



Carolina Power & Light Company

SERIAL: NLS-84-491

NOV 30 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Attention: Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-324/LICENSE NO. DPR-62  
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Dear Mr. Vassallo:

By telecon held on October 22, 1984, Carolina Power & Light Company (the Company) was requested to respond to questions 2, 3, and 4 raised in your letter dated May 7, 1984 as they apply to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2. In response to this request, the Company hereby confirms its belief that:

- i. In performing the review of the methodology to identify equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2), the following steps were addressed:
  - a. A list was generated of safety-related electric equipment as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.49 required to remain functional during or following design-basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or High Energy Line Break (HELB) Accidents. The LOCA/HELB accidents are the only design-basis accidents believed to result in significantly adverse environments to electrical equipment which is required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. The list was based on reviews of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), and electrical distribution diagrams;
  - b. The elementary diagrams of the safety-related electrical equipment identified in Step a were reviewed to identify auxiliary devices electrically connected directly into the control or power circuitry of the safety-related equipment (e.g., automatic trips) whose failure due to postulated environmental conditions could prevent required operation of the safety-related equipment and;
  - c. The operation of the safety-related systems and equipment were reviewed to identify directly mechanically connected auxiliary systems with electrical components which are necessary for the required operation of the safety-related equipment (e.g., cooling water or lubricating systems). This involved the review of P&IDs, component technical manuals, and/or systems descriptions in the FSAR.
  - d. Nonsafety-related electrical circuits indirectly associated with the electrical equipment identified in Step a by common power supply or physical proximity were considered by a review of the electrical

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
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design including the use of applicable industry standards (e.g., IEEE, NEMA, ANSI, UL, and NEC) and the use of properly coordinated protective relays, circuit breakers, and fuses for electrical fault protection.

- 2. Design basis events which could potentially result in a harsh environment, including flooding outside containment, were addressed in identifying safety-related electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1).
- 3. Electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3) is R.G. 1.97 Category 1 and 2 equipment or that justification has been provided for any such equipment not included in the environmental qualification program.

Should you have any questions regarding this issue, please contact Mr. Sherwood Zimmerman (919) 836-3242.

Yours very truly,



A. B. Cutter - Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

MAT/crs (891MAT)

- cc: Mr. D. O. Myers (NRC-BNP)
- Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)
- Mr. M. Grotenhuis (NRC)

A. B. Cutter, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief; and the sources of his information are officers, employees, contractors, and agents of Carolina Power & Light Company.

*Lisa M. Randall*  
Notary (Seal)

My commission expires: 5/18/88

