

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

#### PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-277

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 107 License No. DPR-44

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, et al. (the licensee) dated September 14, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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#### Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 107 are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Stolz, Chief

Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 1985

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## ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 107

## FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44

## DOCKET NO. 50-277

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Insert
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234a
234b
234c
234d
234e
235a
236b

Unit 2

# LIST OF TABLES

Table	Title	Page
4.8.3.c	Maximum Values for Minimum Detectable Levels of Activity	2164-6
3.14.C.1	Fire Detectors	240m
3.15	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation	240u
3.15	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	240v

Amendment No. Yd2, 104, 107 (Updated March 18, 1985),

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LIMITING	CONDITIONS	FOR	OPERATION
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- 3.11.D.Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems
- 3.11.D.1 During all modes of operation all snubbers on safety-related systems shall be operable except as noted in 3.11.D.2 and 3.11.D.3 below. Snubbers on non-safety related systems are excluded from this requirement if their failure or failure of the system on which installed has no adverse effect on a safety-related system.
- 3.11.D.2 During operation in the cold shutdown or refueling modes, snubbers located on systems required to be operable shall be operable except as noted in 3.11.D.3.

3.11.D.3 With one or more snubbers inoperable under the requirements of 3.11.D.1, within 72 hours, replace or restore the inoperable snubber to the operable status and perform an engineering evaluation per specification 4.11.D.6. If these requirements cannot be met, declare the supported system inoperable and follow the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation for that System.

## Amendment No. 33, 797, 107

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.D. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems

4.11.D.1

Snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.6.G.

#### 4.11.D.2

Snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall be visually inspected according to the following schedule.

No. of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection Period

Next Visual Inspection Period

0	18	mo.	+	25%
1	12	mo.	+	25%
2	6	mo.	+	25%
3,4	4	mo.	+	25%
5,6,7	2	mo.	+	25%
3 or more	1	mo.	+	25%

The required inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time. The provisions for extending surveillance frequency included in Section 1.0 Definitions do not apply. Snubbers may be categorized in two groups, "accessible" or "inaccessible", based on their accessibility for inspection during reactor operation. These two groups may be inspected independently according to the above schedule.

LIMITING CONDITIONS F	OR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	4.11.D.3
	Visual inspection of snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall verify that 1) there are no indications of damage or impaired operability, 2) attach ments are secure, and 3) there is freedom of movement if this can be verified without disconnecting the snubber.
	Snubbers which appear to be inoperable may be made operable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that 1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other generically susceptable snubbers; and 2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as found condition and determined operable per Specification 4.11.D.7 or 4.11.D.8, as applicable. When the fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be determined to be inoperable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval.
	4.11.D.4
	Functional Test
•	a) Once each operating cycle, during shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of each type of (mechanical or hydraulic) snubber required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For every unit found to be inoperable an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all
endment No. JØJ, 107	snubbers of that type have been tested. The functional test requirements for mechanical

## Amendment No. 101, 107

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	snubbers will not take effect until the first refueling outage commencing one year after the issuance of Amendment No. 101/103 to the Technical Specifications.
	<ul> <li>b) The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include various configurations, operating environments, sizes, and capacities of snubbers. At least 25% of the sample shall include snubbers from the following categories:</li> </ul>
	<ol> <li>The first snubber away from each reactor nozzle.</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Snubbers within five feet of heavy equipment (valves, pumps, turbines, motors)</li> </ol>
	3. Snubbers connected to safety/relief valve discharge piping within 10 feet of the valve.
	c) If any snubber selected for functional test either fails to lock up or fails to move, the cause shall be evaluated and if the failure is caused by manufacturing or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement is independent of the requirements above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.
	d) Snubbers which are especially difficult to remove or are in high radiation areas during shutdown (dose greater than 100 mrem/hour) shall be included in the representative sample except for those snubbers specifically exempted by the NRC.
Amendment No. 101, 107	4.11.D.5 In addition to the regular sample, snubbers required to be operable under the provisions

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	of 3.11.D.1 which failed the previous functional test shall be retested during the next testing cycle. If such a failed snubber was replaced, both the replacement snubber and the repaired snubber (if i had been repaired and installe in another position) shall be retested. The test results of these snubbers may not be included for the resampling of 4.11.D.4.a.
	4.11.D.6
	For snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shal be performed to determine a) mode of failure, and b) if there is any adverse effect on the supported piping or components due to the snubber inoperability.
	4.11.D.7 Hydraulic Snubbers
	Functional Test Criteria: Functional test shall verify that:
	<ul> <li>Restraining action is achieved within specified range of velocity or acceleration in both compression and tension.</li> </ul>
	b) Snubber bleed rate is within the specified range in both tension and compression. Snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load shall have this capability verified.
	4.11.D.8
	Mechanical Snubber Functional Test Criteria: Functional tests shall verify that: a) The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is

# Amendment No. 101,107

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#### 3.11 BASES

## Alternate Beat Sink

The alternate heat sink is provided as an alternate source of cooling water to the plants in the unlikely event of loss of the normal heat sink (Conowingo Pond) or the maximum credible flood. For the condition of loss of the normal heat sink, the contained volume of water (approximately 3.7 million gallons, which corresponds to a gauge reading of 17') provides a minimum of seven days cooling water to both plants for decay heat removal. The operability requirements for the alternate heat sink are specified in Specification 3.9.

