

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/84-27(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

Meeting At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, IL

Meeting Conducted: October 11, 1984

Report Prepared by: *J. P. Patterson*
J. P. Patterson
Emergency Preparedness Analyst

November 6, 1984
Date

Approved By: *M. P. Phillips*
M. P. Phillips, Chief
Emergency Preparedness Section

November 6, 1984
Date

Meeting Summary

Meeting on October 11, 1984 (Report No. 50-346/84-27(DRSS))

Areas Discussed: A special meeting was conducted to discuss inspection findings resulting from Region III's observations of the July 31, 1984, emergency preparedness exercise of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The meeting involved 8 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.

DETAILS

1. Meeting Attendees

Toledo Edison Company

T. Myers, Nuclear Services Director
J. Hirsch, Emergency Planning Supervisor
G. Reed, Toledo Edison Consultant
M. Fertel, Toledo Edison Consultant

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III

M. Phillips, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section
J. Patterson, Emergency Preparedness Analyst

2. Meeting Details

This meeting was held at the request of the licensee to discuss the inspection findings and weaknesses as specified in Inspection Report No. 50-346/84-14, which resulted from Region III's observation of the July 31, 1984, emergency preparedness exercise at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Licensee representatives wished to discuss the bases for five of the exercise weaknesses listed in the report, which required a licensee reply. Items of discussion are listed as follows:

Exercise Weakness No. 1 - Incomplete Scenario with Several Technical Errors

The licensee was informed that several data sheets and messages were missing in the scenario package sent to Region III. The scenario as used had several technical errors. One example was the unrealistically high release rates indicated in the contingency messages, when compared with scenario data for other plant parameters. The licensee stated that errors in the scenario data were inadvertently provided to the Technical Support Center (TSC), although they had been corrected by the Control Room controller. This scenario data error was not corrected in the TSC, nor did the Control Room inform the TSC of the necessary corrections. NRC recommended that someone skilled in plant operations, preferably a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), be assigned to prepare and develop the entire scenario. The licensee agreed with this, but felt it would be difficult to obtain an available SRO.

Exercise Weakness No. 2 - Poor Activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Radiation Testing Laboratory, Emergency Control Center, and Radiation Monitoring Teams

The licensee explained that some of the 16 people milling around in the TSC after its activation represented non-players who were in training and observing unofficially. These individuals were not identified; however,

and probably were mistaken for participants. NRC agreed that the licensee's response to the TSC activation problems should include this information. Also the licensee stated that they would identify in their TSC activation procedures how to distinguish between those required for the exercise and onlookers, if onlookers are to be permitted within the TSC. The licensee representatives agreed in general with NRC's comments on the disorganized activation of the Emergency Control Center (ECC). The licensee indicated that they plan to do away with the long list of Emergency Duty Officers and change to one emergency title with some alternates for various positions. The disorganized activation of the Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) and the Radiation Testing Laboratory (RTL) was discussed along with the NRC basis for this finding. One exception to our findings was made. The licensee stated that an inventory list of equipment for the RMTs was being followed, but not noticed by the NRC observer.

Exercise Weakness No. 3 - Lack of Communications Coordination between TSC and the Control Room and Exercise Weakness No. 4 - Lack of Trending of Critical Plant Data by TSC or ECC

The licensee and NRC representatives agreed that better coordination of the communication between the TSC and the Control Room was needed in this exercise. Data affecting scenario plant status were changed in the Control Room but not correspondingly in the TSC. A licensee representative stated that the TSC was asked by the ECC to hold up its activities until the Control Room caught up with the activities of the General Emergency. It was suggested to the licensee that the Emergency Action Level (EAL) for a General Emergency should be better defined. NRC stated that lack of trending of critical plant data, such as the primary to secondary leak rate, was evident in both the TSC and the ECC. Crucial data calculated but not available in the data acquisition system should be trended. The licensee indicated that someone will be assigned to trend the release rate and radionuclide composition of the release in future exercises.

Exercise Weakness No. 5 - No Inplant Radiation Monitoring Data Supplied to Operational Support Center

The licensee took exception to our inspection report statements in Exercise Weakness No. 5 that some teams left the Operational Support Center (OSC) without a briefing concerning routes to follow and other actions to minimize radiation dose. They stated that the teams got their briefings at the Health Physics Monitoring Room, a separate part of the OSC. The teams then left this room to go to the Radiation Access Control Area (RACA).

The licensee also stated that Chemistry and Radiation Testers (C&RT) did accompany the repair teams for radiation monitoring surveillance. The NRC observer was unaware that briefings and accompaniment by C&RTs for the repair teams were being made from a location other than the OSC Conference Room. The OSC Conference Room was not informed of changing radiation levels in the plant or cumulative radiation doses for the repair team.

Other Topics Discussed

Inadequate Control Room logkeeping was discussed. NRC gave examples of what information should be included in this log and also recommended a full-time logkeeper for the Control Room.

The licensee stated that the Public Policy & Procedures (Public Information Plan) was sent to the Region III Public Information Officer. Three copies of the Corporate Emergency Plan will be sent to the Region III Incident Response Center and two copies to NRC Headquarters to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirements. There were headsets available in the TSC for use as we recommended in the report; however, according to the licensee, the communicators chose not to use them.

NRC stated that training was one of our major concerns in their emergency preparedness program. Management authority and responsibility for the program were discussed briefly.

3. Meeting Conclusion

The licensee and NRC agreed on a new response date of November 2, 1984, for the licensee to respond to the exercise weaknesses identified in the appendix to the letter of August 27, 1984, and the accompanying Inspection Report No. 50-346/84-14.