

ENCLOSURE

MEETING SUMMARY

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328

License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79

A meeting was held in the NRC Region II Office on February 28, 1985, to discuss Sequoyah's responses to IEB 84-03, dated October 2, 17, and 26, 1984. These responses were reviewed by the NRC Region II and were considered responsive to the concern expressed in the Bulletin. However, following receipt and review of TVA's response, guidance internal to the NRC has been developed regarding acceptance criteria for an inflated, rubber boot seal. Therefore, the responses were re-examined in light of the new guidance and the following comments were presented to TVA personnel with the request that the items be addressed in a supplemental response:

1. The responses stated that the seal was tested at a hydrostatic test pressure equivalent to safety factor of 1.5. NRC has now requested a minimum safety factor of 2.0. A reanalysis or retesting is requested.
2. The responses do not address the effect of a dropped fuel assembly onto the rubber seal. This item was not specifically requested in the Bulletin, but is now considered an important factor in accepting the seal before use during the next refueling. An analysis or testing is requested.
3. The responses stated that the seal is placed in a 2-inch nominal gap between the reactor vessel flange and the floor of the transfer cavity. The gap was not actually measured, but was taken from design drawings. It is requested that the as-built dimension be determined before the seal is placed into service. If the dimension is determined to be greater than nominal, additional action may be required.
4. The responses do not describe the elevations of the top of the spent fuel pool racks, Rod Control Cluster fixture in the transfer cavity, and the reactor vessel flange. These data are requested to determine if spent fuel contained within these components would remain covered by water if the seal were to fail catastrophically.

Enclosure

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It was noted that TVA's responses stated that operating instructions would be revised as needed. The details expected to be included within the instructions were discussed, and the degree of familiarity expected by the operators and supervisors was also discussed.

The licensee indicated that the information requested would be submitted within 60 days prior to Unit 1 refueling.

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F. Japel, Chief
Test Programs Section
Engineering Branch

3/11/85
Date

Attachment:
Attendance List

ATTACHMENT
ATTENDANCE LIST

Tennessee Valley Authority

<u>Names</u>	<u>Titles</u>
H. L. Abercrombie	Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP)
P. R. Wallace	Plant Manager, SNP
J. H. Sullivan	Regulatory Engineering Supervisor, SNP
G. B. Kirk	Compliance Supervisor, SNP
R. E. Alsup	Supervisor Licensing Projects, Group 1 (SNP) (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant)
R. E. Thompson	Supervisor, Risk Management Section

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

<u>Names</u>	<u>Titles</u>
F. Jape	Chief, Test Programs Section
E. Ford	Senior Resident Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant