

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

85 MAR 6 February 27, 1985  
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BLRD-50-438/84-53  
BLRD-50-439/84-49

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

BELLEVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - VARIOUS DEFICIENCIES INVOLVING LAMBDA  
POWER SUPPLIES - BLRD-50-438/84-53 AND BLRD-50-439/84-49 - SECOND INTERIM  
REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
P. E. Fredrickson on October 25, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR 3511. The first interim report was submitted on November 20, 1984.  
Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report on  
or about May 24, 1985. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this  
deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*D. L. Lambert*

J. W. Hufham, Manager  
Licensing and Regulations

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. James Taylor, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
VARIOUS DEFICIENCIES INVOLVING LAMBDA POWER SUPPLIES  
BLRD-50-438/84-53, BLRD-50-439/84-49  
NCR 3511  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Various deficiencies have been identified with the Lambda power supplies installed in Bailey Controls Company (BCCo) cabinets at Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN). The BCCo cabinets were supplied to TVA by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) on the NSSS contract for BLN. The Lambda power supplies are components of the reactor protection system (RPS), engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS), essential controls and instrumentation (ECI) system, and the nonnuclear instrumentation (NNI) system. The RPS, ESFAS, ECI, and NNI systems are primary safety-related systems which, among other essential functions, provide protection to the reactor core during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break, or a feedwater line break. The subject deficiencies involve missing components, loose connections, incorrectly sized capacitors, corroded transformers, and others.

Interim Progress

TVA is still in the process of evaluating the deficiencies for the purpose of determining appropriate corrective action.