



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-263

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 31
License No. DPR-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated July 27, 1984 as clarified by letters dated September 25, 1984 and October 25, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2 Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 31, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
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Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 27, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 31

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

DOCKET NO. 50-263

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
60A	60a
69	69
71	71

Table 3.2.6

Instrumentation for Safeguards Bus Degraded Voltage and Loss of Voltage Protection

<u>Function</u>	<u>Trip Setting</u>	<u>Minimum No. of Operable or Operating Trip Systems (1)</u>	<u>Total No. of Instrument Channels Per Trip System</u>	<u>Minimum No. of Operable or Operating Channels Per Trip System (1)</u>	<u>Required Conditions</u>
1. Degraded Voltage Protection (3)	3915 \pm 18 volts 9 \pm 1 sec	1/bus	3	3	A
2. Loss of Voltage Protection (2)	2625 \pm 175 volts No intentional delay	2/bus	2	2	A

NOTE:

1. Upon discovery that minimum requirements for the number of operable or operating trip systems or instrument channels are not satisfied, action shall be initiated to:
 - a. Satisfy the requirements by placing the appropriate channels or systems in the tripped condition, or
 - b. Place the plant under the specified required conditions using normal operating procedures.
 2. One out of two twice logic.
 3. Two out of three logic.
- * Required conditions when minimum conditions for operation are not satisfied:
- A. Cold shutdown within 24 hours.

Bases Continued:

increases core voiding, a negative reactivity feedback. High pressure sensors initiate the pump trip in the event of an isolation transient. Low level sensors initiate the trip on loss of feed-water (and the resulting MSIV closure). The recirculation pump trip is only required at high reactor power levels, where the safety/relief valves have insufficient capacity to relieve the steam which continues to be generated after reactor isolation in this unlikely postulated event, requiring the trip to be operable only when in the RUN mode is therefore conservative.

Voltage sensing relays are provided on the safeguards bus to transfer the bus to an alternate source when a loss of voltage condition or a degraded voltage condition is sensed. On loss of voltage this transfer occurs immediately. The transfer on degraded voltage has a time delay to prevent transfer during the starting of large loads. The degraded voltage setpoint corresponds to the minimum acceptable safeguards bus voltage for starting and running loads during a loss of coolant accident. An allowance for relay tolerance is included.

Although the operator will set the set points within the trip settings specified in Tables 3.2.1 through 3.2.6, the actual values of the various set points can differ appreciably from the value the operator is attempting to set. The deviations could be caused by inherent instrument error, drift of the set point, ect. Therefore, these deviations have been accounted for in the various transient analyses and the actual trip settings may vary by the following amounts.

	Trip Function	Deviation
Instrumentation That Initiates Emergency Core Cooling Systems Table 3.2.2	Low-Low Reactor Water Level	-3 Inches
	Reactor Low Pressure (Pump Start) Permissive	-10 psi
	High Drywell Pressure	+1 psi
	Low Reactor Pressure (Valve Permissive)	-10 psi
Instrumentation That Initiates Rod Block Table 3.2.3	IRM Downscale	-2/125 of Scale
	IRM Upscale	+2/125 of Scale
	APRM Downscale	-2/125 of Scale
	APRM Upscale	See Basis 2.3
	RBM Downscale	-2/125 of Scale
	RBM Upscale Scram Discharge Volume-High Level	Same as APRM Upscale + 1 gallon
Instrumentation That Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip	High Reactor Pressure	+ 12 psi
	Low Reactor Water Level	-3 Inches
Instrumentation for Safeguards Bus Protection	Degraded Voltage	≥3897 volts (trip) ≤3975 volts (reset) ≥5 sec ≤10 sec (delay)
	Loss of Voltage	<3000 volts >2000 volts

A violation of this specification is assumed to occur only when a device is knowingly set outside of the limiting trip settings, or, when a sufficient number of devices have been affected by any means such that the automatic function is incapable of operating within the allowable deviation while in a reactor mode in which the specified function must be operable or when actions specified are not initiated as specified.