NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
"Missed Surveillance Test"

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	2 1	8 5	8 5	- 0 0 5	- 0 0		0 3	2 2	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Paul J. Hamilton - Senior Plant Engineer	AREA CODE 6 1 7 — 7 4 6 - 7 9 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO		- -	- -	- -

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 2/21/85, the Rod Block Monitor Functional and Calibration surveillance tests required by the Technical Specifications (T.S.) were identified as having exceeded the required test interval.

Cause was due to non-licensed, utility personnel error which was influenced by a misinterpretation of surveillance report information and the complexity of starting up from a 13-month refueling and recirculation pipe replacement outage.

Corrective action was to perform the tests and counsel personnel.

This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3	8 5	— 0 0 5	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 2/21/85, during a review of surveillance tracking reports, it was determined that the Rod Block Monitor Functional and Calibration surveillance tests had not been performed as required by the Technical Specifications (T.S.). Reactor power level was approximately 100% at the time of discovery.

Both tests were performed immediately, but should have been done in mid-January 1985 when a reactor power level of 30% (required by procedure for completion of the tests) was achieved after starting up from Refueling Outage No. 6.

The problem occurred when the responsible person did not utilize all three reports issued by the surveillance tracking system. Instead, priority was put on one report, a list of tests within the +25% allowable time frame. The two tests had been incorrectly listed as overdue and appeared on another report.

Investigation determined that both tests had been rescheduled for startup since it was impossible to complete the tests during the refueling outage. Normally, this would have been appropriate. However, the plant was brought critical on 12/24/84, but 30% power was not achieved until mid-January 1985, due to complex testing required as a result of the recirculation piping replacement. This unusually long time frame between startup and 30% power resulted in the two surveillance tests being incorrectly categorized as overdue and prevented them from being listed on the priority report at the appropriate time.

Corrective action was to initiate a review of the remaining overdue tests. No T.S. tests were identified. In addition, the responsible individual now realizes the importance of all three reports issued by the surveillance tracking program.

This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

A previous LER, 84-003, describes a similar occurrence.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
800 BOYLSTON STREET
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WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

March 22, 1985
BECo Ltr. #85-059

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket Number 50-293
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report 85-005-00, "Missed Surveillance Test," is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

If there are any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,

W D Harrington

W. D. Harrington

PH:caw

Enclosure: LER 85-005-00

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Standard BECo LER Distribution

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