(RC Form 386 9-83)					LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM APPROVED ONB NO 3150-010 EXPIRES 8/31/85																		
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On 2/13/85, a Reactor Scram occurred due to an error incurred during the performance of a surveillance test procedure. The Reactor was at 100% power and automatically scrammed when a differential pressure instrument was incorrectly valved into service. During the resultant vessel level signal transient, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system automatically initiated.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LE	R NUMBE	PAGE (3)				
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level 100%
- b) Plant Mode 1

Event

On 2/13/84, during performance of a routine surveillance test of the Reactor Feedwater (RFW) Turbine Trip on high Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level instrument, the differential pressure (dp) transmitter which initiates this signal was incorrectly returned to service. This caused a Reactor Protection System trip (+13") and resulted in a Reactor Scram. The technicians performing this surveillance test were unable to perform the test as specified by procedural steps (later determined to be due to inadequate venting of test hoses) and decided to return the instrument to service and seek assistance. While returning the instrument to service, the high side block valve was opened with the equalizing valve not fully shut. This resulted in a pressure transient on the reference and variable legs of various dp transmitters. This pressure transient initiated a Reactor Scram signal (+13") and a HPCS injection signal (-50") even though actual RPV level was approximately +35" (a normal value). The HPCS diesel generator also started, attained rated voltage and remained in standby. The instruments initiating these signals (Reactor Scram, HPCS D/G start and HPCS injection) share common reference sensing points with the instrument being surveilled.

Immediate Corrective Action

Plant conditions were stabilized and a normal scram recovery procedure successfully completed.

Further Corrective Action

- o The instruments which initiated the Reactor Scram and HPCS injection were verified to be in proper calibration.
- The technicians involved were given instructions on the proper manner of valving in & out Reactor vessel level instrumentation during surveillance testing.
- o Shop training will reemphasize the proper manner in which Plant instruments are to be valved into and out of service. This training will also reemphasize the need to ensure venting of the test hoses and equipment used in surveillance testing.
- o All Reactor vessel level instrument isolation valve manifold handles are being color coded to emphasize the importance of this instrumentation. Pressure switch isolation valves that share common reference and variable leg sensing points are also being color coded.
- o An evaluation will be performed of the feasibility of replacing the isolation valves for existing RPV level (differential pressure) transmitters with micrometer type valves. This would limit the pressure transients possible due to incorrect valving sequences by increasing the time required to open these valves. This follows an availability improvement suggestion by the NSSS vendor.

NRC Form 386A (9-63) LICENSEE EVENT RE	UATIO	N	APPROVED OMB NO 31500104 EXPIRES 8/31/85							
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Safety Significance

There was no hazard created to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. All safety systems operated as required to shutdown the Reactor and maintain it in a stable condition. The minimum Reactor vessel level recorded during this event was -20" (HPCS would not normally initiate until the -50" was reached).

Similar Events

None

Special Data Required by Technical Specification 6.9.2 3/4.5.1 (ECCS Injections)

This data is supplied to comply with Plant Technical Specification requirements.

Total accumulated initiation cycles to date = 3 Current usage factor value remains well below 0.70

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397 March 14, 1985

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 85-016

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 85-016 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1644 hours on February 13, 1985.

Very truly yours,

R. Corcoron for J. D. Martin (M/D 927M) WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 85-016

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A)

Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA

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