

e. Local Areas

The computer programs used in the analyses of the various interior structures are capable of analyzing the effects of corners and general discontinuities. The vent region, as well as other major openings and penetrations, are analyzed using graded fine mesh finite element models. Boundary conditions for each of these large scale models are obtained from the general analysis discussed in Section 3.8.3.4.2.a.1. Local reinforcement or stiffening is provided around the openings or penetrations for the calculated stress concentrations.

f. Analysis of the Equipment Hatch, Personnel Door and Drywell Head

Analysis of the drywell equipment hatch, personnel door and drywell head is in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, Class MC, for the metallic components and proposed ASME Code Section III, Division 2, for concrete anchorage details. Figures 3.8-30, 3.8-31 and 3.8-32 give typical details of these appurtenances and the anchorage details. The STARDYNE computer program is used for the static analysis, and dynamic effects are evaluated by the use of floor response curves.

g. Variations in Material Properties and Assumptions

For a general discussion on the effects of variations in material properties and assumptions, see Section 3.8.1.4.3.d.

h. See attached.

← THIS CHANGE REQUEST

3.8.3.4.3 Expected Behavior Under Load

The methods of analysis and design used for these structures predict the behavior of the as constructed system. The analytical techniques allow for discontinuities, changes in section and materials such that these effects can be allowed for in the structural design. No impairment of

Add new sub-item "h" to Section 3.8.3.4.2 as follows:

h. Analysis of Drywell Personnel Airlock Shield Door Structural Support System

Potential Issue Form (PIF)# 96-0141 documented that analysis performed using design basis accident loading combinations resulted in certain limited components within the structural support system for the drywell personnel airlock shield doors being stressed beyond design basis allowables required elsewhere within USAR Section 3.8 when the shield doors are in an open position during Operational Conditions 1,2 or 3. The shield doors may need to be open for limited time periods during plant startup and shutdown to perform specific activities such as inspections for piping flange leaks. In the closed position, design basis stress allowables are satisfied within the door structural support system.

Subsequent structural analyses have confirmed that the overall design function of the doors with respect to plant nuclear safety has been maintained. More specifically, the shield door structural support system is adequate to ensure that:

1. Safety related systems/components supported by 620'-6" structural steel platform (which also supports the shield door monorail) are not affected in their ability to perform their intended design function.
2. The monorail system supporting the shield doors will preclude falldown of the doors under accident loading conditions.

The analyses supporting the above conclusions utilized certain alternate analytical techniques and acceptance criteria (as compared to pertinent design basis criteria within Sections 3.7 and 3.8) that are only applicable through plant operational cycle 6. The alternate criteria used operability guidance from NRC Generic Letter 91-18, as well as other interim design criteria changes such as the use of modified loading combinations. Refer to letter PY-CEI/NRR-2030L for a more detailed discussion of the alternate design criteria. A long-term resolution to this issue is required to be completed prior to restart from the sixth refueling outage.

