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ENCLOSURE 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Southern California Edison Co. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Dockets: 50-361; 50-362 Licenses: NPF-10: NPF-15

During an NRC inspection conducted on November 6-9, 1995, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violations are listed below:

License Condition 2.E of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Operating Licenses dated August 25, 1988, requires, in part, that the licensee fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved Physical Security Plan. This includes amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and $10 \ \text{CFR} 50.54(p)$.

A. 10 CFR 73.55(c)(4) requires detection of penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or the isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier in order that adequate response by the security force can be initiated.

Paragraph 6.1.3 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan states that the protected area detection system consists of four types of alarm systems. Figure 6-2 indicates the positions of detection aids on the protected area perimeter. Paragraph 6.9 states that the alarm systems are maintained in operable condition.

Contrary to the above, on November 7, 1995, tests of the protected area detection system identified seven separate protected area, detection zones where attempted penetration of the zones was not detected. The test results indicated that the alarm system was not maintained operable in those locations.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III) (361/9525-01; 362/9525-01).

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B. 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1) requires the licensee to develop and employ compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies.

Paragraph 6.6 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan requires the posting of a security officer equipped with a radio to observe the affected segment pending it's restoration. Further, it states that the compensatory measures will provide the equivalent level of intrusion detection pending the repair of the failed system.

Contrary to the above, on November 9, 1995, the inspector observed an officer posted in such a manner that the compensatory posting did not provide the equivalent level of intrusion detection. Specifically, the officer could not adequately observe a degraded detection zone.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III) (361/9525-02; 362/9525-02).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Southern California Edison Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Arlington, Texas this 22nd day of December

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