



November 15, 1984 RBG-19483 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV, Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Mr. Martin:





On October 16, 1984, GSU notified Region IV by telephone that it had determined DR-253 to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). This deficiency concerns the limit switch compartment covers on Limitorque SMB-060 Valve Operators. The attachment to this letter is GSU's final 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) with regard to this deficiency.

Sincerely,

JE Bocker

J. E. Booker Manager-Engineering, Nuclear Fuels & Licensing River Bend Nuclear Group

JEN PJD/1p

Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

INPO

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IE-27/1

ATTACHMENT

November 15, 1984 RBG-19483

DR-253 Limit Switch Compartment Covers on Limitorque SMB-000 Valve Operators

Background and Description of the Problem

Several Limitorque SMB-000 valve operators that were supplied with standard size limit switch compartment covers have sustained damage to terminal blocks, wire lugs, and wire insulation while removing and/or replacing the cover, due to an extremely close fit around the limit switch compartment components on actuators with double limit switches. The maximum component protrusion exceeds the cover clearance dimensions for that axis by 1/8", therefore, the cover will not go on straight and must be offset in order to be installed.

Safety Implication

Some of the safety related systems impacted by this problem are standby liquid control, closed cooling water-reactor plant, service water-standby, hydrogen mixing purge and recombiner, and MSIV positive leakage control. In all, 66 safety related valves are affected by this problem. The nature of the valve actuator damage could cause the damaged valve to fail to operate when required. Due to the quantity of safety related valves impacted by this problem and their demonstrated susceptibility to damage, it is conservatively assumed that the deficiency could have adversely affected the safe operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limitorque's letter of August 27, 1984 on this subject, 1/4" of material will be removed from the cover internal flanges that are parallel to the motor center line. This will result in a 1/2" increase in the opening and will relieve the clearance problem. Also, the motor/heater terminal block will be removed and replaced with ring tongue splices insulated in accordance with the electrical installation specification 248.000. Engineering and Design Coordination Report No. C-26032 will be issued to implement the corrective action addressed above.