



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 126

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 9, 1995, as supplemented November 9, 1995, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would relocate Surveillance Requirement 4.6.6.1.d.3 for attaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment from TS 3.6.6.1, Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS), to 3.6.6.2, Secondary Containment. The changes would also revise the Action Statement of LCO for both Section 3.6.6.2 to specify that the conditions and required actions associated with TS 3.6.6.1 and TS 3.6.6.2 are not both required to be entered when either TS 3.6.6.1 or TS 3.6.6.2 is entered. These changes would recognize the direct impact of boundary integrity on the drawdown capability and decouple Sections 3.6.6.1 and 3.6.6.2. The effect of these changes would be to allow the licensee to make planned breaches of the secondary containment in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 by entering Action Statement of LCO 3.6.6.2 without having to enter Action Statement of LCO 3.6.6.1. The Action Statement of LCO for TS 3.6.6.2 requires that operability of the secondary containment boundary be restored within 24 hours or that the plant shall be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours. The November 9, 1995, letter provided clarifying information and did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The amendment also makes some administrative changes. Definition 1.12, "Secondary Containment Boundary," is relocated to the Bases, and the term "Secondary Containment Boundary" is changed to "Secondary Containment" in various places.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has historically entered into Action Statement of LCO 3.6.6.2 whenever a breach of secondary containment was planned. Action Statement of LCO 3.6.6.2 requires that in the event the secondary containment boundary operability is not maintained, operability must be restored within 24 hours. The licensee, as a result of a current interpretation of its TS, enters Surveillance Requirements for other connected systems that are also affected

such as the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Systems (SLRS) during planned breaches of secondary containment. A conflict was identified relative to entry into the Surveillance and Action Requirements of LCO 3.6.6.1, (SLCRS) which would have required entry into TS 3.0.3, and consequently, a plant shutdown for any planned breach.

The LCO for TS 3.6.6.1 states that two SLCRS shall be operable; the associated Action Statement addresses actions to be taken if one such system is inoperable but does not address actions to be taken if both systems are inoperable. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.6.1.d.3 requires that at least every 18 months the SLCRS is demonstrated operable by verifying that each system can draw a vacuum of 0.4 inches of water as measured at a specific height in the Auxiliary Building. Were this Surveillance Requirement to be performed while there was a breach in the secondary containment, the licensee anticipates that both systems would fail; therefore, both systems would have to be considered inoperable and the licensee would have to enter TS 3.0.3.

The proposed changes to the TS will resolve this problem by decoupling TS 3.6.6.1 and 3.6.6.2; the licensee will, when breaching the secondary containment, enter only the Action Statements for TS 3.6.6.2. In the event that secondary containment operability is not maintained, the Action Statement for LCO 3.6.6.2 requires that secondary containment operability must be restored within 24 hours. The staff has determined that 24 hours is a reasonable completion time considering the limited leakage design of containment and the low probability of a design basis accident occurring during this period. The staff recognizes that the performance of the SLCRS will be degraded during the time that the containment is breached; however, the system will still be effective in reducing the levels of radionuclides released to the outside environment in the unlikely event of a design basis accident occurring during this period. This situation was recognized by the staff and has been addressed in the improved standard technical specifications for Westinghouse plants (NUREG-1431). The staff considers the proposed changes to TS 3.6.6.1 and 3.6.6.2 acceptable.

The relocation of Definition 1.12 to the Bases and the changing of "Secondary Containment Boundary" to "Secondary Containment" are administrative. The staff finds these changes acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined

that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 39445). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: February 5, 1996