| PLANT UNIT AND/OR CONDITION | SIGNIFICANT EVENT | # OF PERIODS | CONDITION (ELEVATION) | TEMPERATURE (°F) | RELATIVE HUMIDITY (% AT 70°F) | PRESSURE | GAMMA RADIATION DOSE | | BETA RADIATION DOSE | | SUPPLEMENTARY DATA |
|---|------------------------------------|--------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|------------------------|--|--|
| | | | | | | | MAX DOSE RATE (RAD/HR) | INTEGRATED DOSE (RAD) | MAX DOSE RATE (RAD/HR) | INTEGRATED DOSE (RAD) | |
| ZONE CT-1 (HARSH) AREA ABOVE REFUELING FLOOR (CONTINUED FROM B-022-020) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ACCIDENT | LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT | 1 | 1 HR 24 HRS 30 DAYS 100 DAYS 180 DAYS | | | | 3.8x10 ⁸ | 1.2x10 ⁹ 3.5x10 ⁹ 1.2x10 ¹⁰ 2.8x10 ¹⁰ 3.1x10 ¹⁰ | 2.1x10 ⁷ | 0.2x10 ⁸ 1.2x10 ⁸ 2.5x10 ⁸ 6.2x10 ⁸ 1.1x10 ⁹ | (8) |
| ZONE CT-2 (HARSH) AREA ABOVE SUPPRESSION POOL | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NORMAL | NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION | 1 | 2363 HRS 3485 HRS 236.616 HRS | 104 80 91 | 90 70 50 | ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERE | 2.5x10 ⁻³ (14) | 8.8x10 ⁰ | HELDIBLE | HELDIBLE | (4) (8) |
| ABNORMAL | LOSS OF HVAC | 1 | 1/2 HRS | 137 | 97 70 | ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERE | | | | | (8) |
| ABNORMAL | SAFETY RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE | 1 | 0 MIN 30 MIN 2 HRS 3 HRS 4 HRS 5 HRS 6 HRS 7 HRS 8 HRS 9 HRS 10 HRS 11 HRS 12 HRS 13 HRS 17 HRS | 90.0 94.6 103.0 110.7 117.7 118.1 118.9 119.1 119.9 120.0 118.1 115.1 114.7 109.2 105.0 101.7 90.0 | 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 | ATMOSPHERE 1.1 PSIG 1.4 PSIG 1.7 PSIG 1.9 PSIG 1.9 PSIG 1.8 PSIG 1.6 PSIG 1.5 PSIG 1.4 PSIG 1.2 PSIG 1.0 PSIG 0.8 PSIG 0.6 PSIG | 2.1x10 ¹ 2.5x10 ³ | HELDIBLE | HELDIBLE | | |
| ABNORMAL | TOTAL NON-ACCIDENT INTEGRATED DOSE | | | | | | | 2.7x10 ⁸ | | | SUM OF SPWD TRANSIENTS PLUS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION RADIATION DOSES |
| ACCIDENT | LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT | 1 | 0.0 SEC 1.5 SEC 3.0 SEC 6.0 SEC 10 SEC 15.0 SEC 30 MIN 60 MIN 3 HRS 18 HRS 10 DAYS 180 DAYS | 90 70 85 97 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 | 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 | 0.0 PSIG 0.3 PSIG 0.6 PSIG 0.8 PSIG 0.9 PSIG 1.0 PSIG 1.1 PSIG 1.2 PSIG 1.3 PSIG 1.4 PSIG 1.5 PSIG 1.6 PSIG | 1.4x10 ⁸ | 2.7x10 ⁸ 8.7x10 ⁸ 2.9x10 ⁹ 2.4x10 ⁹ 3.2x10 ⁹ 3.6x10 ⁹ | 2.1x10 ⁷ | 0.2x10 ⁸ 1.3x10 ⁸ 2.5x10 ⁸ 6.2x10 ⁸ 8.8x10 ⁸ 1.1x10 ⁹ | (8) |