## C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels

The Emergency Shutdown Control Panels are provided to assure the capability of taking the plants to the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

# D. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems

Snubbers are provided to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems are maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. It is therefore required that all snubbers necessary to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or components be operable during reactor operation.

Because the snubber protection is required only during low probability events a period of 72 hours is allowed for repairs or replacements. A determined effort will be made to repair the snubber as soon as possible. This allowable repair period is consistent with the allowable repair items of other safety related components such as RHR pumps, HPCI subsystems, ADS valves and diesel generators.

An engineering analysis must be performed on supported components when a snubber is determined to be inoperable. The purpose of this analysis is to assure that the supported components have not been damaged as a result of the snubber inoperability.

Amendment No. 101, 107

Ten percent of each type (hydraulic or mechanical) of snubber on each unit shall constitute an adequate sample.

High radiation areas (as defined in CFR 10 Part 20.202) means any area, accessible to personnel, in which there exists radiation at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive, in any one hour, a dose in excess of 100 millirem. Snubbers considered especially difficult to remove are those which because of size, weight, or geometry of installation require the use of unusual rigging equipment or arrangements for their removal, or require more than three hours of effort in their removal.

The service life of a snubber is monitored to assure that consideration is taken for the age of the expendable components. The service life is based upon manufacturer's recommendation, service conditions, maintenance history, operating experience and test and inspection results. When the review of service life records reveals that a snubber is nearing the end of its design service life, efforts are made to include that snubber in the next functional test cycle or the service life is reevaluated. The purpose of the reevaluation is to extend the service life based upon experience and information gained during operations. The results of functional testing and inspection may be used to alter the service lives of all snubbers of similar design operating under similar conditions.

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Amendment No. 107, 107



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

#### PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

#### DOCKET NO. 50-278

#### PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 111 License No. DPR-56

- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, et al. (the licensee) dated September 14, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:

## Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 111 are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 1985

## ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 111

## FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56

### DOCKET NO. 50-278

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
vii	vii
234a	234a
234b	234b
234c	234c
234d	234d
234e	234e
234f thru 234s	
235a	235a
236b	236b

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Unit 3

# LIST OF TABLES

Table	Title	Page
4.8.3.c	Maximum Values for Minimum Detectable Levels of Activity	216d-6
3.14.0.1	Fire Detectors	240m
3.15	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation	240u
4.15	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements	240v

Amendment No. 704, 105, 111 vii (Updated March 10, 1985)

#### LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

- 3.11.D.Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems
- 3.11.D.1 During all modes of operation all snubbers on safety-related systems shall be operable except as noted in 3.11.D.2 and 3.11.D.3 below. Snubbers on non-safety related systems are excluded from this requirement if their failure or failure of the system on which installed has no adverse effect on a safety-related system.
- 3.11.D.2 During operation in the cold shutdown or refueling modes, snubbers located on systems required to be operable shall be operable except as noted in 3.11.D.3.

3.11.D.3 With one or more snubbers inoperable under the requirements of 3.11.D.1, within 72 hours, replace or restore the inoperable snubber to the operable status and perform an engineering evaluation per specification 4.11.D.6. If these requirements cannot be met, declare the supported system inoperable and follow the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation for that System.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.D. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems

4.11.D.1

Snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.6.G.

#### 4.11.D.2

Snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall be visually inspected according to the following schedule.

No. of Snubbers Found Inoperable During Inspection Period Next Visual Inspection Period

-	0	18	mo.	+	25%
	1		mo.	-	
	2		mo.		
	3,4		mo.	-	
	5,6,7		mo.		
8	or more	1	mo.	+	25%

The required inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time. The provisions for extending surveillance frequency included in Section 1.0 Definitions do not apply. Snubbers may be categorized in two groups, "accessible" or "inaccessible", based on their accessibility for inspection during reactor operation. These two groups may be inspected independently according to the above schedule.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	4.11.D.3
	Visual inspection of snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 shall verify that 1) there are no indications of damage or impaired operability, 2) attach- ments are secure, and 3) there is freedom of movement if this can be verified without disconnecting the snubber.
	Snubbers which appear to be inoperable may be made operable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that 1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other generically susceptable snubbers; and 2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as found condition and determined operable per Specification 4.11.D.7 or 4.11.D.8, as applicable. When the fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be determined to be inoperable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval.
	4.11.D.4
	Functional Test
	a) Once each operating cycle, during shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of each type of (mechanical or hydraulic) snubber required to be operable under the provisions of 5.11.D.1 shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For every unit found to be inoperable an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all
Amendment No. 703, 111	snubbers of that type have been tested. The functional test
	requirements for mechanical

