluation show that the acceptance criteria for each event continues to be met and therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety created by revising the EOL MTC limit. Revising the EOL MTC limit in the COLR does not affect the operation of any system or component and therefore neither increases the probability of malfunction of any plant equipment important to safety nor does it create the possibility of a new or different accident than previously analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Based on the results of the evaluation, the EOL MTC limit in the COLR may be revised to  $-50$  pcm/ $^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit and the EOL MTC surveillance at 300 ppm Boron may be revised to  $-41$  pcm/ $^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit without creating an unreviewed safety question.

Revising the EOL MTC used in the safety analyses does not result in a modification to plant equipment or operating practices. Evaluation of the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 15, events based on a more conservative EOL MTC demonstrates that NUREG 0800 acceptance criteria continues to be met. Revising the EOL MTC limit used in the safety analyses does not affect procedural or Technical Specification testing or operability requirements of any piece of equipment important to safety. All analyses potentially affected by revising the EOL MTC limit in the COLR have been evaluated to determine the impact of using a more conservative MTC value in the safety analyses. The evaluation shows that all applicable acceptance criteria continue to be met.

The only changes to plant documents resulting from this evaluation are to the COLR and to procedure STS RE-006, "EOL Core MTC Measurement." The revised USAR Section 15 analyses continue to meet the acceptance criteria set forth in NUREG 0800 for the applicable ANS condition event assuming an EOL MTC more negative than the proposed COLR limit.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0164 **Revision:** 0

**Removal of Thermal Relief Valves**

This modification provides for removal of Fuel Cooling Heat Exchanger thermal relief valves (ECV0996, ECV0997, ECV 0998, and ECV0999) along with the associated drain piping. Blind flanges will be installed in place of the valves. The thermal relief valves do not perform a safety function during operable modes and are not required by the ASME Section III Code. Any overpressurization occurring when the heat exchanger is out of service would pose no nuclear safety concern.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0165 **Revision:** 0

**Temporary Blocking of Fire Protection Trip Signals**

This temporary modification will defeat the fire protection signals (by lifting the leads) to associated with the Main and Startup Transformers (XMA01A, XMA01B, XMA01C, and XMR01) and switchyard lockout relays to block any spurious actuations while work is being performed. The automatic deluge valves at the transformer are to be defeated under the Fire Impairment Control Program and are not to be considered or construed as part of this modification. The impairment program implements approved compensatory measures when fire protection features have been removed or diminished. The Main and Startup Transformers are non-safety related and a fire in this area does not pose a hazard to structures and systems required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. All other transformer protective relaying is in place and will isolate the transformers on a faulted/overload condition.

The blocked signals normally provide protection against equipment degradation only. The loss of these signals will not impact the probability of the occurrence of an accident identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report nor increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The fire protection signals serve to limit the damage to the transformer bushing during a fire protection deluge system actuation only. The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of structures, systems, or components evaluated in the USAR are not affected not will the consequences of a malfunction be increased. There is no credible possibility for a different type of malfunction than previously evaluated in the USAR. Technical specification margins of safety remain unaffected.

This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0168 Revision: 0

#### Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test

This revision to Procedure STS AC-001, "Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test," provides for using the main steam dump valves to maintain reactor power while decreasing main turbine load to cycle the main turbine stop and control valves.

The main steam dump valves are designed to act as an artificial load on the reactor. The valves will be operated in the steam pressure mode and will operate as designed. A caution in the procedure requires the operators to shift the steam dump valves to the Tave mode if a reactor trip load rejection should occur during performance of this test.

All of the accidents in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 15.1 "Increase In Heat Removal By The Secondary System," have been analyzed. It has been determined that the most severe radiological consequences will result from the main steam line break accident discussed in Section 15.1.5. Using the main steam dump valves to cycle the main turbine stop and control valves will change the initial assumptions for USAR accident 15.1.3, "Excessive Increase In Secondary Steam Flow." However, the results are not effected. This test is bound by the accident analyses of the main steam line break in Section 15.1.5 of the USAR.

The steam dump system serves no safety function and has no safety design basis. There is no safety related equipment in the vicinity of the steam dump system. The steam dump system can malfunction in either the open or closed mode. The effects of both of these potential failure modes on the Nuclear Steam Supply System and turbine system are addressed in Chapter 15.0 of the USAR.

The main steam dump valves are not identified in Technical Specifications. A review of Technical Specifications 3.7.1.5, for main Steam Isolation Valves, and 3.7.1.6, for Atmospheric relief Valves, show this change has no effect on Technical Specifications or their Bases.

This revision will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0169 **Revision:** 0

**Work Slab for Steam Generator Cleaning Vitrification Unit**

This modification provides for installation of a concrete work slab west of the Radwaste Building. The installation of this slab is required for the Vitrification unit which is will be used for Steam Generator cleaning. The Vitrification unit is a temporary installation.

The installation of this work slab does not affect any structures, systems or components which mitigate or control the release of radioactive materials. The installation of this slab will not affect directly or indirectly, equipment important to safety. Review of the Updated Safety Analysis Report indicates that the installation of this slab will not affect the Flood Hazards Analysis.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0171 **Revision:** 0

**Condensate Demineralizer System Drawing Change**

This modification corrects Drawing M-12AK01, "P&ID Condensate Demineralizer System," to the as-built configuration. The Service Air to Condensate Demineralizer Tanks valve (AK PCV-0216) is incorrectly shown as a self contained pressure regulator. This modification will revise Drawing M-12AK01 to correctly show valve AK PCV-0216 as a pressure sensing control valve. This is an administrative change only. No structures, systems, or components are affected by this modification.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0172 **Revision:** 0

**Emergency Diesel Generator System Drawing Revision**

This modification revises Drawing M-12KJ02, "P&ID Standby Diesel Generator," to reflect the as-built configuration of the piping line coming from Fuel-Oil-Filter FKJ07A Inlet Pressure Transmitter (KJPT0013). Drawing M-12KJ02 erroneously depicts this piping line as non-pneumatic piping instead of pneumatic piping. This modification will eliminate the existing inconsistency with other drawings. No physical changes are being made to the plant. This is a documentation change only.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Safety Evaluation: 59 95-0173 Revision 1

**Condenser Tube Cleaning System**

This modification provides for a new condenser tube cleaning system to maintain condenser tube cleanliness. The new equipment will circulate sponge balls from the outlet stand pipes to the inlet stand pipes. New strainer sections will be located in the outlet standpipes to catch these sponge balls. A new skid containing a pump and filter will be added.

This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety. This modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

**Safety Evaluation:** 59 95-0183 **Revision:** 0

**Gaitronics Hand Station in Communication Corridor**

This temporary modification provides for Public Address handset station 215 to be temporarily replaced with a station which has a headset receptacle. This modification supports the testing of the Fire Protection System. This temporary modification will not adversely affect the Public Address System because the optional unit is supplied by the same manufacturer and is designed to be used on the Wolf Creek Generating Station system.

No design basis accident is affected by this modification. This modification does not create any credible accidents and affects only non-safety related equipment. There are no credible malfunctions of equipment important to safety, directly or indirectly affected by this modification. Technical Specifications require communications to be maintained between the Control Room and the Refueling area. This modification does not affect that requirement.

This temporary modification will have no impact on accidents or malfunctions evaluated as the licensing basis and there is no potential for the creation of a new type of unanalyzed event. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.