THIS CHANGE REQUEST

- NOTES:
- THE DURATION SHOWN IS FOR EACH OCCURRENCE OF THE LISTED SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION. HOURS REPRESENT THE TIME FOR WHICH THE MAXIMUM MINIMUM AND NORMAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE TEMPERATURE OCCURS OVER THE POSTULATED 10 YEAR PLANT LIFE. THE CYCLE LISTED FOR THE NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION REPRESENTS THIS 10 YEAR DURATION MINOR ANY SIGNIFICANT TRANSCIENTS. THE SUM OF THE NORMAL AND THE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE EQUAL 10 YEARS (1000,000 HOURS).
 - CONDITION DURATION DOES NOT APPLY TO PERCENT RELATIVE HUMIDITY. PERCENT RELATIVE HUMIDITY IN RELATION TO SPECIFIED TIME DURATIONS HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED EXCEPT FOR HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK TRANSIENTS.
 - INTEGRATED GAMMA RADIATION IS OVER 40 YEARS FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND 180 DAYS FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, RADIATION DOSES ARE BASED ON RELEASES INSIDE CONTAINMENT ONLY, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
 - TEMPERATURES SHOWN OCCUR DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATING MODES. THESE NORMAL PLANT OPERATING MODES ENCLOSED THE FOLLOWING:
 - NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION
 - NOT STANDBY OCCURS APPROXIMATELY
 - NORMAL SHUTDOWN OCCURS APPROXIMATELY 2.7 TIMES PER YEAR FOR 30 DAYS
 - CONTINUATION OF SHUTDOWN OCCURS APPROXIMATELY 1 TIME PER YEAR FOR 30 DAYS
 - TESTING DURATIONS VARY
 MINIMUM TEMPERATURES SHOWN ARE BASED ON SYSTEM OPERATION DURING THE ABOVE NORMAL PLANT OPERATING MODES. MINIMUM TEMPERATURES FOR THE PLANT OFF WHEN IN-14 PURGE AND HEAT SYSTEM OPERATING OR TOTAL SHUTDOWN CONDITION ARE NOT SHOWN. DURING THE PLANT OFF CONDITION OR WHEN IN-14 SYSTEM OPERATING THE PLANT HEATING SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 60° F.
 - DELETED
 - LOSS OF HVAC IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE TABLES MEANS LOSS OF NON-SAFETY HVAC DUE TO A LOSS OF OPPOSITE POWER LOOP. THE TEMPERATURES SHOWN ARE BASED ON AN ASSUMED INITIAL TEMPERATURE EQUAL TO THE NORMAL PLANT OPERATING CONDITION MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE.
 - THIS AREA IS SUBJECT TO WATER SPRAY FROM THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM. THE WATER DENSITY OF THE SPRAY IS AS NOTED IN SECTION 2.11.5.1.2 OF THE ESHA. DURATION OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAYS IS CONTROLLED ADMINISTRATIVELY, HOWEVER PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SHALL STATE THAT THE SPRAYS SHALL BE TERMINATED AT A MAXIMUM OF 30 HOURS POST ACCIDENT. SPRAYS MAY BE TURNED ON AGAIN IF REDUCED TO 1 INCH CONTAINMENT AIRSPACE TEMPERATURE 185° F. REACTIVATION OF SPRAYS COULD BE FOLLOWS ANY TIME DURING THE POSTULATED 100 DAY ACCIDENT.
 - FOR QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT TO AN ATWS EVENT, A RADIATION ENVIRONMENT EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE GIVEN LOCA DOSES MAY BE USED.
 - FOR TYPICAL NORMAL OPERATION RADIATION SOURCES REFER TO PAR 2.11.5.1.1.
 - AREAS WITHIN THE AREAS WHICH ARE 60" IN 61.590'-4" NEED NOT CONSIDER HELDIBLE RADIATION IN THESE AREAS ARE SHELDIBLE WITH CONCRETE BY THE CONTAINMENT PER AS SHOWN ON SHEET B-015-012.
 - EQUIPMENT IS SUBJECT TO SUBMERGENCE BETWEEN ELEVATIONS 983'-6" AND 612'-6" FROM AND SPRAY OCCUR FROM ELEVATIONS 612'-6" TO 623'-4". THE DURATION IS 5 SECONDS.
 - PORTIONS OF ZONES CT-2 AND CT-4 DIRECTLY BELOW OPEN BRATING ON ZONES CT-1 AND CT-8 ELEVATIONS MAY BE SUBJECT TO RUN-OFF DRIPPING FROM CONTAINMENT SPRAYS.
 - ABOVE CONTAINMENT ELEVATION 730'-6" THE STRATIFIED TEMPERATURES FOLLOWING A RWCU LINE BREAK WILL BE 220° F FROM 0 TO 3 HOURS POST LOCA.

(Rev. 7 3/95)

REFERENCE DRAWINGS:
B-022-001
B-022-002

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
ILLUMINATING COMPANY

Environmental Conditions
for Containment Building

Figure 3.11-21
(Dwg. B-022-021)

THIS CHANGE REQUEST

14. As Reactor power increases, dose rates at the Drywell Personnel Airlock Shield Doors will increase linearly. The gamma/neutron dose rate adjacent to the shield doors at 100% power, with the shield doors open, will be 45mrem/hr. Access to the 599' containment and drywell with the reactor at power and the shield doors open will be controlled in accordance with Health Physics procedures.