NRC Form 366
(10-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 0	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	0 4	8 5	8 5	—	0 0 4	—	0 0	0 3	0 7	8 5	McGuire - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
5		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Scott Gewehr - Licensing	7 0 4 — 3 7 3 - 7 5 8 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 4, 1985, a small (½ inch by 1¼ inch) hole was discovered in the floor of the Control Room. The hole was in a metal plate which covered a fire barrier penetration, thus rendering the fire barrier inoperable. The origin of the hole is unknown. Following the discovery, a fire watch was established, pending repair of the hole.

The Unit was in Mode 5 at the time of discovery.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

INTRODUCTION:

On February 4, 1985, at approximately 1030, Station Support Division (SSD) personnel discovered a one half inch by a one and one quarter inch (½" x 1¼") hole in the Control Room floor under control board 2MC11. The hole was through the metal plate covering the fire barrier penetration 767-91.0-2. The hole was over a section of the barrier that had not been filled with fire resistant foam. A work request (W/R) was issued to repair the hole. Due to the fire barrier being inoperable, a continuous fire watch is being maintained in the Control Room as required by Technical Specification 3.7.11.

Unit 2 was in Mode Five at the time of discovery.

This incident is classified as an administrative deficiency, because of insufficient administrative control over the fire barrier penetrations. An oversight by two individuals could result in work being performed on a fire barrier penetration without proper documentation.

EVALUATION:

While working in the control board cabinet 2MC11, SSD personnel noticed a hole in the metal plate covering the foam fire barrier. Operations personnel were notified, and they declared the penetration inoperable and started a continuous fire watch. Upon closer inspection of the hole, it appeared that the hole had been made by using a drill and drilling several holes and then knocking the metal piece out with a hammer. The hole appears to be too irregular to have been made with normal cutting tools (a punch). An inspection of the other control board fire penetrations revealed a hole under the corresponding Unit 1 control board (1MC11), but the hole was foamed closed. Both holes seemed to have been made the same way and for a similar purpose since they are both in the same location, but on different units.

Even though there was no foam under the metal plate on Unit 2, it served as an adequate fire barrier until the hole was made. A metal box was welded to the bottom of the plate with foam on the outside. According to Maintenance personnel, this arrangement constitutes an acceptable fire barrier. An inspection of the metal box revealed no indication that it had ever been foamed.

A review of the Outstanding Fire Penetrations Log from November 3, 1983 to February 19, 1985 revealed that the penetration had been opened for two different nuclear station modifications. The penetration was closed after completion. The SSD supervisor responsible for the work stated that all they did was pull cables through existing foam. He stated that they did not cut any holes in the metal plate.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A random sample of the fire penetrations are visually inspected every eighteen months. The sample consists of 10 percent of the total number of fire penetrations on that elevation on each unit. The procedure has been performed four times to date. These fire barrier inspections inspect the foam and fiberboard degradation. A review of the past inspecton results revealed that this penetration had never been selected to be inspected. The last time this penetration was inspected was when it was first foamed. The hole is located in the floor of control board 1MC11 and is difficult to see when the cabinet is open due to poor lighting conditions in the cabinet. The hole is also difficult to see from the floor in the cable spreading room due to all the cable trays obstructing vision.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate: The penetration was declared inoperable and a continuous fire watch is being maintained in the Control Room.

Subsequent: A work request was issued to close the hole with fire resistant foam. This will be completed by April 1, 1985.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

A fire in the cable spreading room would be discovered very quickly since it would actuate the fire protection system in that room. A hole in the floor would hasten its discovery because of the smoke entering the Control Room through the hole. In the cable spreading room, there is no combustible material near the hole. In the Control Room, some cables are within a foot of the hole. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

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VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

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March 7, 1985

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Docket No. 50-370
LER 370/85-04

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 370/85-04 concerning an inoperable fire barrier in the Control Room which is submitted in accordance with §50.73 (a)(i). This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

SAG:slb

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
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