

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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November 28, 1984

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 4

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station  
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. Denton:

On October 23, 1984 representatives from the NRC's Containment Systems Branch toured the Catawba Units 1 and 2 Containment Buildings as a part of the Staff's review of SER Confirmatory Issue 12, Main Steamline Break Using a Revised Heat Transfer Model. During this tour, the Staff requested a followup response to the following questions.

1. Will valves in the lower containment be in their correct position prior to steam generator tube bundle uncover?

Response:

The valves listed in Table 1 of our October 8, 1984 submittal were reviewed and it was concluded that the valves would be in their correct position before the MSLB or would receive a containment isolation signal to reposition before steam generator tube bundle uncover, with the exception of the pressurizer PORV block valves. Since the PORV's are not expected to open in this event, the block valves should not be required.

2. Discuss any Class IE equipment located in the deadended compartment where the main steamlines penetrate the crane wall.

Response:

The only required Class IE equipment located in the ventilation rooms where the main steamlines penetrate the crane wall is valves ND37A and ND2A (Residual Heat Removal Isolation Valves). Each valve is normally closed and has a redundant, normally closed isolation valve upstream, inside the crane wall. In addition, three of the four valves have power removed during operation as discussed in Section 5.4.4.1 of SSER #3.

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*Appendix  
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*Drawings*

*To: Reg File - 1  
K. Jabbour - 3  
CSB - 3*


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3. Does the position of the guard pipe preclude steam blowdown in the deadended compartment?

Response:

As shown on the attached drawing CN-1491-SM003, the guard pipe is welded to the penetration assembly, thereby precluding steam blowdown from a MSLB in the deadended compartment.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

ROS:s1b

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
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