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requirements for mechanical

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	snubbers will not take effect until the first refueling outage commencing one year after the issuance of Amendment No. 101/103 to the Technical Specifications.
	b) The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include various configurations, operating environments, sizes, and capacities of snubbers. At least 25% of the sample shall include snubbers from the following categories:
	<ol> <li>The first snubber away from each reactor nozzle.</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Snubbers within five feet of heavy equipment (valves, pumps, turbines, motors)</li> </ol>
	3. Snubbers connected to safety/relief valve discharge piping within 10 feet of the valve.
	c) If any snubber selected for functional test either fails to lock up or fails to move, the cause shall be evaluated and if the failure is caused by manufacturing or design deficiency, all snublers of the same design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement is independent of the requirements above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.
	d) Snubbers which are especially difficult to remove or are in high radiation areas during shutdown (dose greater than 100 mrem/hour) shall be included in the representative sample except for those snubbers specifically exempted by the NRC.
mendment No. 703 111	4.11.D.5 In addition to the regular sample, snubbers required to be operable under the provisions

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# Amendment No. 703, 111

IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	of 3.11.D.1 which failed the previous functional test shall be retested during the next testing cycle. If such a failed snubber was replaced, both the replacement snubber and the repaired snubber (if i had been repaired and installe in another position) shall be retested. The test results of these snubbers may not be included for the resampling of 4.11.D.4.a.
	4.11.D.6
	For snubbers required to be operable under the provisions of 3.11.D.1 found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shal be performed to determine a) mode of failure, and b) if there is any adverse effect on the supported piping or components due to the snubber inoperability.
	4.11.D.7 Hydraulic Snubbers
	Functional Test Criteria: Functional test shall verify that:
	<ul> <li>Restraining action is achieved within specified range of velocity or acceleration in both compression and tension.</li> </ul>
	b) Snubber bleed rate is within the specified range in both tension and compression. Snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load shall have this capability verified.
	4.11.D.8
	Mechanical Snubber Functional Test Criteria: Functional tests shall verify that: a) The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum drag force. Drag

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MITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	increased more than 50% since the last functional
	test.
	<li>b) Restraining Action is achieved within the</li>
	specified range of
	velocity or acceleration in both tension and
	compression.
	c) Snubber release rate,
	where required, is within the specified range in
	compression or tension.
	Snubbers specifically required not to displace
	under continuous load
	shall have this capability verified.
	4.11.D.9
	Service Life Monitoring
	A record of the service life of each snubber
	required to be operable
	under the provisions of 3.11.D.1, the date of
	commencement of service
	life, (January 1, 1978, unless otherwise
	specified) and the
	installation and
	maintenance records upon which the service life is
	based shall be maintained.
	Once each operating cycle, these records shall be
	reviewed to verify that no
	snubber service life shall
	be exceeded prior to the next review. If the
	service life will be
	exceeded then either recondition or replace the
	snubbers or re-evaluate
	the service life.

#### 3.11 BASES

#### Alternate Heat Sink

The alternate heat sink is provided as an alternate source of cooling water to the plants in the unlikely event of loss of the normal neat sink (Conowingo Pond) or the maximum credible flood. For the condition of loss of the normal heat sink, the contained volume of water (approximately 3.7 million gallons, which corresponds to a gauge reading of 17') provides a minimum of seven days cooling water to both plants for decay heat removal. The operability requirements for the alternate heat sink are specified in Specification 3.9.

## C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels

The Emergency Shutdown Control Panels are provided to assure the capability of taking the plants to the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

## D. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) on Safety Related Systems

Snubbers are provided to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related systems are maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. It is therefore required that all snubbers necessary to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or components be operable during

reactor operation.

Because the snubber protection is required only during low probability events a period of 72 hours is allowed for repairs or replacements. A determined effort will be made to repair the snubber as soon as possible. This allowable repair period is consistent with the allowable repair items of other safety related components such as RHR pumps, HPCI subsystems, ADS valves and diesel generators.

An engineering analysis must be performed on supported components when a snubber is determined to be inoperable. The purpose of this analysis is to assure that the supported components have not been damaged as a result of the snubber inoperability. Ten percent of each type (hydraulic or mechanical) of snubber on each unit shall constitute an adequate sample.

High radiation areas (as defined in CFR 10 Part 20.202) means any area, accessible to personnel, in which there exists radiation at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive, in any one hour, a dose in excess of 100 millirem. Snubbers considered especially difficult to remove are those which because of size, weight, or geometry of installation require the use of unusual rigging equipment or arrangements for their removal, or require more than three hours of effort in their removal.

The service life of a snubber is monitored to assure that consideration is taken for the age of the expendable components. The service life is based upon manufacturer's recommendation, service conditions, maintenance history, operating experience and test and inspection results. When the review of service life records reveals that a snubber is nearing the end of its design service life, efforts are made to include that snubber in the next functional test cycle or the service life is reevaluated. The purpose of the reevaluation is to extend the service life based upon experience and information gained during operations. The results of functional testing and inspection may be used to alter the service lives of all snubbers of similar design operating under similar conditions.